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Safe transportation of hazardous materials is critical as it has a high potential of 
catastrophic accidents depending on the amount of transported product, its hazardous 
characteristics and the environmental conditions. Consequently, an efficient, smart 
and reliable intervention is essential to enhance prediction on the impacts of 
transportation hazards. Although various risk assessment techniques have been used 
in industry and regulatory bodies, they were developed for evaluating risk of 
hazardous materials for fixed installation cases instead of moving risk sources. This 
study applies the Transportation Risk Analysis (TRA), which is an extension of a 
well-known Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) technique in developing and design a 
Smart Advisory Systems (SAS), to determine the safest routes for transportation of 
hazardous materials according to Malaysia scenario. Although a number of Smart 
Advisory Systems (SAS) TRA simulation tools have been developed to assess 
transportation risks, these tools are not user friendly due to the large number of 
variables, complexity of the models and lack of available data for TRA.The proposed 
TRA model in this study aims at minimizing the problems related to SAS simulation 
faced by the previous researchers resulting in an optimum TRA model that is both 
practical and marketable. Several researchers integrate Geographic Information 
System (GIS) with mathematical and simulation models, to develop the required 
databases and expert systems. However, the advantage of using GIS tool is very 
dependent on the functional capability of the latest GIS version to generate a 
comprehensive and updated map. This newly developed SAS simulation software is 
called SMACTRA software, which is designed to be compatible with windows 
operating system. It utilizes Esri and ArcGIS 9.4 to review, analyse and evaluate the 
potential hazards consequences from transportation accidents at any points and 
locations resulting in accurate and precise hazards consequences, and it also predicts 
the survival capability by taking into consideration age and total burn body surface 
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area (TBS) factors. Moreover, some of the hazards consequences from transportation 






Pengangkutan bahan berbahaya dengan selamat adalah kritikal memandangkan ia 
amat berpotensi untuk mengundang bencana sekiranya berlaku kemalangan.Secara 
umumnya kesan bencana dari kemalangan pengangkutan bahan berbahaya bergantung 
kepada beberapa faktor umpamanya jumlah produk yang diangkut, jenis bahan 
berbahaya dan keadaan persekitaran sekeliling. Oleh yang demikian , satu kaedah atau 
pembangunan perkakas yang cekap, pintar dan boleh dipercayai untuk meramal  
kesan-kesan bencana dari pengangkutan bahan-bahan berbahaya amat penting untuk 
direkabentuk. Pelbagai teknik penilaian risiko telah digunakan dalam industri dan 
badan-badan yang mengawal selia undang-undang berkaitan keselamatan dan analisa 
risiko, bagi menilai tahap risiko serta mengenalpasti peluang mengurangkan risiko 
kemalangan dari bahan berbahaya ini. Walaubagaimanapun sebahagian besar 
keputusan penggunaan teknik- teknik penilaian  risiko ini didapati lebih berjaya dan 
tepat bagi kes-kes risiko punca statik berbanding risiko daripada punca- punca 
bergerak. Di dalam kajian ini, Transportation Risk Analysis (TRA), iaitu lanjutan 
daripada teknik analisis risiko kuantitatif (QRA) diaplikasi bagi menentukan laluan-
laluan paling selamat ketika pengangkutan bahan berbahaya. Seterusnya melalui 
penggunaan TRA model ini, suatu Sistem Penasihat Pintar akan direkabentuk untuk 
menilai risiko kemalangan pengangkutan bahan berbahaya berdasarkan senario di 
Malaysia. Oleh itu garis-garis panduan sedia ada bagi model TRA dikaji semula dan 
dianalisis, supaya TRA model yang lebih sesuai dan lebih tepat boleh dihasilkan 
untuk digunakan menurut senario Malaysia. Beberapa Sistem Penasihat Pintar (SAS) 
atau Peralatan simulasi TRA telah dibangunkan untuk menilai risiko pengangkutan 
bahan berbahaya walaubagaimanapun, kebanyakan daripada yang perkakas-perkakas 
tersedia tidak mudahpakai. Ini adalah disebabkan oleh bilangan pembolehubah yang 
digunakan di dalam model yang terlalu banyak, sifat punca-punca bergerak yang 
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terlalu rumit, kekurangan data tersedia / pangkalan data untuk TRA dan kesukaran 
untuk memahami perhubungan yang kompleks di antara unsur- unsur yang terlibat 
semasa analisis. 
 
TRA model yang dicadangkan di dalam kajian adalah bertujuan untuk mengurangkan 
masalah-masalah berkaitan dengan simulasi SAS seperti yang dihadapi oleh 
penyelidik-penyelidik sebelumnya selain memoptimumkan penggunaan TRA model 
di dalam pembangunan perisian simulasi SAS supaya lebih praktikal dan mudah 
dipasarkan. Dalam penilaian risiko beberapa penyelidik telah menggunakan GIS, 
dengan mengintegrasikan GIS dengan formula matematik dan model simulasi, untuk 
membangunkan suatu sistem pengkalan data yang cekap dan sistem pintar. Walau 
bagaimanapun, keupayaan untuk menghasilkan maklumat yang komprehensif kepada 
peta digital amat bergantung kepada kebolehan fungsi- fungsi yang ada pada setiap 
versi GIS yang telah dikemaskini. Perisian simulasi SAS yang baru dibangunkan ini 
dipanggil perisian SMACTRA di mana ia direka bentuk supaya serasi dengan sistem 
pengendalian computer windows. Perisian ini juga menggunakan Esri iaitu ArcGIS 
9.4 bagi semakan semula, analisis dan menilai bahaya akibat kemalangan 
pengangkutan dimana- mana  titik dan lokasi berdasarkan peta yang dijanakan oleh 
komputer dan berupaya untuk mengenal pasti keupayaan mangsa untuk hidup dengan 
mengambilkira pertimbangan keatas faktor umur dan jumlah luas permukaan badan 
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This chapter represents an overview of the entire thesis. Section 1.1 covers the 
background for the Transportation Risk Analysis (TRA). Current trend of TRA 
implementations are presented in section Section 1.2 states the problems that need to 
be solved, aiming for a better designed and reliable Smart Advisory System for the 
transportation of hazardous materials. In the light of that, section 1.3 defines the 
research objectives undertaken in the thesis. Section 1.4 briefly presents the approach 
used, the scope and brief methodology of the performance evaluation and testing of 
the proposed technique.  
 
1.1 Background 
During the last few decades, we have seen a rapid development in chemical industries 
including those related to hazardous materials either explosive, flammable liquids or 
solids, corrosive or poisonous materials [1-4]. These materials sometimes need to be 
transported from one place to another via roads, railways, pipelines or waterways 
which can be extremely harmful to the environment and human health since 
unpredictable accidents may occur along the route [5-7]. Therefore, risk potential 
related to hazardous material transportation has drawn considerable attention from 
local, national and international safety authorities. For instance, Advisory Committee 
on Major Hazards (ACMH) United Kingdom in its report [8-10] suggested the 
government to enforce on safety policy toward company or agency involved with any 
activities related to hazardous materials transportation. This serious attention by 
ACMH towards risk related to hazardous material transportation attracted attention 
from other countries which produce chemical, oil and gas. Previously, to reduce risk 
during transportation of hazardous materials, many governments allow them to use
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only on designated roads, which avoid heavily populated areas. However, hazardous 
material transportation accidental do happen occasionally throughout the world, 
which may lead to a very undesirable consequence including fatalities and injuries 
especially when it happens at a congested population area or sensitive zone area such 
as in a country with limited land space. Therefore, several techniques have been 
introduced in order to identify the safest route for hazardous material transportation. 
Result from transportation risk analysis by using qualitative method has been shown 
to be less accurate since the risk potential from HazMat transportation accident has 
become more complex and the parameters involve  not only limited to population 
density but also include accident rate, length route, meteorological condition and etc.    
 
Among the various technique, quantitative risk analysis (QRA) has been successfully 
applied in a studied risk area to analyze, assess and evaluate hazards from fixed 
facility of chemical process industries (CPI) [8-10]. In the United Kingdom, 
probabilistic safety assessment is not mandatory in the safety report but the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE) find it is easier to accept the conclusion if the risk 
assessment is supported by quantified risk arguments [8]. Up to now, quantitative risk 
criteria have been published most in the UK, as far as the control of land use in the 
vicinity of industrial facilities is concerned. Due to the strength of the QRA technique, 
a similar approach has been established to analyze and to evaluate the impact from 
transportation of hazardous material. However, they are not capable to analyse the 
impact derived from a moving risk source. As the results, transportation risk analysis 
(TRA) is developed as an extension of the QRA techniques, which initially utilize for 
assessing risk in nuclear processes, and then adapted to process industry [11]. 
However, for the risk source which is moving in a continuously changing 
environment prevents the large diffusion of this technique compared with that of fixed 
installations [8, 12]. To perform an accurate TRA, detail information of the area is 
importance such as data on local distribution of population, accident rates and weather 
conditions. This information is gathered by using geographic information system 
(GIS), which can relate the data of interest to its geographical co-ordinates.  
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GIS technology integrates common database operations such as query and statistical 
analysis with unique visualization and geographic analysis capabilities. These 
functions make GIS distinguish from other information systems and make it valuable 
for explaining events, predicting outcomes and planning strategies. Tools for GIS 
spatial risk assessment can externally generated risk contours results (by displaying as 
buffer and multiple ring buffer and others) and links to models describing accidental, 
continuous atmospheric releases and dispersion spills into surface water systems, and 
transportation risk analysis. Therefore by using GIS, hazards from transportation 
accident, can be viewed and evaluated the potential consequences at any points and 
locations based on computer maps generated. Results of consequences such as fire, 
explosion, fireball, BLEVE from transportation accidents will be more accurate, 
precise and more details, depending on how far the very comprehensive maps (spatial 
and non-spatial) in formations can be generated. 
 
Therefore, it is apparent that transportation risk assessment can be made feasible by 
using computer aided technologies. The complex development of transportation 
accident scenarios which transported hazardous materials can be achieved by using 
the consequence modelling combined with various computer softwares.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Malaysia also had experienced some major accidents for instance accidents at Km 
20.8 New Klang Valley Expressway (carrying 21,600 liters of petrol), North South 
highway near Damansara Perdana (LPG tanker), Batu Klawang Ulu Klawang 
involving a truck carrying 33,000liter (21,000 litres of petrol and 10,000 litres of 
diesel) caused 3 fatalities, and property damaged [13-16].  Due to the above matter, 
the safe transportation of hazardous materials from place of origin to place of 
destination has become a major concern to the public and government policy makers. 
Pressure has been placed on the transportation agencies to designate safe routes for 
hazardous materials transport that minimize risk. One of the methods to identify safest 
route is by using smart advisory system (SAS) as transportation risk 
 4 
analysis. However, most of the current SAS for hazardous material (HazMat) 
transportation is lacking of practical application. This is due to most of those available 
tools are not user friendly especially when involving large number of variables or a 
more complex risk sources models. Other reasons are due to lack of available data/ 
database for TRA and difficulty to understand the complex relationships amongst 
many elements involved during the analysis.  Various elements involved in the 
construction of the SAS must be integrated and optimised in order to produce a viable 
model that is marketable and has practical application. 
 
Currently, most of companies in Malaysia are adopting chain business processes 
supply to streamline and automate the distribution of petroleum products per year to 
its customers across peninsular Malaysia. PETRONAS for instance distributes more 
than 7.5 billion liters of petroleum products per year to its customers across peninsular 
Malaysia with more than 600 retail service stations [17]. For that matter, PETRONAS 
Dagangan Berhad (PDB) is implementing Aspen Tech‟s solution for fuels marketing 
as the central element of a project to create an Automated Road Tanker Scheduling 
System (ARTSS), [18] which can create a single system capable of managing and 
optimizing the distribution of all petroleum products – including vehicle gasoline, 
aviation fuel, diesel, fuel oil, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), lubricants and bitumen – 
from bulk terminals or plants to the end-customer. However the system is incapable to 
analyze the accident risk related to the transportation of hazardous material such as 
(petrochemical/oil/ gas/chemical). 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
The main objectives of this study are: 
i) Analyze the existing TRA model to rectify and identify the possible parameters 
for the proposed TRA model according to Malaysia scenario. 
ii) Based on the above identification as in (i), proposed suitable TRA model for 
Malaysia transportation risk of hazardous materials. 
iii) Integrate and compute the proposed TRA model, with established consequences 
model and databases to develop a smart advisory system for transportation risk 
analysis 
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iv) Develop a user-friendly software package using Visual Basic application for 
analyzing the transportation of hazardous material accidents.  
v) Customize a GIS desktop application through integrated Visual Basic with 
ArcGIS Engine Developer Kit to assess the chemical transportation hazards with 
its geographical locations. 
vi) Confirm the validity and verification of the software by comparing the results 
from the current software with other results from established data, published 
literature, laboratory and numerical data sets and various risk assessment 
software. 
  
1.4 Scope of Study 
 
 The aim of this study is to develop a smart advisory system (SAS) which is 
capable of estimating the risk from transportation of hazardous material according to 
Malaysia scenario Therefore to estimate the hazards risk from transportation, there are 
several TRA models which will be reviewed and analysed to identify the weaknesses 
and the strength of the model.  Based on the loopholes of existing models, the 
improvise TRA model will be utilized in SAS to assess the transportation risk 
consequence scenarios. All calculations involving the proposed TRA model, 
established consequences model, with related databases are computerised in the 
proposed smart advisory system software. To develop and to design a SAS which 
assesses the consequences accidents from transportation of chemical is created by 
integrating the models in the system with GIS tools and by using Visual Basic 
programming language to simulate the consequences models and perform advanced 
calculations of the data input for the selected field.  
 
It is also known that SMACTRA software calculations are limited to: 
-  Applied the proposed TRA model  
- Most of databases such accident rate, road network, topology, weather and 
meteorology condition, and etc are based on Malaysia scenario 
- Consequence hazards from explosion, fire and toxic release. 
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- Light buoyant gas. 
- Toxic release in horizontal direction. 
- Outdoor consequences caused by chemical transportation accidents. 
- Two dimension of visualisation for hazard mapping. 
- Online risk analysis simulation  
- Calculate individual risk 
- Calculate the societal risk 
- Risk estimation for acceptability risk 
- Transportation Risk analysis Potential Safest Route Solution to the Complex 
Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) Release Consequences in Major Transportation 
Accident 
 
1.5 Layout of the thesis 
 
 This thesis is consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis outlines the literature review related to hazardous materials 
and the risk involved in road transportation, overview of the importance of TRA, 
TRA procedure, general framework of TRA, comparison of hazardous material 
transportation and fixed facility risk analysis characteristics, presents preliminary 
work in this discipline which has been categorized as TRA methodology guidelines, 
applications, procedures, data availability such as accident database, application of 
Geographic Information System (GIS) transportation, and trend of TRA software and 
their limitation. This chapter ends with summary to point out several important 
considerations for the present research work. Chapter 3 presents some issues and 
factors affecting transportation risk analysis for Malaysia scenario,  a description of 
modified TRA model. Since most of QRA software do not distinguish for specific 
age, amount of burnt skin and survival rate of the victim based on the depth of burn 
injury, and risk outcome is represent by number of fatality. In this chapter, the 
assessment of thermal radiation consequences has been extended to include a 
methodology describing the prognosis of burn injury victims, therefore it is possible 
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to estimate the mortality probability of a victim knowing the victim„s age and 
percentage body area suffering from burn injury and also avoid double counting on 
effect calculation.  A description of GIS integration with SAS simulation is provided 
in this chapter. The analysis of results and conclusions will be discussed in chapter 4. 
The case study involving  5 selected routes of interest in Port Dickson. In this chapter, 
the SMACTRA calculation results, are tested by using an established data, and 
compared with the results from published literature and chemical risk software. 













































































Over the last three decades process industries has developed a distinctive approach to 
prevent and control hazards that can cause loss of life and property. This approach is 
called loss prevention. Since1960s, modern technologies contributed a great changes 
in the chemical, oil and petrochemical industries. The energy which derived from the 
chemical process and the chemical process activities may possess high pressure and 
temperature which may expose a great hazards during accident. These hazards from 
chemical process technology not only happen at chemical plants, but it may become 
more complex and severe if accident occur during transportation of this hazardous 
material which has high pressure, very reactive chemicals and highly toxic. Therefore 
there is an absolute requirement  for a reliable risk, safety and loss prevention 
technology which is parallel with the advancement of chemical process technology. 
The first UK IChemE symposium in Chemical process hazards with special reference 
to chemical process plant design in 1960, is the pioneer to a serious discussion on the  
implementation of safety and loss prevention aspects into chemical plant design and 
process operation [8-10]. This effort by Intitute of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) UK 
is then continued by American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE) in 1967 
which initiate the first AIChE loss prevention symposeum. Meanwhile European 
Federation of Chemical Engineering (EFCE) in 1972 which introduced the major loss 
prevention in the process industries.  
Risk analysis is a concept that is vaguely understood by many researchers. In 
1662, mathematicians in the Port Royal monastery in Paris whom first described the 
modern concept of risk analysis define risk as “Fear of harm ought to be proportional 
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not merely to the gravity of harm, but also to the probability of the event” [19]. This 
definition of risk has not changed till 350 years. Correspondingly,  the Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) define risk  as „a measure of potential economic 
loss, human injury, or environmental damage in terms of both the incident likelihood 
and magnitude of the loss, injury, or damage‟ [11, 20] and transportation risk analysis 
(TRA) defined as the „development of a qualitative or quantitative estimate of 
(transportation) risk based on engineering evaluations and possibly mathematical 
techniques for combining estimates of incident consequences and frequencies‟ [21, 
22]. The UK Health and Safety Executive provides an analogous definition of risk 
[24] as „the likelihood of a specified undesired event occurring within a specified 
period or in specified circumstances‟. As a conclusion, in TRA, risk is defined as a 
measure of the possible undesirable consequences and frequencies of a release of 
HazMats during their use, storage, transportation and disposal either caused by an 
accident or without an accident. Risk assessment is defined as the process by which 
the results of risk analysis are used to make decisions, either through relative ranking 
of risk reduction strategies or through comparison with risk targets [19]. 
 
Even though loss, damage, or injuries resulting from the incident are the 
consequences of the event [19], but in most of the transportation hazard assessment, 
these consequences are not well presented. For example, most of the risk analysis 
does not include the magnitude of human injury, disability and fatality or some 
studies only include fatality risk in their TRA. Historical evidence has shown that 
incidents due to hazardous materials (HazMat) releases during transportation can lead 
to severe consequences. Therefore, these hazards need to be identified, controlled or 
eliminated through the use of risk analysis or assessment tool.  
 
Apart from that, previous TRA researchers faced problems to estimate or 
predict consequences towards impact zone. This is probably due to enormous data are 
required and each of them must be analyzed before they can be applied in the TRA 
model calculations. For example, in order to generate the best route with the least risk 
if an accident happens, data such as accident rate and population along the route are 
essential. However, these data cannot be utilized directly into the model unless they 
have been analyzed such as the total route involved, the number of accident in a year 
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along the route, the number or accident related to transportation of hazardous 
material, the traffic condition, the  topology and socio-economic status of the studied 
area. Even though researchers have established the simplified assumptions in order to 
ensure an accurate impact calculation for the safest route, they are only capable to 
calculate risk for a limited number of routes. This chapter describes an overview of 
the existing literatures related to risk assessment for transportation of hazardous 
material and discuss on the current capabilities of TRA guidelines, databases and 
softwares development. Various SAS techniques for the hazardous materials 
transportation risk analysis have been developed, is also reviewed in this chapter.  
 
2.2  Hazardous Materials  
The chemicals transportation is unavoidable for the manufacturing and distribution of 
products within and across regional and international borders. These transportations 
must comply to the country transportation regulation which are referred as “dangerous 
goods” or “hazardous materials”. The federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Act 
of 1975 (HMTA) of United States of America and its re-authorizing legislation define 
hazardous material as a substance or material that, if not regulated, may pose an 
unreasonable risk to health, safety, or property when transported in commerce. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) has identified more than 3,300 hazardous 
materials which need to be regulated. Thousands of unnamed materials are also 
identified for regulation based on their characteristic such as explosive, flammable, 
corrosive or infectious [1]. 
     According to the United States Department of Transportation, gasoline and other 
petroleum products contributed to about 40 percent of all hazardous materials 
shipments in US [2-4] with more than two-thirds of petroleum products are 
transported using road tanker [3,6-7]. In Europe, concern is now being voiced about 
HAZMAT transportation risk to the public, so that the legislators have begun to pay 
more attention to it [21, 22, 29].  
    In view of the rise in the advancement of industrialization in Malaysia as with the 
rest of the world, the numbers of stationary installations (i.e. process plants, liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) terminal, refineries, petrol stations etc.) have grown significant 
over the past few years. Furthermore, since the discovery of oil and gas in the country, 
the growth of chemical related industries had further spurred and it is became one of 
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the major focuses for expansion [30, 31]. As a result, this scenario has indirectly 
caused an increase in the number of HAZMAT transportations from one stationary 
installations to another for further processing or for product distribution. From the 
previous hazmat risk assessment based on facility location, routing and network 
design literature, it is obvious that, since 1982 there are numbers of papers  published 
by the researchers focus on identifying a lesser risk route either by road [39-48, 53],  
rail [ 49, 50], marine [51] and combine road and rail [52]. However, many researcher 
still facing problems to precisely estimate or predict the consequences towards the 
impact zone. This is probably due to enormous data required and each of them must 
be analyzed before they can be applied in the consequences calculations. Secondly, 
this is due to lack of available data or databases, relevant to the transportation risk 
area. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) approaches and its use have grown significant 
over the past twenty years and is now widely used and incorporated into safety 
legislation for a number of industries. However, most developments and use of QRA 
are mainly on fixed installations. Since HAZMAT transportation is not a fixed source 
therefore the magnitude of risk related to accident is unpredictable. Road 
transportation of dangerous goods carries risk to the surrounding people and 
environment at any point along its routes. Previous review on the transportation 
HAZMAT accidents have also shown that the accident related to hazardous materials 
transportation may also give additional consequences due to its chemical and physical 
properties [21, 22, 26, 27]. The amount of destruction is expected to be worse if the 
accident occur at high population density area [28]. 
 Due to enormous numbers of HAZMAT, an effective controlled systems such as 
engineering codes, checklists and process safety management (PSM) is needed to 
ensure safety and reduce risk related to HAZMAT. It is also important to identify and 
analyze the risk first then a reliable management systems need to be developed that 
involve procedures and actions to support strategic, tactical and operational decisions, 
including the transportation route selection, facility selection, emergency response in 
case an incident would occur [11, 17, 18, 21, 22, 32-35].  
So far there are some recognized regulations and rules which have been set to 
regulate HazMat transportation activities. For instance in USA, the Hazardous 
Material Transportation Act (HMTA) enacted in 1975 [ 4 ], is to provide adequate 
protection against the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation of 
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hazardous material, in Singapore the transportation of hazardous chemical and 
petroleum products is controlled by the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs through the Poisons (Hazardous Substances) Rule enacted in 1986 and 
the Petroleum Act 1985, which aim to reduce the consequences that may occur from 
loss of containment of the hazardous chemical during transit through the road 
network. In Malaysia there are also laws and regulations such as Environmental 
Quality Act 1974 to regulate the environmental management of chemical substance in 
air, land, water and Scheduled Waste Regulation, 2005 to control hazardous waste 
management [36] and Petroleum (Safety Measures) Act 1984 [38].  However, those 
regulations are mainly addressing definition, hardware, procedures and compliance 
with those regulations do not necessarily guarantee the desired reduction on risk 
transportation for hazardous material. New innovative means and measures need to be 
devised by which these complex HazMat transportation risk problems can be dealt 
with more effectively in the future [36]. 
 
The conventional way to evaluate risk assessment is by using mathematical models.  
However, it is essential to know that the HAZMAT transportation risk assessment is 
complex and difficult to be implemented manually by using the mathematical 
technique due to the following reasons: 
 The calculations are difficult to perform, 
 A large number of  calculations are required, 
 Trained users are required as most people cannot understand, or utilised 
mathematical risk assessments, 
 There may be several event outcomes from a single accident; thus it is difficult 
to keep track of these outcomes as the road tanker is moving along the road, 
 The summation of risk required much effort even though it would be for an 
individual risk. For societal risk, the effort required for manual calculation 
would be overwhelming, even more worse for transportation risk analysis. 
 
For these reasons, there is no doubt that a user friendly computer-aided technology is 
required for risk assessment. Casal et al. [37] have proven that implementation of 
computerised models has led to a powerful and easy-to-use tool for the prediction of 
the effects of hazardous material releases. He also concluded the designed tool 
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application can also be used by introducing less complete information, for the real-
time prediction of the evolution of accidental releases.  
 
As mentioned earlier, there are many undesirable consequences of HazMat 
transportation. The geometric shape and size of an impact  area are not only 
depending on the substance being transported but also on other factors, such as 
topology, weather, population density, accident rate, traffic volume, wind speed and 
wind direction.  Apart from that, any changes in the route selected require both the 
acquisition of data and the calculations for the new route, to examine alternative with 
possibly less hazardous route. Therefore the application of TRA via manually 
calculation will introduces additional uncertainties in the risk estimated. Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) has a great potential in effectively handled in those TRA 
data, since they allow managing databases related to territorial entities such as towns, 
roads, rivers, hills, weather, population and etc.,  along the route or associated to their 
respective geographical location. Due to this, the integration of risk assessment 
program with a GIS appears as a suitable mean for performing TRA based on accurate 
territorial information, in order to obtain reliable risk measure.  
 
Some numerical methodologies have been developed to assess the transportation risk; 
however, most of those methodologies were hard to employ directly by decision or 
policy makers. One reason is that the methodologies were proposed without input 
data, or the methodology was too complicated to obtain available input data. For 
example, incident frequency and conditional release probability data were assumed to 
be available in most of the methodologies, but in fact the acquisition of the required 
data calls for considerable effort. In many cases not all the data required by the TRA 
are available, thus some mathematical methodologies are needed to assess the 
required data based on expert experience or other information sources. The lack of the 
match between the data/database analysis and the numerical methodologies for TRA 
has prevented decision makers from making sound actions quickly. Therefore, a smart 
advisory system should be developed, so that the decisions on HazMat transportation 
risk could be made quickly, effectively and accurately test the suitability of alternative 




2.3      Hazardous Materials (HazMat) Transportation Incident 
A major goal of the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials is a 
reduction in incidents that could lead to a release or to misuse. To date, the 
achievements in safety are the result of regulations, industry standards, individual 
company initiatives, and emergency response preparedness, as well as investments in 
training, systems, and technology. Even with the foundation that these programs and 
activities supporting the day-to-day operating practices provide, the safe 
transportation of hazardous materials is still a complex matter due to a number of 
issues [11, 21, 22]:  
 
• Number of regulated hazardous materials (thousands are listed in regulations 
worldwide), 
• Regulations that vary by mode, region, and country, 
• Different hazards classes including toxicity, flammability, corrosivity, and 
reactivity, 
• Various modes of transportation including road, rail, marine (including bulk 
vessels), pipeline, and air, 
• Multiple packaging types including bulk and non-bulk, 
• Use of more than one mode during a shipment (intermodal), 
• Complexity of the supply chain including multiple parties and changes of 
custody during transit, 
• Overlapping and potentially unclear responsibility of various parties and 
• Transport routes where the risk profiles change depending on proximity to 
the public or other sensitive areas.  
 
As a result, even with the availability of current safety regulations and operating 
practices, accidents involving the transportation of hazardous materials accident still 
occur [21, 22, 25, 34, 54]. For example, in 1978, at San Carlos de la Rapita, Spain, 
fireballs from a tanker containing 23.5 ton of propylene caused about 200 fatalities 
[32, 38, 56-64].  
Nevertheless, HAZMAT accident do happen and in many cases have severe 
consequences such as accident involving chlorine leaking from damaged tank cars 
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due to a derailment in Mississauga, Ontario in 1979 leading to an enormous loss of 
properties and  forced the evacuation of 200,000 people [56-58].   
In another accident, that resulted from BLEVE impact from a tanker vehicle on 
June 22, 2002, near the city of Tivisa in Catalonia, Spain [66]. The driver died while 
two persons (at a distance of 200 m) suffered from 1st and 2nd degree burns. The 
pressure developed during BLEVE was estimated to be about 10 bar. Hence, it is 
necessary to design and develop SAS to assist the authorities in the control of 
transportation of hazardous materials to ensure the accidents damages are minimized 
in the future. 
 
Although the liability cost of an average hazmat incident is not significantly higher 
than the cost of a non-Hazmat incident, but many cases studies involving major 
HazMat transportation incident show that the cost of a hazmat accident especially 
when it is resulting in fire or explosion is significantly higher [55]. Therefore, HazMat 
transportation accidents are perceived as low probability–high consequence (LPHC) 
events and so far the current data seem to support this statement [55]. In fact, 
according to the DOT of United States of America statistics, 156,483 HazMat 
transportation incidents have occurred between 1995 to 2004, resulting in a total of 
226 fatalities and 3,218 injuries [62, 63].  
  
Table (2-1) illustrates list of selected major transportation accident in various 
countries, across different modes of transportation. 
 
2.4   Transportation Quantitative Risk Analysis 
 
2.4.1 Risk Assessment 
 
Few definitions need to be clarified to assist in further discussion for risk assessment. 
Risk involves in most fields and activities including economies, business, sport, 
industry, also in our daily life. Risk associated with probability and consequence of an 
undesirable event [67]. Risk and hazard are often used synonymously, but they are 
actually two different entity. Hazard is the inherent characteristic of a material, 
condition, or activity that has the potential to cause harm to people, property, or the 
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environment [13, 34]. The Center of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) characterized 
hazard into inherent physical and chemical characteristic [11, 68] with the potential 
for causing harm. Some authors define risk as the product of probability and expected 
consequence of the undesirable event [25, 69]. 
Probability can be defined as a number between zero and one that expresses the 
degree of belief concerning the possible occurrence of an event. Conditional 
probability is a probability of an event that should be preceded by another specific 
event. Consequence is considered to be the direct effect, usually undesirable, of an 
event such as a rail accident involving hazardous materials. The consequences of risk 
analysis begin with the release of hazardous material from the container and involve 
three-step procedure: (i) the release amount and mode of release; (ii) the extent to 










Location Transport mode Substance and 
quantity 
released 






1969 Mississippi, USA Rail tank car Anhydrous 
ammonia, 
29,200 gallons 
Derailment, a gas cloud was formed which 
blanketed the surrounding area  
F/E 64/53/0 Yes [56, 59, 60-63] 
1971 Texas, USA Rail tank car Vinyl chloride Derailed cars included six tank cars containing 
vinyl chloride monomer and two cars containing 
other hazardous materials. Two tank cars were 
punctured in the derailment. The vinyl chloride 
monomer escaped and ignited 
F 6/50/0 Yes, tank car 
ruptured violently 
and another tank 
car “rocketed” 
approximately 




1972 Lynchburg, USA Road tanker Propane Overturning, the vehicle slid on its side and struck 
a rock embankment, which ruptured the tank shell 
and permitted the propane to escape 
F/E 1/5/0 Yes [57,59, 62] 
1974 Illinois, USA Rail tank car Isobutene Collisions and punctured the tank. Isobutene 
escaped and vaporized for 8 to 10 minutes before 
it exploded. The yard, surrounding residences, and 
commercial facilities were damaged extensively 
by fire and shock waves. 
F/E 7/349/0 Yes, property 
damage was 




1974 Eagle Pass, USA Road tanker LPG Leakage LPG during transport F/E 17/34/0 Yes [56-59]
 
1974 Yokkaichi, Japan Transhipment Chlorine Leakage of chlorine during transhipment VCE 0/521/0 Yes [56-59] 
1976 Deer Park, USA Road tanker Ammonia Collision during road transportation ammonia TG 5/200/0 Yes [56-59] 
1976 Illinois, USA Rail tank car Ammonia Derailment and collisions TG 0/14/0 Yes, damage 
from the accident 
was estimated to 





Texas, USA Rail tank car Anhydrous 
ammonia, 7,509 
gallons 
The tractor and trailer left the ramp, struck a 
support column of an adjacent overpass, and fell 
onto the Southwest Freeway, approximately 15 
feet below 





















Location Transport mode Substance and 
quantity 
released 






1977 USA Rail tank car Anhydrous 
ammonia 
Derailment and puncture TG 2/46/1000 Yes, property 
damage was 
estimated to be 
$724,000.  
[61, 63] 






Derailment of 44 tank wagons 
Caused by sabotage caused 
Big chlorine release 
F/E 8/153 Yes [57-59] 
[64]
 
1978 Florida, USA Rail tank car Chlorine Leakage of chlorine during rail transportation TG 8/138/0 Environment [56-58] 
1978 Los Alfaques, 
Spain 
Road tanker Propylene Unknown E 216/200/0 Yes [21,56-58, 64] 
 
1979 Suda Bay, Greece Road tanker Propane Unknown E 7/140/0 Yes [56, 57] 
1979 Mississauga, 
Canada 
Rail tank car Chlorine, 
Propane, LPG 
Derailment of a train carrying dangerous goods 
3cars (propane) exploded, chlorine tank punctured, 





Yes [56, 57] 
1981 Montannas, 
Mexico 
Road tanker Chlorine Accident during transportation of chlorine TG 28/1000/5000 Yes [21, 56, 57, 64] 




Drive, Collision, Penetrate/Puncture 
Release, Chemical reaction, Ignition 
Fire, Vaporize 
F/E 0/34/0 Yes [57-59] 
1983 Nile, Egypt Marine LPG Explosion during transportation  F/E 317/44/0 Yes [56, 57] 
1984 Matamoros, 
Mexico 
Unknown Ammonia Accident during transportation of ammonia TG 0/182/3000 Yes [56, 57] 








Location Transport mode Substance and 
quantity 
released 






1998 South Korea Marine, tanker Butane, LPG, 
Propane 
During unattended unloading a hose ruptured and 
Fire heated up 2 lpg tank vehicles causing bleve 




1/83/0 Yes [57] 
1998 Kyrgyzstan Road tanker Cyanide 
(1800kg) 
Sodium cyanide were spilled into a river upstream 
of several villages 
TL 0/>1000/0 Yes, polluted a 
river , symptom 



































21,850 liters of 
petrol 































on fishing, oyster 
farming, and 
tourism 

















Malaysia Road tanker 21,600 liters of 
petrol 
Crash of a lorry carrying petrol at km 20.8new 
Klang Valley Expressway  
F/E/ 12/50/0 Yes, traffic more 





Japan Road tanker Benzene (fp< 
21deg. C 
Collision on slight bend of tunnel caused huge 
Explosion, fire, damage to tunnel and 
2 casualties 








Road tanker Gasoline 
(17,000 litres) 
Truck carrying gasoline was lost control and hit 
one of the buses and burst into flames while the 
leaking gasoline, which turned the whole area into 
an inferno, incinerating the buses and the fireball 
then enveloped five other buses 
F/E 
(fireball) 
90/110/0 Yes, firemen took 





2003 Malaysia Road tanker Gasoline 
(38,000liters) 
Petrol tanker skidded before landing on its side 
and caught fire. 
F/E 0/1/0 Yes [13] 
 
2007 Malaysia Road tanker Petrol (21,840        Petrol tanker skidded and overturn F/E  0/1/0                              Yes, traffic for 3.5    [38] 
                                                                                            liters hours and 2km 
 













Location Transport mode Substance and 
quantity 
released 










Train derailed F/TG/ 0/.190/ unknown. 
The highly toxic 
substance, which 
can catch fire 
spontaneously on 
contact with air at 
temperatures higher 
than 104 degrees, 
can cause liver 
damage 
Yes, Six of the 
tankers caught 
fire and smoke 
from the burning 
phosphorous 




2007 Mexico Road tanker Ammonium 
nitrate 
Truck loaded with ammonium nitrate has 
exploded in Mexico after a traffic accident, 




28 people, including 
rescue workers and 
photographers. 
People stuck in the 
traffic jam caused 




2008 Mexico Road tanker Ammonium 
nitrate 
Emergency crews were on the scene of a propane 
tanker accident in Chelsea for more than 24 hours. 
The truck was carrying 2,400 gallons of propane 
when it slid off the road-- spilling gas into a 
nearby stream. Officials say about 1,800 gallons of 
fuel leaked into the waterway. And because the 
flammable fuel could catch fire 























2010                Malaysia                 Road tanker 21,000liters             Collision F/E 4/0/0 Property [38] 




     An initiating event is the first in a sequence of events that may lead to an 
undesirable consequence. In transportation risk analysis, the initiating event is the first 
event which initiate a particular accident that requires notification to the regulatory 
agencies. An undesirable event that results in the release of a hazardous substance is 
called an incident. Although there can be many undesirable consequences of an 
incident (such as damage to wildlife, economic losses, and injuries), the prime 
concern is incidence fatalities. It is common to assume that the undesirable 
consequence is proportionate to the size of the population surrounding the incident 
and the type of substance carried by the HAZMAT [21, 22].  
By considering fatalities as the prime concern, this will simplify the risk 
assessment process even though its end result might be far then from the absolute risk 
of a potentially transportation hazards activity. Saccomanno and Chan [48] have 
described the assessment of risk with the financial loss (US dollar) related to fatalities 
and other type of injuries. However it is difficult to be implemented, since most of 
HazMat direct impact on human life is difficult to be quantified and valued [11, 19, 
23].  
Risk assessment has been accepted as the determination of risk acceptability 
and CCPS define risk assessment as the process by which the results of a risk analysis 
are used to make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk reduction strategies 
or through comparison with risk criteria [19]. In TRA, risk assessment is define as  
the process by which the results of a risk analysis are used to make decisions, either 
through a relative ranking of risk reduction strategies or through comparison with risk 
targets [21,22, 70].  
While taking action to reduce risks is called as risk management [7]. Risk assessment 
should quantify the transportation risk, identify sources of greatest risk, and examine 
specific issues in risk reduction. It should identify risks associated with accidents on 
transportation of hazardous materials and determine the levels of risk that are 
acceptable, affordable and comparable with HazMat transportation risks present in 
Malaysia. Most of this depends on probabilistic estimates of a release from an 
incident. Risk assessment also estimates the frequency and consequences of 
undesirable events, then evaluating the associated risk in quantitative terms. The final 




2.4.2 The Public and Risk Assessment 
 The techniques of risk assessment address two fundamental questions: i) what is the 
actual level of risk? , ii) what level of risk is acceptable to those affected? [25]. 
Qualitative judgments are important to the second question. The public creates its 
own unscientific risk assessments and still raised their concern regarding HAZMAT 
transportation incidence even though the safety record of hazardous material being 
transported is excellent. This is due to unpredictability and the disaster that can 
happen in accident involving HAZMAT transportation. Risk acceptability is 
complicated by the fact that the public may have risk perceptions that differ 
substantially from the actual risks.  
 2.5    The Quantitative Risk Analysis Procedure 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is the development of a quantitative estimation of 
risk based on engineering evaluation and mathematical techniques by combining 
estimation of incident consequences and its frequencies [11]. The QRA procedure is 
basically consists of a set of methods to estimate the risk posed by any given 
condition in terms of human loss or economic loss [67]. The  QRA also able to 
identify incident scenarios and evaluate the risk by defining the probability of failure, 
the probability of various consequences and the potential impact of those 
consequences Various publications provide information on QRA methodologies. Two 
of the most important examples are the “Purple book” published by TNO [71] and the 
guidelines published by CCPS [11].  
In the past, the techniques of chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA) are 
more recognised than those of TRA. CPQRA is a method designed to provide 
management tool to evaluate overall process safety in the chemical process industry 
[11, 72]. The tool such as engineering codes, checklists and process safety 
management (PSM) provide layers of protection against incidents. However, the 
potential for serious incidents cannot be totally eliminated. CPQRA provides a 




2.5.1 Framework of TRA  
Transportation risk analysis (TRA) methods have existed for about the same time 
period as CPQRA, but yet they are far less widely used and understood [32, 33]. TRA 
can be conducted on a qualitative or quantitative basis [35, 67]. Qualitative 
approaches include risk-screening methodologies, which are generally unique for each 
company. Other qualitative approaches include carrier screening programs, route and 
container selection, driver training and selection programs. The quantitative approach 
in TRA is similar to CPQRA, which is used to help to evaluate potential risks when 
qualitative methods cannot provide adequate understanding of the risks and more 
information is needed for risk management. It can also be used to evaluate alternative 
risk reduction strategies.   
In CPQRA, risk is defined as a function of probability or frequency and 
consequence of a particular incident scenario and calculated as below: 
Risk = F(s, c, f)                                                                                    (2-1) 
where, 
s = hypothetical scenario, 
c = estimated consequence(s), and 
f = estimated frequency. 
This function can be extremely complex and there can be many numerically different 
risk measures (using different risk functions) calculated from a given set of s, c, f. 
which will be further discussed in section 2.6. 
 
The general steps of TRA are described below [11, 21, 22, 72, 73]: 
• TRA Scope Definition converts user requirements into study goals and 
objectives. Risk measurement and risk presentation formats are chosen in 
final step in TRA. The depth of study is  based on the specific objectives 
defined and the resources available. 
• Movement Description is the compilation of the transportation activity 
information needed for the risk analysis. For an example, mode, container 
specification, weather data, number of trips, volume per container, material, 
shipping conditions, route or origin and destination, and population data. 
This data information is then used throughout the TRA. 
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• Hazard or Initiating Event Identification is a critical step in TRA. The 
incident-initiating events of concern can generally be identified based on 
previous data. Non-incident-initiating events can be identified through 
hazard identification techniques described in CPQRA Guidelines [17, 39]. 
• Likelihood Estimation is the method used to estimate the frequency or 
probability of occurrence of an incident. Estimation may be obtained from 
historical incident data on failure frequencies or from failure sequence 
models such as fault trees and event trees or from special failure models. 
• Consequence Estimation is the methodology used to determine the 
potential damage, fatality or injury from specific incidents. A single 
incident (e.g., leakage from pressurized liquid tank) may have many distinct 
incident outcomes, e.g., vapor cloud explosion (VCE), boiling liquid and so 
on. 
• Risk Estimation combines the consequences and likelihood of all incident 
outcomes from all selected incidents to provide risk measurement. The risks 
of all selected incidents are individually estimated and summed to give an 
overall measure of risk. 
• Utilization of Risk Estimates is the process by which the results of a risk 
analysis are used to make decisions, either through relative ranking of risk 
reduction strategies or through comparison with specific risk targets.  
 
Other qualitative analyses do not comply to these steps completely. Risk screening 
can be developed by adopting one or more of these steps into account. Level analysis 
can be conducted by comparing the data set for the transportation of concern with the 
data set and results for another transportation for which a quantitative TRA has been 
conducted, and simply determining if the transportation of concern poses more or less 
risk than the previously evaluated one. In quantitative risk analyses it may be possible 
to take the results of other studies and use them as the basis of one or more of the 
steps in the TRA, but these other results may first need to be scaled or adjusted before 




2.5.2 Comparison to Stationary Facility of Chemical Process Risk Analysis  
There are similarities and differences between HAZMAT transportation and fixed 
facility risk evaluations. As an example, for the usual singular focus on a single 
vehicle with a single hazardous cargo, the identification of the hazard, the 
consequences interest, and the initiating events are very much simplified for 
transportation. Both TRA and fixed facility risk evaluations can be qualitative or 
semi-quantitative compared to quantitative. In these Qualitative or semi-quantitative 
estimate risk by taking into account experience, judgment, good practices, training, 
procedures, inspection and maintenance, codes and standards, past performance, etc., 
whether one is dealing with fixed facilities or transportation movements. 
 
The modelling of release consequences is largely independent on the cause of 
the release and is therefore directly transferable from CPQRA method to TRA. Risk 
measurement are also commonly utilised in these two types of quantitative risk 
analyses. The most fundamental difference between CPQRA and TRA is that TRA 
deals with a linear source of risk, while CPQRA deals with relatively discrete point. 
This linear source may be static such as pipelines or may be a moving source for other 
modes of transport. 
 
The nature of TRA data can be different from CPQRA data. They are often 
expressed as a function of distance travelled or per trip, transit, or visit. External event 
causes of accidents are generally included in the data including such items as 
vandalism for rail transport, adverse weather for marine transport, and third-party 
damage for road. Other difference between transportation and fixed facility risk 
evaluations is the nature of the risk reduction and mitigation alternatives available. By 
virtue of the unknown location of transportation release (prior to its occurrence), it is 
much more difficult to identify and implement effective mitigative (post-release) 
strategies. Secondary containment via water sprays, foams, evacuations, etc. are either 
not feasible, or can only be initiated some significant amount of time after the release 
has occurred. Given the rapid dispersion of many large releases, such mitigation 
measures may be totally infeasible or untimely. The result is to make mitigation 
modelling more uncertain for a transport accident than it is for plant accident. 
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In transportation, a release can occur anywhere along a route between the origin 
and destination. The unpredictability of the exact release location often requires the 
use of generalized approaches to limit the data needs and number of incident outcome 
cases. These generalized approaches may relate to one or more of the following: 
 
• Identification and selection of initiating events – may utilize an aggregate 
incident rate or a limited breakdown, such as derailments and collisions, rather 
than a detailed breakout by failure mode. 
• Selection of incidents and incident outcomes – particularly release sizes and 
rates, release orientation, material temperature and pressure at time of release. 
While a release in a facility is reasonably predictable in terms of the material 
conditions, these could change with the season changes. 
• Meteorological conditions for modeling – wind roses and stability class 
distributions vary from location to location, as does the ambient temperature 
and humidity. 
• Ignition probabilities – the number, type, and proximity of ignition sources 
vary along a route, and it may be very difficult to get route specific data.  
• Population distribution –The population density around a traffic accident 
varies, for example, from large city to a rural area. In addition, traffic can 
build up behind an accident, resulting in a high number of victims surrounding 
the accident. 
 
For fixed facilities, it is possible to eliminate or prevent risks but in 
transportation, risk reduction is the main aim. Most researchers estimated that 24- 47 
% of hazardous material incidents are due to human error [74, 75]. The degree of 
variability and influence of human performance is often cited as being much greater 
for some modes of transportation than others especially for transportation compared 
to fixed sites. This is particularly true for road transportation where the route taken 
can vary from one trip to another.  
2.5.3 Reason in Conducting TRA 
TRA is a powerful tool in HazMat transportation decision-making system. TRA is 
utilized in QRA and it provides a consistent and defendable decisions. It allows an 
effective evaluation of existing controls and procedures, but more important, its 
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capable to provide an insight on how to cost- effectively reduce the risk. It able to 
assist decision maker to choose a site for a facility or process relocation or expansion, 
by taking both fixed site and transportation risks into account. It is helpful in choosing 
alternative routes by providing information on the relative risks associated with each 
route therefore the appropriate mode of transportation or most effective container can 
be selected especially if additional protective measures are warranted.  
 
In case if a transportation incident occurs, TRA could provide the emergency 
response plans. It can also help to understand the influence of material state on risks 
and make judgments about the tolerability of existing or increased movement levels. 
2.6  Review of Previous Work on Transport Risk Analysis Models and 
Guidelines 
 
In the past two decades, attention has been focused on risk analysis of HazMat within 
transportation networks, and the techniques of QRA initially developed for fixed 
plants have been extended to TRA. Review of transportation risk analysis 
methodologies and consequences calculations for HazMats transportation, are mainly 
from  major TRA guidelines and risk assessment handbooks such as  CCPS 
Guidelines of Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, (2000), Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO) (yellow book), TNO (purple 
book), CCPS Guidelines of Chemical Risk Transportation Risk Analysis, (1995), 
CCPS, Guidelines of Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions (1994), CCPS, 
Vapor Cloud Dispersions (1987), Rhye [25] and BUWAL methodology recently 
developed by Swiss Federal Institute of Technology [11, 21, 22, 25, 26, 32, 76 -78]. 
 
 
2.6.1 Swiss Methodology (BUWAL) for Assessing the Risk of Hazardous 
Materials Transportation by Road  
 
 
In 1992 the Swiss Federal Office for Environmental Protection, Forestry and 
landscape (BUWAL) has issued a “Handbook III to the Regulations Concerning 





2.6.1.1  Subdivision of the Road Tracks into Road Segments 
As in the CCPS and Rhyne [21, 25] methodology the route is segmented to consider 
the variation of the characteristics along the route.  The length of a segment is 
determined in such a way, that the architectural and technical configuration, the 
environment, the traffic and safety measures should be homogenous within the 
selected segment. Each length of a segment should not be less than a kilometer. 
 
2.6.1.2          Data information 
 
Population density - The population density is to be indicated for the close-and-far-
range along the road, and should mention the number of inhabitants per square 
kilometer (Inh. /km
2
). If there is no data available, than the population density could 
possibly be estimated as follows: 
 Urban population density :> 5000 Inh. /km2 
 Small-town population density: 2000 to 5000 Inh. /km2 
 Village population density: 100 to 2000 Inh. /km2 
 Slight or no settlement: ˂ 100 Inh. /km2 
 
Traffic Rise - The traffic volume is defined, as the average Daily traffic per 24 hours 
(ADT-24). The heavy Traffic Share (HTS) corresponding to this ADT-24 must be 
indicated. 
 
Average Daily Traffic per 24 Hour - This is defined as the yearly total of vehicles at 
a certain road cross section divided through 365. This can be determined for certain 
through-roads from the published statistics of the Swiss traffic counting, which takes 
place every five years. Since such counts records catch hold of the ADT-24 data. A 
conversion is necessary. If records concerning the average (hourly) traffic of motor 
vehicles at day (Nd) and night (Nn) are available from the cantonal noise-pollution 
registers, then the ADT-24 data can be determined from such records. 
 
Traffic Composition-In order to assess the composition of the Swiss traffic, one has 
to indicate the Share of Dangerous goods Traffic based on the Heavy traffic (SDH) 




Share of Dangerous Goods based on the Heavy Traffic (SDH)- According to the 
latest road traffic survey of the year 1984, the share of the dangerous goods traffic 
related to the total heavy traffic amounts to 8% (Swiss average). Depending on road 
segment and regional particularities this proportion can vary between 5% and 15%. 
 
Ratio of the different SDR-Classes based on the Dangerous Goods Traffic (RSC). 
For transit roads, it can be assume the following distribution, which is based on the 
Swiss average (Table 2-2): 
 
Table 2-2: Ratio of the different SDR-classes to the dangerous goods traffic (RSC) 
SDR-class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
RSC 0.001 0.07 0.70 0.07 0.01 0.07 - 0.08 - 
 
Depending on the regional aspects (presence of a harbor, stores, loading/unloading 
station, chemical plant, or processing plan) the RSC-share corresponding to a given 
road segment may be corrected on the basis of estimates. 
 
Accident statistics - The Accident Rate of the total traffic is to be considered (ART). 
This is to be calculated according to Swiss VSS-directive, (1990). When some 
accident statistics are not available, the accident rate corresponding to different road 
categories can be selected from the data listed in Table (2-3), showing the accident 
rates, and in brackets, the confidence limit. However, if statistics concerning Accident 
Rates for Heavy traffic (ARH) are available for the different road segments. The data 
must be used for the calculation. Where this data are not available, the accidents to the 
total traffic accidents (Swiss average) is approximately half as large as the share of the 
heavy traffic to the total traffic. In special cases, e.g., strong ramp, this value can be 








Table 2-3: Accident rates for the total traffic (average values AR-total) is based on empirical data 
collected in Switzerland. 
Road Type Accident Rates 
Highways 0.45 (       x 10-6/Vehicle.km 
Semi-Highways 0.50 (       x 10-6/Vehicle.km 
Main roads (outside localities) 1.20 (       x 10-6/Vehicle.km 
Main roads (inside localities) 2.10 (       x 10-6/Vehicle.km 
 
2.6.1.3  Estimation of the likelihood of an Incident with Severe Consequences 
to People or Environment 
 
The goal of this assessment is to compare which road segments that will have high 
probabilities of severe damage to people and environment for further investigation. 
The methodology followed by the Swiss Authorities is based on the most actual 
national and international knowledge and experience in this field.. The method allows 
to coarsely assessing, for each road segment, the probability of an incident causing 
severe damage to people, groundwater resources, and surface waters, on the basis of 
representative incident scenarios. Unfortunately, this method cannot cope equally well 
with all kind of situations, like for instance very long tunnels. The frequency (per km 
and year) of representative incident scenarios is determined for each road segment as 
in Eq. (2-2), [32]: 
 
                                                                                        (2-2) 
where, 
ADT = ADT (24) (i.e., Average Daily Traffic) is to be converted on a year basis, i.e., 
average number of vehicles per year (vhc. /year); assuming that a year has 
365 days, 
AR   = Accident Rate (vhc. /km)
-1
, 
Fs      = Frequency of a representative incident scenario with severe damages  
             [(km.year)
-1
], 
HTS  =  Heavy Traffic Share based on average daily traffic (ADT-24), 
(dimensionless), 




RRP = Ratio of the Relevant Product of the SDR-class applicable to the representative 
incident scenario (dimensionless), 
RSC = Ratio of the different SDR-Classes corresponding to the dangerous goods    
traffic (dimensionless), 
RSS = Ratio of the representative incident scenarios leading to severe damages        
(dimensionless), and 
SDH = Share of Dangerous goods traffic based on the heavy traffic. 
 
2.6.1.4  Frequency of incident with severe damages 
 
Severe Damages to the Population: one has to consider the sum of the frequencies of 
the incident scenarios burning, explosion and release of toxic gases. 
 
2.6.1.5  Ratio of the relevant Product of the SDR-class Applicable to the 
representative Incident Scenario (RRP).  
This RRP-value is expressed as the ratio of the relevant products of the particular 
SDR-class representative of a given incident scenario. 
 
Relevant Release Rate and Ignition Rate: It is assumed, that all materials 
relevant for a representative incident scenario are transported more or less in similar 
quantities and containers, so that a uniform release rate, and in the case of burning and 
explosion, that ignition will follow. This value is valid both for open rail tracks, as 
well as for tunnels. 
Ratio of the Representative Incident Scenarios leading to Severe Damages: 
The RSS-factor stands for the probability of severe damage under the condition, that a 
relevant release, and for burning and explosion, the ignition has already occurred.  
 
2.6.1.6  Assumptions concerning the representative incident scenario for the 
“Population” 
In this methodology, the total number of people which will be exposed to the 
potentially HazMat vehicle is based on relevant correlation of RRI impact for release 
rate, for burning  and explosion over RSS ratio of severe damages from BUWAL 
published data. 
 
2.6.1.7  Comparison risk by two routes only at one time 
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The methodology has also proposed a short cut approach, if maximum two alternates 
route want to be compared. The probable number of fatalities from a road tanker 
carrying a HazMat load along the entire route can be calculated as in Eq. (2-3):  
                          ∑                                                                           (2-3) 
where,      ∑    
 
                                           (2-4) 
 
 
SIL  = Severity Index for a specific load, L (km
2
) 
Pai   = Probability of the tanker involved in an accident in section, i (dimensionless), 
Di    = Population density in section, i (Inh. /km
2
), 
Psj    = Probability of scenario j‟s occurrence (dimensionless), and 
rj      = Effect radius of scenario, j (km). 
 
For each accident there is a number of possible accident scenarios, which may be 
considered to be fatal to individuals present within radius rj. The number of people N, 
present at the location of the accident, which may be affected depends on the density 
of the population Di is represent by      
   . For any type of load, the term  
   
      as in Eq. (2-4) is constant which is independent of the route. This term is also 
called the Severity Index, SI. Since, the probable number of fatalities from a tanker 
carrying load L along sub segment i, is equal to            , therefore the probability 
of someone being killed, due to the passage of the tanker for the entire length of the 
route, is the sum of the probabilities for all possible accident scenarios which is equal 
to      ∑         as in Eq. (2-3).  
 
For any given load the smaller the values of SIL and PaiDi as in Eq. (2-4) the safer the 
transport operation. Therefore it is possible to compare the relative risk of two 
alternatives routes by comparing the term ∑        , i.e. , the population density, Di, 
along the route times the probability, Pai, of an accident. The weakness of this 
methodology is because the standard coefficient or data used in the Eq. (2-2) to Eq. 
(2-4) is not suitable to be used for other country, because the accident rates and 
statistics, traffic volume and other data might differ considerably. Moreover the Swiss 
methodology used gasoline as the standard substance in all type of fire incident cases, 
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LPG represents any explosion incident cases while chlorine and ammonia represent 
any toxic release cases in the RRI and RSS calculations as in Eq. (2-2). 
 
2.6.2 Rhyne Methodology for Assessing the Risk of Hazardous Materials 
Transportation by Road  
 
In Rhyne methodology two important parameters, frequency and consequence are 
included. Similar to CCPS, the risk, Ri, for accident scenario i is a function of the 
scenario frequency, Fi, and the scenario consequence [21, 25]. 
                                                                                                         (2-5) 
However the two parameters, frequency and consequences in Rhyne [25] consisting 
different subcomponent aggregation for both of the parameters used in the CCPS [21, 
22].  As usual, the  procedure for a quantitative transportation risk analysis is to divide 
the transport route into segments (also called links) along which the important 
parameters can be reasonably approximated by a single average value. A detailed 
expression for risk in Rhyne [25] can then be further defined: 
 
                                                                            (2-6) 
where, 
Fi     =                                , frequency  subcomponent parameters; 
Ci     =                  , consequences subcomponent parameters; 
F1a  = frequency of an accident per mile in transport link a based primarily on 
highway (or rail track) type and conditions, vehicle type, and traffic 
conditions; 
Ma   = number of miles, or miles per year, in link a; 
P2ab  = probability that the accident in link a results in accident forces of type b (e.g., 
mechanical or thermal forces); 
P3abc = probability that release class c occurs, given that the accident force type b 
occurs in link a, which depends on the force magnitude and the container's 
capability to resist the force; 
P4ad   = probability that population distribution class d occurs in link a; 
P5ae,  = probability that meteorological condition e occurs in link a; 
Nad   = number of persons in affected area d in link a; 
Aabc    = release amount for release class c, given that force type b occurs in link a; 
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Xace,, = fraction of persons in the affected area which experience the specified health 
effect from a unit release of the hazardous material for meteorological 
condition e for release class c. 
 
The overall risk (fatality per year) is obtained by summation of all scenarios for each 
link or for the entire route: 
   ∑                                                                                                                 (2-7) 
 
The frequency component of risk  in Eq. (2-6) consist of three main subcomponents: 
Firstly the accident frequency (Fai), which regard to  how often the accident is likely 
to occur along the length route (M). Second, the conditional probability of the release 
of contents given that an accident has occurred. That means how did  the accident 
occur (P2ab), whether it is due to over speed, failure of the tanker or collision to 
another vehicles. Apart of that, second subcomponent of frequency is also considered,  
the seriousnees level of the accident probability, based on the magnitude of accident 
force impact occurs (P3abc), such as considered, whether the magnitude is sufficient to 
cause container failure and thirdly, there is the conditional probabilities that arise 
from the consequence component such as the meteorological conditions influence 
toward population distribution [25]. For instance how the influence of wind direction 
will determine to which population is exposed (during indoors and outdoor or during 
night time or daytime) (P4ad), to a downwind plume, if 16 directions (each directions 
is 1/16 = 0.0625) are used  to plot the probability that the wind (P5ae), will come from 
a particular direction and at particular speed.  However, in most cases, the data are not 
specific for the a particular situation therefore the risk analyst will compensate for 
lack of specific data by using data from a broad class of situations, for example, 
failure probability for radioactive material containers,  a hole produced by accident 
forces [25]. The consequences component of risk can be considered to consist of three 
sub component. First is the amount of material released. It is about the quantity of 
material being released out of the tanker (Aabc). Second the number of people 
exposed, which means how many people are likely to be affected by the amout of 
material released (Nad), and finally the health of the exposure, (Xace), which means 




For risk route comparison, Eq. (2-6)  and Eq. (2-7) are produce a quantitative value 
for absolute (or complete) risk. It is useful to compute relative risk for two or more 
options using only a few of the parameters from Eq. (2-6) as a surrogate for risk. This 
approach is used frequently to compare routing options. Previously, the basic 
approach used the accident rate per mile times the number of miles in a highway 
segment as a surrogate for the frequency portion of Eq. (2-6) and the number of 
people in a 0.5 to 1-mile-wide band along the highway segment as a surrogate for the 
consequence portion of Eq. (2-6) The product of the two terms is a relative risk 
indicator, and the route with the lowest indicator has the lowest computed relative 
risk. Expressing the relative risk indicator approach mathematically is helpful. For 
simplicity of presentation, the following assumptions will be used: only one release 
class (c = 1), one population distribution along each link type (d = 1), with single 
meteorological condition (e = 1). Thus, P4 = P5 = 1. If comparison of the relative risk 
of options route, x and y is desired, then the question is whether R
x
 is less than, 
greater than, or equal to R
y
. Using Eq. (2-6) the question can be reformulated by 
comparing risk between the route x and y as follows: 
 
   
        
    
    
    
                 
     
   
    
    
                      (2-8) 
 
Since P4 = P5 = 1 for both routes x and y, Eq. (2-8) is simplified into 
  
        
    
                 
       
    
              If some terms are the 
same for both options, if it would be the case for many routing studies (e.g., if 
  
     
    
    
                     then Eq. (2-9) is became more 
simplified to the following expression for routing purposes: 
 
          
                
                                                             (2-9) 
To use of Eq. (2-9) as a safest risk route indicator includes some important 
assumptions such as the same container were used on all potential routes; therefore all 
related of the  container safety factors such as failure threshold and response time to 
the accident force types must be also same. 
 
2.6.3  CCPS-TRA Methodology for assessing the risk of hazardous Materials 




Transportation risk analysis (TRA) methodologies have existed for about the same 
time period as chemical process quantitative risk analysis (CPQRA) methodologies, 
but yet they are far less widely used and understood. TRA shares many of its tools 
and techniques with CPQRA, but distribution activities are often housed in a separate 
part of an organization and may not be aware of all the internal resources available in 
risk analysis. There are three basic types of risk measures which are developed for a 
semiquantitative or quantitative analysis for both CPQRA and TRA: 
• risk indices, which are single numbers or scores. 
• individual risk measures, which consider the risk to a particular person or at 
a particular location. 
• societal risk measures, which consider the overall risk associated with an 
activity to a particular population. 
 
Individual risk measures the risk to a person along a transportation route, and can be 
calculated for the most exposed individual at a specific locations along a route, or for 
an  individual average risk in a potentially affected area. Societal risk considers the 
summation of likelihood of severe events occurring. It can be much higher for 
transportation movements than is commonly found for fixed facility operations, 
because of the multiplicative effect of route length and number of trips. In other cases, 
transportation risks can be much lower than facility risks if the route is remote from 
population, such as for some marine movements and pipelines. 
 
The overall expression for annual risk at any specific location (such as x), assuming a 
constant accident rate, is thus [21,22]: 
           ∑     ∑          
 
   
 
   ∑        
  
                                                 (2-10) 
where, 
       = the total individual risk of fatality at geographical location x,y (chance of 
fatality per year) 
T       = trips per year 
A      = accident rate per mile 
        =  release probability for release size i 
          number of released size considered 
        = lenght of release location zone j for release size i (in miles) 
m      = number of release location zones and wind directions affecting location x,y 
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      = probability that wind blows in direction of concern for release location zone j 
(does not vary by release size) 
         = probability of a fatality at location x,y given that incident outcome k occurs in 
release location zone l with appropriate wind direction, given release size i 
        = number of incident outcomes for release size i 
        = release size counter 
       = incident outcome counter 
 
If the accident rate varies or if there are non-accident-initiated events to be considered 
as well, Eq. (2-10) can be modified accordingly by adjusting parameter, A or adding 
another term for fixed sources of risk where there is no length of a release location 
zone to be considered. The main difference between calculating societal and 
individual risk is in determining the consequences associated with an incident 
outcome. Individual risk essentially determines whether or not a particular location is 
involved in an incident outcome case, while societal risk considers how many people 
are involved in an incident outcome case. 
 
 Given the length of most transportation routes, it is suggested that the route first 
subdivided into segments over which the population density can be assumed to be 
uniform. If the route is divided into segments, then the frequencies and consequences 
can be obtained for each incident outcome case in each segment.The frequency of 
incident outcome k for release size i on segment g is defined as [21, 22]: 
 
                                                (2-11) 
  where, 
          = frequency of incident outcome k for release size i on segment g (per year) 
          = trips per year 
   A     = accident rate per mile 
        = release probability for release size i 
        = length of segment g in miles 
        = probability of incident outcome k for release size i 
        = segment counter 
   i       = release size counter 
   k      = incident outcome counter 
 




        = number of fatalities for incident outcome k for release size i on segment g 
       = consequence area associated with incident outcome k for release size i 
      = population density for segment g 
       = probability of fatality for incident outcome k for release size i 
     g  = segment counter 
      i  = release size counter 
      k = incident outcome counter 
 
This calculation is repeated for all incident outcome cases. The results are then 
combined to construct societal risk F-N curve as described in Eq. (2-8). Eq. (2-9) can 
also include an additional term for wind direction. This might simply be set equal to 
0.5 or might be calculated based on wind rose data. It is recognized that the release 
may originate in one segment but cause consequences in the next. This is generally 
insignificant as its occurrence is counteracted by releases in the previous segment 
which can cause consequences in the present segment. The only place that the 
crossing of segment boundaries is a significant concern is when the hazard length is 
much greater than the segment length. 
 
2.6.4  Previous Trend on Development of Transportation Risk Analysis Model   
 
As mentioned by Lees [64], the work of Westbrook [65] was the earliest study in 
HazMat transportation to estimate the risks of chlorine to the road and pipeline. Then, 
in 1988, Ormsby and Le [90] proposed the use of frequency-number (F-N) curves for 
transport specific type of chemicals such as chlorine, LPG and natural gas. However, 
till year of 1990, there is no comprehensive guideline and procedure has been 
developed to manage risk of HazMat during transportation. To reduce the risk impacts 
from hazardous materials transportation, Health and Safety Executive of United 
Kingdom, 1991 [8], had published a first comprehensive report in „Major hazard 
aspects of the transportation of dangerous substances‟.   
 
Since 1991, several studies have been reported in literature related to hazardous 
materials such as the database development, selection criteria for designation of 
hazardous materials highway routes, risk assessment of HAZMAT transportation, 
hazard areas and safe distance for transporting hazardous materials by truck, accident 
rate model for routing and methodology to determine safe routes for hazardous 
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materials transportation [29, 39-53, 55, 79, 80-85]. Abkowitz and Cheng [86] 
identified that statistical accident database is the most commonly used method for 
estimating risk. Their methodology presumes that sufficient historical data must exists 
to determine the frequency and the consequences of the release incidents and those 
past observations can adequately be used in future. Vilchez et al. [74] also reported 
the same conclusion as Abkowitz and Cheng [86] on the use of major accident 
transportation statistic data method after comparing statistically the historical accident 
cases from major online or hardcopy databases such as MHIDAS, MAHRB, FACTS, 
and IChemE major accident database [87].  
 
From the database analysis results, Vilchez et al. [74] have used the causal factors 
from the transportation of hazardous materials accident for ranking of the incident 
outcome (BLEVE, fireball, flash fire, pool fire, toxic dispersion). Harwood et al. [88] 
presented data analysis from several databases which identify that traffic accidents as 
a major cause of severe hazmat incidents and attempted to estimate the probability of 
a release given by an accident. Glickman [89] provided accident rate in transporting 
hazardous materials. Erkut and Verter [83] proposed a framework for quantitative risk 
assessment in hazardous materials transport. According to them in the case of an 
accident, all residents in the population center will experience the same consequences. 
However, their model is only will perform well if the hazardous materials route passes 
by a small population areas. 
  
Till to date, most of risk modeling analyses have revolved around one, partially or all 
of the following criteria suggested by Erkut and Verter [79] such as (i) shortest travel 
distance, (ii) minimum population exposure, (iii) minimum societal risk, (iv) 
minimum DOT risk, (v) minimum accident probability, (vi) minimum incident 
probability. According to them, the shortest travel distance might not always be a best 
choice for transporting hazardous materials. Minimum population exposure as in 
criterion (ii) seems to exclude incident probabilities and find the path that exposes the 
fewest number of people to the hazardous materials.  While a criteria (iii) is the 
traditional definition of risk, which uses the following formula to find the risk: 
Societal risk = (length of the exposure area per miles) X (accident rate probability per 
mile) X (conditional release probability given an accident) X (population/worker 
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density in the neighborhood of the exposure area-persons per sq. mile) X (pi-impact 
radius in miles-sq). Thus, the societal risk is the expected number of people who 
receive the accident impact as an important factor for risk. For criteria (iv) the 
definition of risk is according to the U.S. Department of Transportation (1989). By 
using this definition, mathematically it will affect the societal risk calculation with 
two differences, such as excluding conditional release probabilities, and computes 
population who are impacted by using a rectangle instead of a circle. Finally, criterion 
(v) is to find the path that minimizes the accident probability, has ignoring all other 
information.  
 
In QRA, Rowe [90] characterized the quantitative risk analysis methodologies for 
transportation in three ways: (i) how they combine the two parameters to arrive at 
risk; (ii) the level of detail; and (iii) the methods for obtaining data and modeling 
parameters. As described in CCPS and Rhyne [11, 19, 21, 22, 25], usually the 
framework for TRA includes the following steps: (i) TRA scope definition; (ii) 
shipment description; (iii) hazard or initiating event identification; (iv) likelihood 
estimation; (v) consequence estimation; (vi) risk estimation; and (vii) utilization of 
risk estimation.  In principle, these steps have to be repeated every time that any of the 
parameters involved in the above calculations changes along the itinerary, so usually a 
great deal of computation time is required to achieve the TRA goal [90]. Researchers 
in this field have executed substantial efforts to explore the practical and reasonable 
methods to measure the risk associated with HazMat transportation. Ang [91] 
suggested a general framework for risk analysis in transportation that decomposed the 
problem into three separate stages: (i) determination of an undesirable event (an 
accident involving the release of a hazardous material). (ii)  estimation of the level of 
potential exposure, given the nature of the event and (iii) assessment of the magnitude 
of consequences (fatalities, injuries and property damage) given the level of exposure. 
These three stages produce one or more probability distributions, with the last two 
producing conditional distributions.  
In practice, the process is seldom carried all the way through [53]. Frequently, the 
conditional probability distributions are ignored and the product of the probability of a 
release accident, and the extreme consequence of the accident, are used to estimate 
the risk. The potentially impacted population often represents the extreme 
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consequences. Abkowitz and Cheng [92] attempted to measure the risk of hazardous 
material transportation by summing the cost of fatalities, major injuries, minor 
injuries, and damage to property. The risk was expressed as a risk profile, which is a 
probability distribution of incident likelihood and severity. Purdy [29] estimated the 
impact to humans from flammable substances and toxic gases. The entire population 
that may be affected by a HazMat incident was considered in their model, including 
motorists on a road where an incident occurs, travelers on trains, and people who live 
near the transportation route [29]. Erkut and Verter [83] proposed that an assessment 
of HazMat transportation is a two-stage process that involves: (i) representation of 
risk via a quantitative model; and (ii) estimation of the model parameters. A basic 
model for risk assessment was presented in their work.  
Kara et al. [93] pointed out that what differentiates HazMat transport models from 
other transport models is the explicit modeling of transport risk which usually consists 
of one or both of the following two factors: incident (i.e., spill, fire) probability and 
population impacted. They focused on modeling the incident probability and 
modeling the population exposure to quantify the risk along the transportation route 
[93]. Vayiokas and Pitsiava-Latinopoulo [84] developed a methodology for the risk 
assessment during road transportation of HazMat. Two critical factors have been 
taken into consideration: the probability of an outcome during incident occurrence 
and the consequences of the outcome. Theoretical risk source release model, exposure 
model, and consequence model were set up for the ultimate risk estimates [84, 93].  
Fabiano et al. [94] developed a site-oriented framework of general applicability at 
local level. The evaluation of frequency took into account on one side inherent factors 
(e.g., slope, characteristics of neighborhood, etc.) and on the other side, factors 
correlated to the traffic conditions (e.g., dangerous goods trucks, etc.). The simple 
theoretical models were given to express both the incident frequency and the fatality 
number. 
 
Rhyne [25] expressed the overall risk as obtained by summing over all scenarios; the 
scenario frequency computation usually is divided into three components: the accident 
frequency; the conditional probability of a release, given an accident; and the 
conditional probability of various consequence terms. The accident frequency starts 
with a value for accidents per mile and usually ends with accidents per year or 
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accidents per some unit of material delivered so that all analyses can be put on a 
common basis. The conditional probability of release may be subdivided into several 
components in the predictive approach or simply evaluated at this top level in the 
historical approach. The consequence analysis usually introduces some conditional 
probabilities into the frequency term, such as the probability that a certain 
meteorological condition exists, given that the accident has occurred. The terms in the 
mathematical formulation may vary with the specific analysis. The usual procedure 
for a quantitative transportation risk analysis is to divide the transport route into 
segments (also called links) along which the important parameters can be reasonably 
approximated by a single average value. 
 
Ang and Briscoe [91] suggested a general framework for risk analysis in 
transportation, drawing heavily on the experience in the nuclear power industry. One 
of the key ideas in this approach is to break the problem into three separate stages: (i) 
determining the probability of an undesirable event (e.g., an accident involving 
release of hazardous material); (ii) determining the level of potential population and 
properly exposure, given the nature of the event; and (iii) estimating the magnitude of 
the consequences (i.e., fatalities, injuries and property damage), given the level of 
exposure. Although most hazardous materials incidents involve property damage 
only, it is the small but finite probability of a major disaster with multiple fatalities 
that attracts most of the attention in a risk analysis.  
 
Conceptually, at least, each stage of the process described above, produces one or 
more consequences. These three types of distributions can then be combined to 
produce a resulting distribution of potential consequences from a specified activity. In 
practice, however, the process is seldom carried all the way through. A frequent 
shortcut is to compute only the expected value of each of the distributions, producing 
an "expected loss" as the measure of risk. In other cases, the sole focus is on the 
second stage, and population exposure to an assumed "worst case" event is used as the 
measure of risk, without regard for the likelihood of such an event, or the probability 




One method of summarizing a risk analysis is by using risk profile. The risk profile 
gives the probability of consequences that will exceed a given level. It is a multiple-
measure method because it may produce varying probabilities of different levels of 
consequences, rather than a single measure such as "expected fatalities. For example, 
one study focused on six major types of potential events: corrosive or toxic liquid 
release, flammable liquid release, liquefied gas release, toxic gas release, asphyxiate 
gas release, and condensed phase explosion. For each type of event, probabilities of 
exceeding 1, 10 and 100 fatalities were estimated, as a means of creating a series of 




The U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) established a set of guidelines to be 
used in assessing the risks of transporting hazardous materials over specified routes. 
These guidelines have been used in several studies involving a variety of materials 
and sites. For example, Hobeika et al. [110] applied them to the movement of spent 
nuclear fuel between two power stations in Virginia for analyzing and developing 
evacuation plans around nuclear power stations.  Kessler [97] performed a similar 
analysis for a wider variety of hazardous materials moving through the Dallas-Fort 
Worth metropolitan area in Texas. The work done for high-level nuclear wastes (spent 
fuel assemblies from commercial reactors) provides an example of risk analysis which 
includes a substantial effort on assessing risks that are associated with normal 
operations, rather than focusing only on incident-related risk. Cashwell et al. [96] 
provided an extensive report on risk analysis for transporting nuclear wastes, based on 
use of models developed at Sandia National Laboratories. This modeling takes a 
routing selection as input, and then assesses the level of risk to both workers and the 
public from movements along the route. 
 
Unlike fixed HazMat facilities in which HazMat types, sources, and accident location 
conditions are all known, HazMat transportation risk assessment is associated with a 
road network and contains an element of uncertainty with regards to the expected 
location and condition of the accident site. The common approach to transportation 
risk analysis is to divide the HazMat route into portions where different parameters 
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can assume the same value. The average length of each route portion should be set 
according to the scope of the analysis and to the extent of accuracy and reliability of 
the available data. The smaller the portion, the greater the accuracy will be. However, 
this enhanced accuracy will lead to larger computational efforts. A review of various 
research topics associated with the transportation route, procedure for assessing risks 
from road transport and rail transport and how to obtain the minimum risk route of 
HazMat can be found in the related literatures [29, 48, 79, 83, 98-108].  
 
Erkut and Verter [83] and Leonelli et al. [98] proposed that a path between a given 
origin-destination pair can be represented by a set of road segments, where the road 
characteristics are uniform within each segment. The risk imposed on an individual 
due to a HazMat shipment can be estimated as the probability of an incident during 
transport multiplied by the probability of the individual experiencing the consequence 
as a result of the incident. At the same year, Spadoni et al. [99] also proposed that the 
risk resulting from the transport of HazMat has to be calculated considering all the 
incidents occurring at any point of the road network, namely a set of linear source 
risk. The technique they used to perform linear source risk calculations is to divide 
each route into arcs, each then being considered as a point risk source. Next, a 
reassembling methodology has to be applied to perform calculations of indicators of 
the area risk [79, 99]. Bubbico et al. [100] proposed methodology allows an easy and 
rapid selection of the safest route for transporting dangerous substances by road. 
Depending on the scope of the analysis, approximate as well as detailed approaches to 
TRA can be used. The former could be kept as simple as possible, to carry out the 
analysis and to immediately use its results for a basic evaluation of the risk level for 
transport activity under consideration. The latter could be kept as accurate as possible, 
enabling a specialist to properly assess the risk, to investigate the presence of highly 
hazardous spots and to suggest effective mitigation measures. Bubbico et al. [100, 
101, 103, 104] also proposed a simplified approach to TRA. From this approach only 
limited number of incident scenarios and release consequences need to be estimated in 
this simplified approach. Therefore, in this manner, TRA could be performed very 
rapidly to obtain the relevant risk measures, which can be used for a preliminary 
assessment of the case. Saccomanno and Chan [48] examined three strategies for 
routing of hazardous material shipments. These were: (i) minimize risk exposure, (ii) 
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minimize accident likelihood and (iii) minimize operating costs. Abkowitz and Chan 
[108] evaluated the use of five criteria for routing analysis: (i) minimize shipping 
distance, (ii) minimize travel time, (iii) minimize release-causing accident likelihood, 
(iv) minimize population exposure, and (v) minimize the product of accident 
likelihood and population. The first two criteria minimize economic cost, and the 
latter three maximize safety. The researchers found that routes that minimize risk may 
be so circuitous that they can be economically unfeasible, or at least impractical. His 
recommendation was that a routing analysis considers combinations of factors and use 
different weighting factors to evaluate trade-offs [48, 108]. 
 
Many risk models in the hazardous materials transport have used the concept of a 
danger zone. The assumption is that residents and workers inside a circle centered at 
the incident site, with a given impact radius, will experience the same undesirable 
consequence, and residents/workers outside this circle will experience no undesirable 
consequence. Although most researchers agree on the need to include risks in route 
selection for hazardous materials transport; they do not agree on how transport risk 
should be modeled. 
Other prominent models include: traditional risk, population exposure, incident 
probability, perceived risk, and conditional risk. Some analysts use population 
exposure. Others multiply population exposure by the amount of material being 
shipped. Still others try to estimate the expected fatalities, injuries, environmental 
impacts, and dollar damages. When these latter measures are used, accident 
probabilities must be multiplied by conditional probabilities that other events will 
occur in succession (e.g. a catastrophic release given that an accident has occurred). 
The conditional risk model can be viewed as a multiplicative multi-attribute model, 
where the first attribute is traditional risk and the second attribute is incident 
probability.  
2.7  Application of Geographic Information System in TRA 
According to Chang [111] a Geographic Information System (GIS) is a computer 
system for capturing, storing, querying, analyzing, and displaying geospatial data. 
This application also called geographically referenced data, geospatial data are data 
that describe both the locations and the characteristics of spatial features such as 




In recent years GIS has been used for crime analysis, emergency planning, land 
records, market analysis, and transportation application. As for HAZMAT team GIS 
will performs search for optimum routes and provides navigation guidance to 
emergency vehicles for quickly reaching disaster sites. Its real-time traffic detection 
component acquires and up-dates dynamic traffic information such as route condition 
and traffic delays in real-time using various types of sensors. 
 
Effective use of the GIS technology depends upon detailed knowledge of how real-
world spatial objects and entities are represented. GIS supports three separate data 
models vector data, raster data and triangulated irregular networks (TINs). Vector 
data are represented with points, lines, or polygons. They can all be characterized by a 
series of X, Y coordinate pairs. The representation of spatial data in a continuous 
coordinate space permits the closest approximation of the original spatial feature and 
thereby improves the accuracy of analysis. Therefore, the relationships among spatial 
entities are stored explicitly or can be computed when needed [112].  Raster data can 
either be a picture file, such as a bitmap file, or it can be a gridded data file 
represented with grids, where each cell in the grid has a particular value. TINs are 
particularly useful for surface representation and three-dimensional mapping. The 
data usually is stored in a file format called coverage or shape file. Individual 
coverage or theme can be displayed or removed depending on the intended 
application. Each of coverage is linked to an attribute table so that information is 
available on the individual features, or records, of the theme. The capacity to retain 
the spatial integrity of georeferenced data distinguishes a GIS from other 
computerized data management systems [113]. 
 
GIS software has integrated the algorithms into an analysis environment utilising a 
common spatial data model. The first phase of GIS development is exemplified by the 
development of analysis tools such as SYMAP (System of Map Analysis Package) 
and Map Algebra (Map Analysis Package) in the late 1960s and early 1970s at 
Laboratory of computer graphics and spatial analysis at Harvard Graduate School of 
Design. These early GIS packages were written for specific applications and required 
the mainframe computing systems found usually in government or university settings. 




M&S computing (later Intergraph) and Environmental Systems Research Institute 
(ESRI) emerged as the leading vendors of GIS software. In 1981, ESRI released 
Arc/Info, a standard package which ran on mainframe computers. As computing 
power increased and hardware prices plummeted in the 1980s, GIS became a viable 
technology for state and municipal planning. In 1992, ESRI released ArcView, a 
desktop mapping system with a graphical user interface that marked a major 
improvement in usability over Arc/Info‟s command-line interface. The GIS 
technology has extended to the current integration of topological data structures, and 
Relational Database Management System RDBMS such as ESRI‟s ARC/INFO and 
Intergraph‟s Modular GIS Environment (MGE). Virtually all GIS and image analysis 
software packages are sold with specific programming languages. Changes in the 
industry are supporting the need for knowledge of Visual Basic, VB.Net or other 




2.8 The Application of GIS for HAZMAT Transportation 
In order to perform an accurate TRA, the knowledge of territorial information of 
comparable accuracy is of paramount importance. Data for local distribution of 
population, incident rates, and weather conditions are gathered. Lepofsky et al. [109] 
have first proposed to integrate GIS into TRA to manage those kinds of information. 
GIS is a combination of computer software, hardware, and data that can be 
manipulates and to be analyzed, and presents information that is tied to a spatial 
location. GIS contain both geometry data (coordinates and topological information) 
and attribute data, i.e., information describing the properties of geometrical spatial 
objects such as points, lines, and areas.  
 
In the work of Lepofsky et al. [109], GIS was employed to develop transportation 
networks that incorporate both physical and operational characteristics, and overlay 
these networks on other spatially referenced data. Fedra [114] proposed to employ 
GIS in the spatial TRA. GIS capable to map risks clearly and a powerful tool for risk 
assessment [113]. The integration of GIS and simulation models, together with the 
necessary databases and expert systems, within a common and interactive graphical 
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user interface could make for more powerful, easy-to-use and easy-to-understand risk 
information systems.  
 
GIS is capable to become a central tool and user interface, databases of hazardous 
installations and hazardous chemicals which are linked in a hypertext structure. GIS 
application is also included as the tool for spatial risk assessment based on externally 
generated risk contours and it assist to describe the accidental and continuous 
atmospheric releases or toxic dispersions and transportation risk analysis. 
 
2.9 The Application of GIS for Air Dispersion Consequences 
Atmospheric dispersion modelling is the mathematical simulation of how air 
pollutants disperse in the ambient atmosphere. It is performed with computer 
programs that solve the mathematical equations and algorithms which simulate the 
pollutant dispersion such as chlorine, ammonia and etc. Currently, there are five types 
of air dispersion models, which are normally used in computer simulations for 
calculating the effects of toxic gas dispersions [115]:  
 
 Gaussian model: The Gaussian model is perhaps the oldest and the most 
accepted computational approach to calculate the concentration of a pollutant 
at a certain point. The origin of the Gaussian model is found in work by Sutton 
[116], Pasquill [117, 118], and Gifford [119, 120]. Gaussian models are most 
often used for predicting the dispersion of continuous, buoyant air pollution 
plumes originating from ground-level or elevated sources. Gaussian models 
may also be used for predicting the dispersion of non-continuous air pollution 
plumes (called puff models). A Gaussian model also assumes that one of the 
seven stability categories, together with wind speed, can be used to represent 
any atmospheric condition when it comes to calculating dispersion. There are 
several versions of the Gaussian plume model. A classic equation is the 
Pasquill-Gifford model. Pasquill [121] suggested that to estimate dispersion 
one should measure the horizontal and vertical fluctuation of the wind. 
Pasquill categorized the atmospheric turbulence into six stability classes 
named A, B, C, D, E and F with class A being the most unstable or most 




 Lagrangian model: a Lagrangian dispersion model mathematically follows 
pollution plume parcels (also called particles) as the parcels move in the 
atmosphere and they model the motion of the parcels as a random walk 
process. Lagrangian modelling well described by number of studies by 
Eliassen [122], Hanna [123] and Robert et al., [124]. Lagrangian modelling is 
often used to cover longer time periods, up to years [125]. 
 
 Box model: The simplest approach to estimating pollutant concentrations 
over a given domain is to implement a single box model. As the name implies, 
the principle is to identify an area of the ground, usually rectangular, as the 
lower face of a cuboid which extends upward into the atmosphere [126]. Box 
models which assume uniform mixing throughout the volume of a three 
dimensional box are useful for estimating concentrations, especially for first 
approximations [127]. Box model is well discusses by Derwent et al., [128] 
and Middleton [129, 130]. 
 
 Eulerian model: Eulerian dispersions model is similar to a Lagrangian model 
in that it also tracks the movement of a large number of pollution plume 
parcels as they move from their initial location. The most important difference 
between the two models is that the Eulerian model uses a fixed three-
dimensional Cartesian grid. 
 
 Dense gas model:  Dense gas models simulate the dispersion of dense gas 
plumes (i.e., pollution plumes that are heavier than air). The most commonly 
used dense gas models are the DEGADIS model [131] developed by Dr. Jerry 
Havens and Dr. Tom Spicer at the University of Arkansas under commission 
by the US Coast Guard and the US Environmental Protection Agency.  
 
By integrating air dispersion modelling as above, under GIS environment, the output 
of the pollutant records can be obtained in the form of spatial records. In the toxic 
dispersion impact model, it relationship to geographical data should be self evident. 
Thus, for more complex models that go beyond the classical Gaussian plume models, 
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topographic data, surface roughness, and surface temperatures are important input 
parameters [132]. The prediction of the magnitude of impacts is often undertaken by 
the application of simulation models [133]. The obtained result will most often be a 
map of the value of a given environmental descriptor (e.g., concentration of an air 
pollutant) at any location within the study area. The extension of environmental 
impacts can therefore be estimated from the spatial distribution of environmental 
quality values predicted for each alternative. Many models have been coupled with 
GIS in the past decade to simulate various environmental processes as described by 
Longley et al. [134]. 
 
In transportation risk analysis, the used of dispersion models were suggested by 
Zhang, et al [135] to incorporate  route selection for HazMat transportation to find 
minimal risk paths on a network, while the Gaussian plume model is employed to 
model the air pollution dispersion .  However, the analysis does not consider other 
parameters, such as accident rate, road tanker trip, traffic volume, and the sequence of 
the accident event, since an accident is normally propagated more than one incident 
outcomes. 
 
The information on surrounding locations in the model is treated by adopting raster 
GIS framework. The raster framework transforms a continuous space into a discrete 
one by modeling it as a tessellation of square arid cells called pixels. Raster is 
commonly used to approximate continuous surfaces in GIS. Raster GIS are organized 
to a few number of layers, one assigned to each characteristic of interest. The 
traditional raster GIS overlay techniques were used to predict the spatial 
consequences of potential releases of airborne HazMat in a network. 
 
Verter and Kara [136] set up a model to assess the total transport risk as well as the 
equity of its spatial distribution. They employed GIS to manage territorial information 
during the risk analysis of transportation network.  A GIS-based model that was 
suitable for representing the HazMat transportation was constructed for Quebec and 
Ontario areas. Bubbico et al. [101, 104] which pointed out that the TRA tool 
developed based on the GIS approach allows risk assessment for various 
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transportation modes and permits to rapidly investigate possible benefits resulting 
from changes of routes. 
 
 
2.10 Transportation Accident Trends Based on Available Accident Database 
 
Accident prevention and mitigation of consequences is the focus of a number of 
industry programmes and regulatory initiatives. There are two basic types of 
information; first is a database consisting of standardized fields of data usually for a 
large number of incidents and second is a database for a more detailed report on an 
individual incident. Analysis of these accident history databases can provide a better 
insight into accident prevention needs. While the analysis and conclusions obtained 
from the accident database is often limited by the shortcomings of the databases 
themselves, the fact remains that accident history databases are very useful and can be 
a powerful tool in focusing risk reduction efforts. The conclusions can be used to 
systematically identify the greatest risks to allow prioritization of efforts to improve 
process safety. 
 
There are a number of major accident databases such as the Major Hazard Incidents 
Data Service (MHIDAS) [59], the Explosion Incidents Data Service (EIDAS) [64] 
and the Environmental Incidents Data Service (EnvIDAS) of the Safety and 
Reliability Directorate (SRD) [59, 64]; the Failure and Accident Technical 
Information System (FACTS) of TNO [57]; the Major Accident Reporting System 
(MARS) of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) [58]; and World 
Offshore Accident Database (WOAD) of Veritas Offshore Technology [62] and many 
others.  
 
Cannon and Bendell have developed an account of data banks and databases given in 
Reliability Data Banks [73]. As mentioned by Lees [64], Fragola [42] has reviewed 
reliability databases from a historical aspect, suggested the possible improvements of 
reliability database development [62]. So far, there are two main types of databases 
known as the incident database and the reliability database. The incident database 
does not have the inventory of items at risk and concentrates on the attributes and 
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development of the incidents. The information available is often limited to whatever 
is recorded at that particular time.  
 
The reliability database may record the incidents better, and it treats them primarily as 
events from which statistical value on reliability, availability and maintainability can 
be derived [9]. Written report supported by graphics and photos are often published 
by various agencies and provided on governmental websites. There are also higher 
institutions and corporate organizations that compile the transportation hazardous 
incidents and publish them in their websites.  
 
Since about 1996, the US Environmental Protection Agency (under the Chemical 
Emergency Preparedness and Prevention) has investigated and reported on many high 
profiles US chemical plant and refinery hazardous incident. As the result of these 
investigations, classifications of incidents have been developed [63] to assist in future 
investigation. Although there are many accident databases such as MHIDAS, MARS, 
NSTB, IChemE accident database, Unep/Apell/disaster etc. Perhaps, FACTS online 
database was the best major hazard online database for analyzing of accidents in the 
transportation of hazardous material study due to several reasons such as the 
information contained in FACTS is generally more complete and according to study 
requirement, compare from other databases and it is well structured for analyzing 
trends and obtaining general statistics. The abstracts are very accessible, so that even 
the most complex accidents are easy to comprehend as shown in Table (2-4), for 
comparison of major hazard online database basis. 
 
According to the previous case studies from MHIDAS (Major Hazard Incident Data 
Service) database, [74] majority of HAZMAT transportation accidents occurred in a 
highly populated area (66%) compared to low populated areas (12%) and rural areas 
(22%) [137]. This trend is similar to the percentage obtained by other authors (Cheng 
Beng et al. [102], Planas et al [138], and the percentage have increased during the last 
decades as reported  by Godoy  et al. [139]. In the tunnels, the accident may develop 




Table 2- 4: shows selected list of major accident database 
Name of accident 
database 
Developer Contents/ Features / Source of information  Applications 
 
















i) Contains more than 23,000 accidents records. 
ii) Gathered the information about near-misses, minor accidents and major accidents 
associated with hazardous materials (with tutorial on how to use the database) 
iii) The accidents are coded in abstracts making the existing data suitable for risk analysis, 
risk management, damage prevention and statistics. The abstracts are very accessible, so 
that even the most complex accidents are easy to comprehend.  
iv) Features of the database are a schedule of accident attributes and values and a 
hierarchical keyword structure. Another structure is the cause classification in which the 
course of the accident is translated into a sequence of occurrences. 
v) The information is often obtained from professional sources, such as accident reports 
made by companies, government agencies or from publications in technical periodicals 
and other literature. (Have free sample for unlicensed users of about ~ 80 records) 
  
(i) Analysis of the role of instrumentation in accidents; 
(ii) analysis of incorrect human response and (iii) 
compilation of a reference book to trace incident causes 
(the Cause Book), giving a survey of incident causes 
which can occur in a large number of systems and 
operations. (Can perform statistical analysis according 
to specific circumstances, for each specific event). 
Application not for:- Nuclear materials and military 








UK Health Safety 
Executive 
i) Database was established in 1985 
ii) Contains coded information on reports of some 11,000 major accidents which are in the 
public domain. The database is updated quarterly and is available to users via various 
media including compact disc and internet. 
iii) Contains incident from over 95 countries throughout the world, particularly USA, UK, 
Canada, France, Germany and India. 
iv) No tutorial, and user guide on how to use the database 
v) No free sample of MHIDAS accident database and not free access. 
 
 Provide comprehensive accident database, involving 
the transportation, storage and processing of hazardous 
materials, which considered had the potential to cause 
off-site impact. Incidents which incurred casualties, 
required evacuation of either on-site or off-site 
personnel or caused damage to property or the natural 
environment, together with incidents. Application not 
for:-Types of incidents, involving radioactive materials 











i) It is a hybrid between a database and a report-based system. The data is structured it 
contains extensive text descriptions of the incidents. In accordance with the call of the 
"Seveso II Directive" for a more open access to information on major accident hazards 
ii) Currently about 450 cases available to the public. 
 The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) was 
established to handle the information on 'major 
accidents submitted by Member States of the European 
Union to the European Commission in accordance with 
the provisions of the 'Seveso Directive' 
 
Notes: other major accident database: - a) UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME Industry and Environment Center (UNEP IE) This site contains the chemical accident database, 
APELL, compiled from various government sources by UNEP. b) Department of Transportation (DOT) _Hazardous Material Incident Reporting System (HMIRS) This reporting system includes all 
modes of transportation except pipelines. c) Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), maintains a private database. Only members that contribute incidents to the database are allowed to view the 




2.11 Smart Advisory System in HazMat TRA 
Recently, there have been quite a number of research studies related to the safety 
aspects of hazardous materials transportation which have shown that the transport of 
hazardous materials to and from factories plays an important role in determining the 
overall risk to an area. However, most of these research studies, concentrate mainly 
on the following areas: alternative HAZMAT routes [6, 98, 99, 102, 103, 141], risk 
assessment methodologies [143-145], dispersion and probabilistic models [100-107, 
142, 146-148], and studies on transport guidelines and criteria.  
 
Thus, in this section, the existing literatures are reviewed to assess risks from 
transportation of hazardous material by utilising smart advisory system (decision 
support system). Since historical evidence has shown that incidents due to hazardous 
materials (HazMat) releases during transportation can lead to severe consequences, 
the public and some agencies such as the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
express concern with regard to hazard associated with HazMat transportation. Many 
hazards can be identified, controlled or eliminated through use of risk analysis. The 
assessment of the hazard related to transportation of dangerous goods is a reasonable 
basis for any policy of risk management and reduction.  
 
Spadoni et al. [99] reported that most of the features of risk assessment in transport 
networks are complex and a long computing time is required, compared to fixed plant 
risk assessment. An accident might occur at any point along the way, so that the 
analyst has to simulate at a different traveling accident point by considering linear risk 
source equivalent to a great number of point risk sources. In summary, when the risk 
sources are moving: this means that most of the parameters involved such as 
meteorological conditions, wind direction, population density and etc, change along 
the itinerary. This problem create a great obstacle to the wider use of TRA, therefore 
the need to limit the calculation burden imposes the need for the use of simplify 
assumptions and a fast running computer facility [98, 99]. Bubbico et al. [98,141] 
have also addressed and highlighted similar points of consequences and its 
uncertainties due to the applications of TRA methodology to determine the hazard 
represented by transportation of hazardous material [141]. Transportation Risk 
Analysis (TRA) presents in computer-aided approach is a powerful tool in HazMat 
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transportation decision support system. It is helpful in choosing alternate route/s by 
providing information on risks associated with each route, and in selecting appropriate 
risk reduction alternatives by demonstrating the effectiveness of various alternatives. 
 
Spadoni et al [27, 145] used a computer program to assess transportation of hazardous 
material based on numerical procedure which overcomes the difficulties outlined from 
manual scrutiny calculations to evaluate risk levels and to test the suitability of 
alternatives choices using valid acceptability criteria in  quantifying risk arising from 
road transport of either flammable or toxic substances [8,99]. Bubbico et al [28, 141] 
proposed TrHazGis as an integrated computer aided program approach, based on GIS 
Arcview 3.1 Map Risk software to TRA. The proposed program TrHazGis 
successfully perform more accurate risk estimates, substantial reduce the time 
required to perform the analysis, a simplification of the data input step, and able to 
display the result on the area map [141].  
 
Chee Beng G. et al. [102] developed a methodology for the risk analysis of road 
transportation of hazardous chemicals (LPG) in Singapore. In these studies, the 
researchers used PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools) version 4.1 to 
evaluate the fatality zone for each of the identified hazards for the various zones of 
the route. The calculations for the likelihood of release, and estimating event of the 
event frequencies were done via manual calculations. A group of researchers at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), California State University have 
developed software tools for estimating the risk associated with truck and rail 
transport of hazardous cargos [149]. The software has been developed in conjunction 
with commercially available. S.M. Godoy et al.[139] have developed a software name 
STRAPP (Stochastic Toxic Release Risk Assessment Package) for risk assessment 
and emergency planning (safe distance calculation). STRAPP used Monte Carlo 
modeling approach in order to improve the system capabilities, for risk calculation of 
particulate matter diffusion and hazardous gas diffusion of light, neutral and heavy 
gases. STRAPP used DEGADIS software to present the Gaussian modified diffusion 
dispersion model. Godoy et al. [139] did not considered fire and explosions model in 




Abkowitz and Associates, Inc. [150] in association with Vanderbilt University 
developed multimodal of hazardous materials management transport risk tool. The 
software is an integrated system database, map analysis modules and management 
reporting by identifying high-risk operation, evaluating risk reduction alternatives and 
emergency planning.  
 
Other popular software models are CASRAM, Chemical Accident Stochastic Risk 
Assessment Model (Argonne National Laboratories, 2005), FIREPLUME, to predict 
consequences of toxic chemicals released from a vehicle fire that burns the hazardous 
material cargo (Argonne National Laboratories, 2005), SPILL, to estimate transient 
(including two-phased) release from a pressurized vessel (Oakridge National 
Laboratories, 2005), HEGADAS, to estimate the consequences of steady state or 
transient release of dense vapor, and to help to predict near-field and far-field 
consequences (Oakridge National Laboratories, 2005). These models have been used 
by United States Department of Transportation for carrying out risk assessment 
studies (Argonne National Laboratories, 2005; Oakridge National Laboratories, 2005) 
[150, 151]. 
 
Arthur Little Inc. [64] has developed transportation Risk Screening Model (ADLTRS) 
as a tool for determining risk to people and environment posed via chemical 
transportation operations. The program offers Microsoft PC and DOS 3 and greater 
based tools to evaluate and categorize the risks associated with differences between 
chemicals, transportation modes and routes. It offers rankings that can be used for a 
large number of movements. Easy-to-use techniques consider the chemical, transport 
mode, container type, distance, route characteristics and annual volume. Final results 
are placed in risk categories to establish relative ranking. Technica, Inc., Software 
Products Division has developed (SAFETI) software, which is an integrated set of 
computer programs designed to automate the risk assessment of chemical and 
petrochemical facilities involving the manufacture, storage, and transport of toxic and 
flammable materials.  
 
The consequences calculation of possible accidental releases and their impact based 
on event frequency to produce measures of risk such as Risk Contour Plots and FN 
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curves. SAFETI is basically composed by DOS3.3 and higher, Math Microprocessor 
[5, 6, 152]. Yuanhua et al. developed decision support system of quantitative risk 
assessment for transportation hazardous material used fuzzy logic programming, 
CANARY software for consequences modeling, and GIS [152, 153]. Leonelli et al 
developed TRAT2 [27] software for the evaluation of hazardous materials 
transportation risk. TRAT2 is basically composed by tree executable codes (written in 
C++ and FORTRAN languages) and Microsoft access database to which 
communicate through direct access libraries. Based on the above mentioned, most of 
the research studies have shown that the analyses of transportation risk are depending 
on the availability of data/databases, commercially available software, and expert 
knowledge.  
 
Abkowitz et al. [154] carried out a study on the use of GIS in managing hazardous 
materials, and have found that GIS is ideally suited for minimum path identification 
and risk computations, because it allows the integration of the transportation system 
with the environment.  Saccomano et al. [155] presented an interactive model for 
routing transportation of dangerous goods through an urban road network. The model 
computes minimum risk routes based on each segment origin and destination, where 
risk is estimated considering accident rates, spill probability, spill impact area and 
population exposed. Many techniques have been proposed for solving multi-objective 
vehicle routing and scheduling problems. There are 3 main categories:- 
 
 Scalar Method- These methods use mathematical transformation, like 
weighted linear aggregation. They have some disadvantages, like the 
difficulty of eliciting the weights and the facts that they may not be able to 
find all the Pareto optimal solutions. However, these techniques are quite 
simple to implement and can be used with any of the single-objective 
heuristics described in literature. 
 
 Pareto Methods- These methods apply the notion of pareto dominance to 
evaluate solutions or to compare solutions. This concept is frequently used 




 Non-scalar and non-pareto algorithms-These methods, which often 
consider the different objectives separately  
 
Table 2-5 shows the routing management for hazardous materials transportation. Most 
of the researchers use GIS as a tool to map the location with several attributes within 
the origin to destination of the shipment. In 1994 the Sandia National Laboratory 
produces a software name MOSA (multi-objective spatial Analysis) [157]. As refer to 
Pawnhar et al. [156], they have explained the application of MOSA and RISKCHEM 
to demonstrate the analysis and to evaluate the consequences of hazmat risk after 
accident. The researchers such as Spadoni et al. [27, 44, 159, 160], Bubbico et al. [28, 
141,142] have developed new software in order to enhance the previous software 
weaknesses. The development of ARIPAR-GIS software in year of 1990 for risk 
assessment which has some limitation of application forces the researcher to enhance 
the software application by producing TRAT2 [158]. TRAT2 provide the user with 
greater application in global risk assessment for HazMat transportation. With 
collaboration with researchers from Pisa University the main result is a standardized 
approach should be developed for the release characterization and the consequence 
assessment in quantitative hazardous material transportation risk analysis, in order to 
obtain significant and consistent values of the different risk indexes to be really useful 
for risk comparison and decision-making. The limitations of ARIPAR-GIS software 
encouraged the development of OPTIPATH software [159-160]. OPTIPATH 
determine alternative paths, whose risk values are lower than those of the routes 
usually chosen by drivers on the basis of economical and practical considerations. The 
OPTIPATH procedure is a risk-based routing methodology, which performs the 
evaluation of these alternative paths. It determines the flow of each chemical on each 
arc so as to send all trucks from their origin to destination while minimizing the total 
cost of transport and honoring risk acceptability criteria. Acknowledges by Scenna et 
al. [161] the awareness of dispersion of hazmat also develop the STRRAP software 
and it capability has been improve year by year. This tool is based on a method which 
lets the handling of stochastic uncertainty of atmospheric parameters, critical when 
calculating risk, especially when hazardous gases or particulate matter diffusions 
occur as a result of an accidental release or emission. The development of new 
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software for routing management nowadays helps most logistics company in reducing 
cost.  
 
The product from ESRI which is Arc Logistics allows users to specify a route renewal 
point at any number of user specified locations. Arc Logistics Route solver 
functionality includes an advanced routing and scheduling algorithm that has proven 
itself in deployments across numerous industries. The benefits of Arc Logistics Route 
extend beyond calculating routes and being able to accommodate "normal" situations. 
Logistics management is seldom routine, and the assurance of having a robust and 
tested solver functionality will save time and money and conserve resources when 
demands are high. The Arc Logistics Route solver functionality accommodates a wide 
range of routing and scheduling problems. Lue and Colorni [162], explained the 
capability of DSS as a support system for hazardous material transport can be divide 
into two which are i. public decision making and ii. vehicle guidance. The 
development of software for routing management and risk analysis in supporting GIS 
for hazmat transportation is very important to ensure the safe condition for all. The 
different of location, type of product and populations make the necessary of 




Table 2-5: Software and their features involved in chemical transportation risk analysis and routing management. 
 
Name of the 
software 
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2.12 Discussions Analysis for Proposed A Smart Advisory System of 
Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis Based on Malaysia 
Scenario. 
A thorough analysis was made as discussed in previous section in Chapter 2 on the 
current worldwide development and practice of Smart Advisory System (SAS) for 
hazardous materials transportation risk analysis; therefore it can be adopted into 
Malaysia scenario. Since the development of SAS for Hazmat TRA is dependent on 
the type of TRA model which is being used, therefore a careful analysis must be 
undertaken on the existing TRA model before it can be applied and programmed in 
SAS. The TRA may need to be modified and upgraded before it can be applied into 
the SAS. The correct selection of TRA software is vital, since the result of risk 
analysis for safest route for a HazMat transportation from a road network can be 
generated. The correct and reliable TRA software is also vital since the risk points 
which are need to be analyzed along the route are enormous and furthermore each 
HazMat carries a different level of consequences. Due to the differences in 
consequences, different model consequences are utilized for accident scenario 
involving fire, explosion and toxic release. Scenario can become more complicated if 
the collision involving more than 2 trucks which are transporting different hazardous 
material. In section 2.9, it is stated that there are few available software which are 
used in TRA model, however there are some limitation in the TRA software, such as 
DEGADIS (Fortran 90) which is used in STRAPP can only recognize the safe 
distance calculation for truck tanker which carry toxic release dispersion impact with 
no ignition such as chlorine, therefore it is not suitable for the fire and explosion 
cases. Meanwhile due to its chemical characteristics, chlorine has a potential to create 
an incident similar to UVCE incident especially if the ignition source spark within the 
chlorine zone release area. Therefore in this research, the aim is to develop a suitable 
SAS which is capable to analyze the impact of HazMat transportation accident 
according to Malaysia scenario. The proposed TRA model which is programmed into 
SAS must approximate to the actual HazMat risk on the road. Consideration on few 
factors will be discussed further in subsection 2.10.1 and 2.10.2 according to objective 




2.12.1  Analisis from  the existing TRA model of hazardous materials  
In Malaysia unfortunately, there is no TRA guideline available for reference. 
Therefore, the existing TRA guidelines have been reviewed, analyzed and modified 
before they are utilized in Malaysia as a guideline for hazardous materials 
transportation.  
 
In this study, several major TRA guidelines were reviewed such as Center for 
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Risk Assessment Subcommittee (RASC) [11, 20- 
22, 25, 32, 33], Health Safety and Executive United Kingdom (HSEUK) for the 
assessment of societal risk for the road transportation of hazardous chemicals [8], 
Swiss federal Office for Environmental Protection, Forestry and Landscape 
(BUWAL) [32, 73] and others published TRA researchers work such as Rhyne [25],  
Leonelli et al. [44, 98], Spadoni et al. [99] and Bubbico et al. [100, 101, 103, 104, 
141].  
 
In order to recognize a suitable TRA guideline, all mathematical models in TRA 
analysis as in CCPS of the AIChE [11, 19-22], BUWAL [73] and other guidelines 
[25, 167] were reviewed. The review was done for the assumptions, parameters and 
definitions which were utilized in those TRA models. Subsequently, the possibilities, 
data and parameters which were required for the proposed model were recognized. 
Every changes made onto the proposed model were ensured that they did not alter the 
original objective of the particular model that is going to be developed.  After the 
thorough review of the previous guidelines and TRA studies, few factors were 
considered for development of Malaysia TRA model; 
 
 CCPS [21, 22], Rhyne [25] and BUWAL [73] methodology has introduced its 
owned method in determining the frequency of incident scenario. In CCPS 
[21], the formula model of frequency of incident scenario included trips per 
year. Every trips delivery is counted to get the average probability of accident 
rate to occur. The road is segmented less than one mile for suburban and urban 
area and longer than one mile for rural area or no settlement to define better 
potential accident rate along the route taken. The type of accident occurs such 
as collision, obstruction, and truck speeding also is take into account to 
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analyze the impaction to human and surrounding areas and to verify the result 
of hole sizes gained from the impaction. The length and number of release 
location zone, probability of wind blows direction and probability of fatality at 
the affected zone track are also introduced as the longer the track the higher 
the rate of accident. Thus, data of accurate route length, wind direction are 
needed in order to avoid uncertainty. 
 
 While BUWAL [73] is proposing alternative way in identifying the frequency 
of accident rate by introducing parameter likes yearly number of accident 
goods. This parameter is used to estimate the number of transporting 
dangerous goods by dividing the annually transported quantity of dangerous 
good by the average of the road tanker. Probability of damages is also 
suggested by assuming that all materials relevant for a representative incident 
scenario are transported more or less in similar quantities and containers, so 
that a uniform release and ignition rate are introduced in the case of burning 
and explosion. The rate of release and ignition values is determined from the 
collected information sources and Swiss data. The Accident Rate of the total 
traffic (ART) is calculated according to Swiss VSS-directive, (1990). The 
accident rates of Runway Road Corresponding categories (highways; semi-
highways; around roads (outside Localities) and main roads (inside and 
Federal)) are selected from the  data as listed in the table (2-3). However, 
logically every accident that occurs at any point does not have the same 
accident rate. Therefore, the accident rate for different highway; semi-highway 
and mains road must have different value no matter in any place whatsoever. 
Thus, the accident rate value from Swiss VSS-directive can not be used in 
determine the transportation risk analysis at Malaysia. 
 Rhyne [25] methodology used probability as a weightage value to estimate 
such as population distribution, meteorological condition, that the accident 
may occur from value 0 until 1. The worse accident may have high value of 
probability. However, probability factors indicator are not easily quantified, 
such as the presence of schools, very high building offices and hospitals that 
are not easily evacuated, the presence of reservoir at accident residential area 




 Meanwhile, the difference in the CCPS-TRA methodology compared with 
other methods, CCPS complete extensive use of parameters for example 
length of release some of of LPG from the starting point until to the location 
of the accident. This length of road is introduced in calculation to find the 
accurate the rate accident before the gas release, the longer the track the higher 
the rate of accident. Thus the length of the release location is needed to avoid 
uncertainty. Probability of a fatality accident at the accident location are 
accounted for in accordance with wind direction and release location of 
hazardous material. If wind direction heading to high population, so the 
fatalities may higher. Therefore, road transportation can be divided into two 
segments which is urban and suburban areas. Urban areas may has the higher 
population compared to suburban areas, so this situation may affect fatality at 
some location. Moreover in CCPS the consequences area is calculated based 
on established models for fire, explosion, toxic gases  as in CPQRA [11]. This 
consequences calculation method is much more better compared to BUWAL 
and Rhyne methodology. For instance, in BUWAL methodology, gasoline is 
used as the reference substance in all type of fire incident cases, LPG 
represents any explosion incident cases while chlorine and ammonia represent 
any toxic release cases in the RRI and RSS calculations as in Eq. (2-2). Thus 
the above assumptions create more uncertainty in the risk result calculation. 
Meanwhile in Rhyne [25] methodology the severity of consequences  accident 
is based on probability value (according to numerical evaluation of truck 
accident scenario frequencies from selected state route in United State of 
America) 
 
 The accident rate for CCPS is counting per segmented of mile while BUWAL 
in a measurement of kilometer. It should be no problem with the unit 
conversion. But, mathematically 1 mile give 1.6 km which is ideally 1 km per 
segmented will result better risk assessment of multiple ring display in GIS 
programming. 
 
 Since transportation accident is unpredictable therefore it can occur at any 
time, any location and without warning. This situation will made the 
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calculations of consequences from the accident can become more complex 
since some parameters such as atmospheric stability class distributions, the 
ambient temperature and humidity (which are dominant contributors in the 
TRA analysis), are changing along the route. For example, to estimate the 
probability that wind blows in the direction concerns during HazMat 
transportation as in Eq. (2-10), the meteorological conditions such as wind 
direction must be determined from 16 probability of wind directions based on  
their weight age ratio; N, NNE, NE, ENE, E, ESE, SE, SSE, S, 
SSW,SW,WSW,W,WNW, NW and NNW.   
 
 The severity of injury or damage caused by the release of hazardous materials 
depends on the number and the nature of population distribution surrounding 
the area. In the TRA model the injury, fatality, or damaged caused by the 
release of chemicals are difficult to be estimated due to population distribution 
(density) constantly changes along the selected route. Therefore, the 
calculation to estimate the population density as in Eq. (2-11) and the 
probability of fatality as in Eq. (2-12), should be repeated at every point of the 
road segment.  
 
Spadoni et al. [99] and Bubbico et al. [28, 101, 141, 142] had simplified the 
calculation in the developed guidelines of Center for Chemical Process Safety 
of American Institute of Chemical Engineers [19-22] and proposed the 
application of GIS technology, in order to overcome the variation of the 
population density changes along the road. However those methodologies 
have a constraint on their capability to extract data (available data) such as 
accident rate, traffic volume or knowledge of territorial information of the 
selected route transportation from relevant organization due to their limited 
computer hardware capability.  
 
 In reality, the population and environment closer to the source of an event is 
expected to experience more severe consequences than those farther than it. 
As the distance from the event increases, the consequences of such an event 
decreases. Thus the assumption of uniform distribution across the impact area 
used as in Eq. (2-10) – Eq. (2-12) in CCPS [21, 22], as in Eq. (2-8) in Rhyne 
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[25], and as in Eq. (2-2) – Eq. (2-4) in Swiss risk methodology (BUWAL) [73] 
may note correctly represent actual condition and may lead to a 
misrepresentation of risk.  
 
 Based on the assumptions in CCPS guidelines [11, 21, 22] as reported in 
section 2.6, the individual risk, IRx,y (chances per year), is defined as the 
probability that an individual will die or injured by the consequences of the 
transportation hazard at a specific geographical location, within each portion 
of route can be expressed as in Eq. (2-10). Equation (2-10) permits the 
estimation of how individual risk changes with variable distance from the 
route. According to CCPS guidelines [11, 21, 22], the value of Pi, j, k will be 
equal to 0, if the hazard does not reach location x, y. Therefore the term of Pi, j, 
k will be equal to the likelihood of the incident outcome multiplied by the 
chance of fatality at a given exposure to the hazardous outcome. Since 
researchers such as Spadoni et al. [99] and Bubbico et al. [141, 142]  and 
guideline of Center for Chemical Process Safety of American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers [19-22] define the individual risk as the risk to a person in 
the vicinity of a hazard and includes the nature of the injury to the individual, 
the likelihood of the injury occurring and the time period over which the 
injury might occur. However, the use of injuries as a basis for risk evaluation, 
are very limited to the data available on the level of injuries. Therefore, none 
of the TRA technique publication and software of risk analysis have 
introduced problems associated with the degree of injury in comparison to 
different types of injuries (such as thermal radiation effects vs. explosion 
effects vs. toxic effects). 
 It is realised that when different probit equations are used to estimate diverse 
consequences (for example, first-degree bums, second-degree bums, or 
lethality) on a given population, different categories will overlapped. Thus, all 
those individuals suffering second-degree burns will appear to have also 
suffered first-degree burns, and all those individuals who die due to thermal 
radiation will also have suffered second-degree burns. As a result,  the 
percentage of people that can be affected by the accident will become more 
than 100%. Therefore to avoid doublecounting, the overall damage 
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probabilities must be equal to 1.0.  Based on software risk analysis results, 
none of risk analysis software have been reported considered on this matter in 
the calculation [66, 182] 
 
 Severity resulted from a thermal radiation affects the survival ability of a 
victim. However, existing research were still contain many loopholes as few 
important factors are not considered such as age, total body burn surface area, 
type of fabric respond to a particular incident flux, antibiotics and etc. This 
explains why many death records showed up after few days after the actual 
event happened. The absence of this factor reduces the accuracy of a risk 
analysis during transportation. 
 
 For the thermal effects calculation, some researchers such as Bull et al. [163-
165] and Curreri et al. [166] have studied thermal radiation impact accident, 
and demonstrating the relationship between mortality and probits. So far the 
first application of probit analysis to human mortality was proposed by Bull 
[164]. Bull [164] works is very relevance to reality since he applied the 
analysis to burn injury mortality data. According to Bull [164], in the majority 
of cases, the exact diagnosis of burn depth injury was often very difficult, and 
subject to healing stages revision, presence of infection and likely to vary with 
the judgement of different clinicians. Therefore, Bull has reviewed his 
mortality analyses several times since1949 and finally successfully published 
his „burn injury probability‟ chart [165]. Bull „s chart showed strong 
relationship between percentages of the total body surface area (TBS) burned 
and  age with mortality. For instance, an injurious dose death relationship with 
a marked age effect such as elderly patients suffers a higher mortality for a 
given severity of injury. However, all of Bull [163-165], findings were not 
applied in the TRA risk software analysis such as TriHazGis [141], TRAT2 
[159], since most of the researchers such Bubbico  et. al [141-142], Spadoni 
et. al [159] are more comfort to programmed the existing TRA by using  
CCPS [21] and Rhyne [25].  
 
 The effect model assesses the consequence from hazardous incidents in CCPS 
[21]. The damage caused to the vulnerable receptor in terms of injury, fatality, 
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level of burns and structural damage are dependent on the intensity of the 
impact experienced by a person, structures and the exposure duration. 
However, the probit table in CCPS [11], is unable to predict probit value 
which has a conversion less than 1%, and the percentage result is not in 
decimal point at the range of 1% to 99%. Furthermore, there is difficult to 
introduce data from figures and tables into a computer code. 
 
 Accident rates are the most important components of a truck (HAZMAT) 
tanker risk analysis. Generally, the rate is affected by numerous parameters 
such as road conditions, environmental, trucking operation, types of road 
(urban, sub urban, rural and remote routes area). However, most of the truck 
tanker risk analyses are normally based on accident rates characteristic of 
broad classes of route types for which useful data are available [11, 20-22, 25, 
100, 101, 103, 104, 141]. Since the work of Radin[169] has been the 
foundation of the Malaysian road accident analysis, thus his work and MIROS 
will be considered as the basis for the study. 
 
 TRA model required a lot of data access. However, the data access has 
become more complicated since it may involve multi- agency and some 
informations are difficult to be gathered since they are depending on the 
efficiency of that particular department or organization in collecting, 
extracting, recording and updating their data. Therefore an efficient and 
accessible method of data storage also important since it can facilitate TRA 
analysis. 
 
 With the previous computer hardware, there is difficult to extract information, 
data or database in relation to TRA in order to obtain result for the risk 
analysis such as low speed or memory. However this problem has been 
overcome after the discovery of computer processor technology, such as i7 
technology millennium, which evolved from i5, i3, Core 2 Duo and become 
more efficient to upload more data and capable to read various data format 
[141, 142]. Unfortunately the current development of TRA analysis software 
which has developed is not in parallel with the development of the computer 
hardware. This is due to some of the version of TRA software is not upgraded 
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to be capable of converting and using directly the data format from available 
databases such as geo-data.    
 
 It is recognized that the TRA method which has been used in TRA software 
are still the same for instance, even though Health Safety Executive (HSE) of 
United Kingdom [24, 54] has produced many independent review guidelines 
to improved risk analysis for societal and individual in reference to the Control 
of Major Hazard Installations Regulations 1999 (COMAH), the improvement 
only noted on the approaches, assumptions, methods and models used by HSE. 
This is also observed for the UK Chemical Industries Association (CIA), 
IChemE, UK and the UK Petroleum Industries Association (UKPIA). 
Therefore an updated development and an efficient designed TRA software 
technology are required for implementations which comply with recent 
guidelines review. The impact of above matter will lead to the minimization of 
loophole in the chain of TRA methodology development and TRA software 
technology development at implementation level. 
 
 Most of the softwares that have been used by enforcement and research 
agencies in Malaysia such as Riskplot, Phast, Safeti, ALOHA, FRED in 
detailed Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study which involved 
hazardous materials installation, mainly focus on a fixed facility cases or 
pipeline of LNG. Based on the discussion with Department of Environment 
(DOE) Malaysia and analysis of Detailed Environmental Impact Assessment 
(DEIA) reports which was sent to DOE for licenses approval, it is concluded 
that none of TRA analysis software which have been used since EIA 
regulation 1989 has been enforced under the Environmental Quality Act law 
1974 in Malaysia [168]. 
 
 
2.12.2  Requirement to develop and design proposed SAS for hazardous 
materials transportation 
Based on the above reasons and previous discussion in Chapter 2, a review on 
available guidelines  and modification of TRA model were undertaken to fulfill the 




 The GIS technology will be applied to TRA, which capable to analyze the 
size, composition, distribution and change in population along the route. 
Moreover, GIS is a powerful tool for displaying and analyzing data during the 
planning, scoping, and problem formulation phases, during the exposure 
assessment, and displaying and evaluating the results of the risk 
characterization in tables and maps 
 To facilitate the data and database access for Hazmat analysis requirement, it 
is noted that some organization and department in Malaysia are practicing 
online data access for humidity, temperature, wind speed, accident rate and 
land use. For example MIROS, had recorded data of death from the accident 
and other related safety issues and on road traffic accidents and if the data are 
not available in the database, the data could be determined via MIROS 
published mathematical model [169-171] which is commonly used for 
estimating accident rate from a particular route. Data from CCPS and other 
resources can be utilized if it is not available in Malaysia, for example 
probability data for initiating event and data for incident outcome. 
 
 The accident rate mathematical model [169-171] is more suitable in the TRA 
analysis calculation in Malaysia compared to other models such as in CCPS of 
AIChE [11, 21, 22], BUWAL [73] and or other data [25, 32,33]. This is by 
considering some data such as accident rate, traffic flow etc depending on 
geographical characteristics and scenario accident in Malaysia. Data from 
CCPS, BUWAL and some other data from several researchers are only 
suitable to the geographical condition of that particular country.  The above 
factors are the reasons of why some TRA software such as TrHazGis [141], 
TRAT2 [27], and STRAPP [139] are not suitable for Malaysia usage. The 
result of TRA calculation is more accurate by using local data of the studied 
area. Therefore it will give an accurate picture of Malaysia accident scenario, 
its consequences and acceptable risk for any transportation of hazardous 
materials activities in Malaysia. 
 
 TRA analysis is usually involving a very wide territorial geographical. As a 
result, the risk analysis will require abundant interstate data, e. g accident rate, 
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population distribution and others.  In Malaysia, in order to facilitate the data 
extraction for all states has been made by developing a single agency to 
control and update all data for each state in Malaysia e.g. MIROS for traffic 
information, JPBD for land use information, Department of Statistic for 
population density and others similar purpose organizations.  
 
 Eventhough majority of risk assessments which have been conducted were 
based on fatal effects, however there are uncertainties on the exact fatal dose 
of thermal radiation, blast effect, or a toxic chemical to the severity of injury. 
Where it is desired to estimate injuries as well as fatalities, the calculation of 




Assessing the accident risk of a region implies the use of a complex methodology, 
requiring a lot of information such as population density, incident probability, hazards 
health and environment. Moreover, till to date, actual evidence from various major 
accident databases such as FACTS, MHIDAS and etc., have reported the impact from 
hazardous substances could result in death or injury to people, property damage or 
damage to the biophysical environment, through the effects of fire, explosion or 
toxicity. Special attention has to be paid to the potential risk that may arise from the 
transport of hazardous materials (HazMat) through large territorial areas, which, in 
some cases, are heavily populated. and difficult to predict where and when the 
accident will be occurred. 
 
An increasing number of transportation accidents involving dangerous substances 
have occurred worldwide, giving place to major awareness in government, industry 
and community ways to improve safety management of hazardous materials 
transportation. 
 
Amongst the three major TRA guidelines, the CCPS Model is the most simplified. 
This acquires a simpler estimation of the model. If compared to the Rhyne Model, 
there are more parameter involves and it seems to give more accuracy of the 
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estimation.  Since the Rhyne Model is more complicated, it needs special attention for 
the parameter to be selected. For the BUWAL Model, the parameter includes the 
traffic composition and volume. But BUWAL Model is more empirical, since the 
traffic composition and population are referring the Swiss conditions. 
 
Based on the literature, no work has been conducted on the designing and developing 
on a smart advisory system for hazardous material transportation risk analysis using 
quantitative approach according to Malaysia scenario. The only road transportation 
analysis works in Malaysia which are nearly related to this study, are a study to 
identify the root cause of road accident in Malaysia as reported by Radin [169-171]. 
In his study, Radin [171] analyze the contributing factors of road accident by 
considering accident rate, traffic flows and road geometry. In other work of Radin 
[169], a mathematical model using log linear model was developed to forecast the 
number of road crashes. However, Radin et. al studies [169-171]  were not considered 
the impact of hazardous material release during transportation which caused fire and 
explosion, wind direction release zone area, type and quantity of hazardous material 
transport, trip, population and property and environment damage within 1 km radius 
from source of accident. Other factors will be discussed in detail in Chapter3. Since 
Malaysia did not have its own TRA model for hazardous material transportation, 
CCPS-TRA methodology is likely more suitable to be used instead of other methods 
because estimated the accident consequences impact area by using such as established 
mathematical  model to calculate fire and explosion incident, rather than use fix figure 
of consequences impact,. this model is more accurate in parameter since, the TRA 
model considered direction of wind and considered a length of release location zone. 
However, not all CCPS-TRA parameters can be used, this model should be modified 
in order to be used and consider the weather in Malaysia, pressure, Malaysia 
Population data and daily traffic in the highway. The accident rate per mile must be 
collected depending on the roadway in Malaysia. Moreover in section 2.10, none of 
TRA analysis software had been developed locally and used since EIA regulation 
1989 has been enforced under the Environmental Quality Act law 1974 in Malaysia 
[168]‟ 
Even though, several workers have developed a method of SAS TRA software for 
hazardous material. In section 2.9 and 2.10, the existing design and developed TRA 
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software which is a refinement on this work. Note that the existing TRA model 
guideline is limited to the consequences behavior observed only for fatality (death) 
impacts, the survival ability of an injury victim are not considered such as age, total 
body burn surface area, type of fabric respond to a particular incident flux, antibiotics 
and etc. This explains why many death records showed up after few days after the 
actual event happened. The absence of this factor reduces the accuracy of a risk 
analysis software during hazardous material transportation. The literature does not 
contain any detailed study to show how the various level of injury impact of the TRA 
model  is integrate in designing the TRA risk analysis software. Detailed about the 
limitations of the existing TRA model and requirements to develop and design 
proposed SAS for hazardous material transportation have been address in section 2.9 
and 2.10. 
 
In conclusion, the future study must consider all of the required possibilities as 
discussed in Chapter 2, when designed and developed an effective decision making 
tool of Smart Advisory System (SAS) for hazardous materials transportation.  
Therefore this thesis will provide the first detailed study of the smart advisory system 
for hazardous materials transportation risk analysis via quantitative approaches for 
Malaysia scenario. The existing TRA model will be analyzed to rectify and identify 
possible parameters for the modification of TRA model apply, to Malaysia scenario. 
Further, the proposed TRA model will also be integrated and compute with 
established consequences model and databases to develop a smart advisory system for 
transportation risk analysis. Since most of data involved such as geographical data, 
land use development, road networking, accident rate are different among countries, 
and also crucial in the TRA analysis impact, therefore GIS is customize  in SAS. 
Once the SAS TRA software is developed, a predicted result may be obtained and 
curve may be plotted, and compared with the results from published data in the 








CHAPTER 3                                                                                                                                                                         
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used for development of smart advisory 
system for hazardous materials transportation in relation to risk associated with 
potential incidents.  As explained in Chapter 2, this system should to be capable 
minimize several loopholes and weaknesses which are existed in the current TRA 
guidelines. Thus, before compute the TRA model in the system, the entire 
requirement to design and develop a proposed SAS for transportation of hazardous 
materials which to be adopted for Malaysia scenario, will be followed the suggestions 
criteria as discussed in section 2.10.2 and 2.11.  Basically, this chapter will provide 
the first procedure to improve the accuracy of transportation risk analysis software in 
Malaysia to determine the minimum exposure routes and to obtain the safest route for 
the transportation of hazardous material. To achieve this purpose, three main stages 
which consist of different aspects of risk analysis process are involved. In the first 
stage, the existing guidelines of TRA such as in CCPS [22], BUWAL [32, 73] and by 
Rhyne et al. [25] were reviewed, analyzed and modified to fit into Malaysia 
transportation risk characteristic scenario. All parameters, assumptions and constraint 
involved in the previous TRA model calculation were studied to identify the strength 
and weaknesses of the models. In the second stage, the proposed TRA method will be 
integrated with the established consequences models and the available data related to 
transportation of accident such as accident rate, traffic volume and population density. 
For thermal effects calculation, the severity of the accident impact on an individual or 
the society and the probability of a person surviving from the fire and explosion from 
the transportation accident; the age of the person and the percentage of total body 
surface (TBS) area burned are considered. In the third stage, the proposed system will 
be integrated to GIS, to enhance the visualization of the impact incident and to 
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determine the routes between the Origin-Destination (OD) pairs. The schematic 
diagram for the development of smart advisory system for transportation Risk 
Analysis (HazMat) is demonstrated in the Figure 3. 1. Meanwhile Figure 3.2 shows 





































Figure 3.1 Flowchart shows the summary of the development of smart advisory 





Literature review  





 Analysis, verification 
with case study 
Smart Advisory System 
development 
(VB, M.OFF, and ARGIS) 
Source Collection, Planning Application 
according to Proposed TRA procedure 
flow  
(see detail flowchart in Figure 3.2 and 3.7) 
 
The procedure entails:- 
 Identify and quantify incident 
scenarios referred to each 
traveling risk source 
 Zoning of the route (Route 
segmentation 
 Establishing the likelihood of 
release, and estimating the 
final event frequencies 
  Estimating the hazard zone: 
application of appropriate 
consequences models for (jet 
fire, flash fire, BLEVE, 
fireball, toxic dispersion and 
pool fire) to estimate the 
impact zone 
  Estimating the route societal 
risk 
  Time of day effects 
  Comparison of alternate 
routes 







































Figure 3.2 Overview flowchart of proposed TRA methodology for Malaysia HazMat 
scenario. 
Review of the existing TRA models 
 To study their parameters, assumptions, and 
limitations 
 To identify the data/ database utilized in the 
model (as discussed in section 3.1) 
 
Proposed TRA model for Malaysia HazMat 
Based on transportation accident scenario 
(as discussed in section 3.2) 
 
Probability of accident scenario 
 
Frequency Estimation 
 Determine probability of incident outcome 
 
Consequences analysis 
 Characterize source term- fire, explosion and toxic release 
 Quantify exposure and effect to population, property and environment 
 Probit Analysis (Effect calculation over age, TBS) 
 
(as discussed in section 3.2 and 3.3) 
                                          Risk estimation 
 Calculate the individual and societal risk (as discussed in section 3.5) 
 Map analysis with GIS 
 
Acceptance Criteria 
See detailed in section 3.5 
Optimize risk     Risk Evaluation 
Safest Risk Route 




3.1 Review the existing TRA model of hazardous materials  
 
The detailed about this subject, have been discussed in section 2.10 and 2.11. As an 
overview, Rhyne methodology [25] is more accurate but the detailed information is 
not easily available, even in developed countries such as USA, Canada, and Europe. 
Whilst Buwal methodology [167] is more empirical, since all the calculated 
parameters in the model are based totally to Swiss condition. Compare to CCPS 
methodology, it only requires local information in order to obtained result as realistic 
as possible. Therefore, for Malaysia scenario, it is most suitable to use CCPS 
methodology because this model is more accurate in parameters such as direction of 
wind and consider a length of release location zone.  
 
However slightly an additional modification should be introduce to suit Malaysia 
population data, weather condition, pressure, daily traffic in the highway and road trip 
for delivery. The accident rate per mile must be collected depending on the roadway 
in Malaysia. There will be much easier to collect the required data since only MIROS 
provided the service of freight wagon inventories for petroleum besides transporting 
other types of hazardous materials. 
 
Since, this study considers improvement of several parameters in the risk model to 
enhance the quality of risk estimates and to better understand their focus and 
sensitivity of some assumptions. When parameters are limited so that a complete 
analysis of the entire models is not possible, statistical methodologies result will be 
used as suggested by Radin et. al [169].           
 
3.2 Modification of TRA model for Malaysia 
As discussed in Chapter 2, any risk assessment dealing with multiple hazards, it is 
desired to estimate injuries as well as fatalities from each  incidents in the risk 
calculation for example first and second degree burns,  fragment injuries, and lung 
hemorrhage injuries due to thermal radiation intensity and explosion exposure. Thus, 
as in CPQRA guidelines, most of TRA risk analysis often estimate the risk of fatality 
by determine the appropriate levels of concern for overpressure, thermal radiation, 
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and toxicity hazards [11]. Therefore, these CCPS guidelines estimation [11, 21, 22] 
will open more space for inaccuracies in the TRA results evaluation. For example, 
most of the individual risk result in TRA considers the total individual risk of fatality 
by excluding the type injury, in assessing the level of risk from selected route of the 
transportation of hazardous materials.  Moreover, according to CCPS model the 
numbers of death is depending on the fatality probability of an accident area 
multiplied with the population density.   
 
The rational to include injury as in Eq. (3-3) in addition to fatality as used in CCPS 
have been discussed in detailed in section 2.10. In general, the  severity of accident 
impacts towards human is not uniform, but the severity is varies depending on 
fewfactors such as the distance from source  of accident, therefore a person closer to 
the accident event will receive the higher dose of death relationship, Other factors, 
which contribute to severity of injury such as  physiological and pathological effect as 
reported by Bull [163-165] in detail,  as discussed in section 2.10 which is also 
explain why few parameters are included in the Eq (3-1). Therefore by including 
those parameters in the Eq.(3-1), the result of transportation risk analysis will be more 
accurate. This opinion, is concluded based on the incidents which had happened in 
Bhopal, Seveso and other places which show that an increasing number of chronic 
disease after the accident. Moreover some incident, such as the effects of hot gases 
may have a significant contribution to an excess mortality especially in a confined 
situation such as inside the building.  
 
The usage of fatality probability calculation in CCPS [11, 19-22], rather than the 
consequences model calculations as in Eq.(3-1) may yield a less accurate result for  
TRA analysis.  For instances, if the level of exposures are assumed to yield 
probability of 0.3-0.4 fatalities (when the impact area have been protected by building 
structures or shelter, rapid escape, and clothing), the non-fatality results, is equal to 
the probability of 0.6-0.7 which mean that the incident area will be not affected by the 
accident. CCPS model does not give the probability of injury and unable to 
differentiate the different level of injury from the affected accident area, such as 
number of victim that will be affected by first or second degree burn, eardrum rupture 
and other impacts as shown in the Eq. (3-2) from the coordinate x,y against the 
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accident scenario. Besides that, the CCPS TRA model also cannot predict the 
projection number of road trip per year either increase or decrease over the years.  
 
Accident rate is an important element in TRA analysis.  However, the accuracy of 
TRA result is reduced, when the accident rate characteristics do not match with the 
geographical condition of the accident area during risk calculation.  Therefore,   Radin 
et. al [169] work is utilized as in Eq.(3.2). Detail about this subject will be discussed 
further in section 3.2.1. 
 
In order to estimate the risk of injury and fatality, the Eq. (3-1) has been modified as 
follows: 
              
            [
 
         
  ]         ∑  
 
   
 ∑    
 
   
    ∑                
  
   
                                
where, 
                  = the total individual risk of injury and fatality at specific geographical 
location x, y coordinate 
            T      = number of trips per year 
            TNYI  = number of year (after projected number of trip per year) 
            TTP%  = percentage of road trip projection (increase / decrease) 
            AMIROS= accident rate per kilometer according to Malaysian Institute of Road 
Safety Research 
        Ri        = release probability for ith release size 
             Li, j     = length of release location zone j 
    Wj       = the probability that wind blows in the direction of concern 
 Corrected Pi, j, k=the probability of injury and fatality at coordinate x,y given 
that accident k occurs 
             m   = number of release location zones and wind direction affecting 
coordinate x, y 
             n        = number of release sizes considered  
             Si          = number of incident outcomes for release size i 
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              i        = release size counter 
              j        = release location zone counter 
              k       = incident outcome counter  
              HD  = Probability of the highest level of damage for Corrected Pi, j, k (fatality) 
             MD =Probability of major level of damage for Corrected Pi, j, k (injury or 
fatality)  
              MiD = Probability of minor level of damage for Corrected Pi, j, k (injury, such 
as first degree burn) 
             UED = Probability of no damage for Corrected Pi, j, k (no fatality and no 
injury) 
By using Eq.(3-1), it is shown that the TRA analysis results is more accurate than 
CCPS, and the result is closer to the actual scenario consequences for transportation 
accident based on facts which were discussed before and in this section. Appropriate 
model is required in view of a rapid and continuous population growth leading to an 
increase in traffic and new development of industrial area with new findings in the 
chemical products. In the event of transportation accident, the information on the 
number of people affected is essential therefore an appropriate action or decision can 
be made especially during emergency cases such as the speed of hazard response team 
operation, the amount of medical supply and medical personnel involved.  
 
A careful land use planning such as built- up of mixed development area or other 
related project must undergo EIA technical consensus from expertise, since they need 
to identify buffer or safe distance before any industry can be built within housing 
area.    
 
3.2.1 Accident rates 
 
Accident rates are the most important components of a truck (HAZMAT) tanker risk 
analysis. Generally, the rate is affected by numerous parameters such as road 
conditions, environmental, trucking operation, types of road (urban, sub urban, rural 
and remote routes area). However, most of the truck tanker risk analyses are normally 
based on accident rates characteristic of broad classes of route types for which useful 
data are available. To calculate an accident rates in the modified TRA model as 
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demonstrated in Eq. (3-1), whereby several parameters are needed such as length of 
the road segment in kilometre, number of the registered vehicles and number of the 
truck accident.   
 
The degree of accuracy in accident data relates directly to the size and quality of the 
database used to estimate rates. According to the literature review [25, 141, 142], 
most guidelines have utilised accident rates according to population density, type of 
road, road classes, and road area but the level tend to decrease as the conditions are 
made more restrictive. Therefore, to apply Eq.(3-3) in Malaysia, the accident data 
should be taken from Malaysian Institute of Road Safety Research (MIROS ), Jabatan 
Perancang Bandar dan Desa (JPBD) and others relevant data sources. For example, 
statistical data of the accident rates and road accident statistics are available from 
MIROS, Royal Police Malaysia, Highway Planning Unit (HPU) which provide the 
number of road deaths, number of road crashes, traffic volumes, for every 1 km of any 
motorway, express highway and major road in Malaysia.  
 
Malaysia has experienced a remarkable period of economic expansion and growth in 
population, economy, industrialization and transportation.  With the influence of rapid 
economic growth in Malaysia, the number of vehicles on the road, and highways are 
expected to increase. The total numbers of fatal road crashes were contributed by 
different type of modalities. In this study, road crashes are based MIROS formal data 
and Radin et al [171] statistics data whereby more than 58 % of fatal accident was 
constituted by motorcyclists, pedestrians constituted 12% of road fatalities, bicyclists 
constituted 5% of road fatalities, and truck crashes contributed 3-5% of road fatalities 
per year.   
 
The mathematical models between Eq. (3-2) to Eq. (3-5) which were developed by 
Radin et al. [169] to forecast the number of road traffic deaths, number of road 
crashes and an accident rate, in Malaysia will be used in this study. The equations for 
predicting the number of road crashes and deaths for a given year are as follows: 
 
Number of Road traffic deaths = 
                                                                                                                (3-2) 
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Number of Road crashes= 
                                                                                                              (3-3) 
 
The above equations are included in Eq. (3-1). Data system factor in the above 
equations is equal to 1 for Peninsular Malaysia and 2 for East Malaysia. Estimated 
total number of vehicles in the year is expressed in millions. By applying Eq. (3-3), 
the total number of vehicles crashes in the year is obtained.  
 
Both of the exponent model in Eq. (3-2) and Eq. (3-3) were established based on time 
series log-linear model, to explain the relationship between traffic deaths and traffic 
exposures, namely population, vehicles and road length. For reference, both of the 
models defined population as the estimated total number of people expressed in 
millions. Road means the estimated length total of roads expressed in thousands of 
kilometers.  
 
Since the models established in 1994, Radin model is recognize as the best model 
which capable to accurately forecast the number of road traffic death and road crashes 
between year 1974 to 2000 [169] compared  to the other popular models of traffic 
accident in Malaysia such as Rehan model and Aminuddin model [169].   
 
Most probably, the assumptions parameter and criteria used in the Radin model was 
the most closest in explaining the actual traffic exposures in Malaysia. Amongst the 
assumptions which are considered in the Radin model were the number of vehicles 
per year, number of population per year, road length per year and standardization of 
accident data. Therefore the thesis used Radin et. al [169] model  to incorporate in the 
Eq.(3-1), when some of the road accident statistic are not available in MIROS due to 
the rationale factors as below:- 
 
 Malaysia is a developing country which is undergoing a dynamic growth in 
vehicle industry. This trend is approximating to developed country.  In 
general, the growth for vehicle industry follows the „S‟ curve which shows an 
exponential growth at the beginning and plateau when the each population 
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own about 2 vehicles per person. Based on this phenomena, we can predict 
that the improvement in the „S‟ curve in 2020.  
 
 It is known that the number of accident and death from an accident will 
increase with the increase in the number of population in a country. This is 
due to an increase in the number of traffic activities which directly increase 
the accident risk. Therefore the calculation of the number of population must 
be included in the model for road accident death.  
 
 Exposure to accident also increases with the increase in the number of the 
road, road networking and road distance. These factors lead to an increase in 
the number of trips along the road especially with the increase in economic 
growth and commercialization activities in this country. Therefore the above 
factors must be taken in to consideration in the model calculation.   
 
 Before 1981, only data on mortality, vehicle involved and route length 
throughout Peninsular Malaysia were reported. Only after 1981, all these 
information were integrated with Sabah and Sarawak datas. This explained 
why the statistic on the number of accident and death related accident 
suddenly showed a marked increment after 1980. Therefore, the effect of 
standardization in recording system must be considered in the calculation 
model. 
  
However, the usage of Radin model has some limitation in the situation when the 
economic status is down whereby less people will buy vehicle. Therefore time series 
variable is more suitable for that condition [171]. 
 
For the state road portion, the average value of accident rate in year 2010 is 5.3 x 10
-
8
/km.yr. Amiros in Eq. (3-7) is also considered the relationships between accident, 
traffic flows and road geometry in the following mathematical expression as in Eq. (3-
4) [169]: 
 
Accident=6.6                                                                          
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                                                                                                                                  (3-4)     
 
                
Table (3-1) shows the structure and definition of independent variables for applying 
Eq. (3-4) 
 
Independent    Description                Level factors          Coding system 
Variables 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
  FL  Traffic Volume  2 (1) Traffic Volume < 30,000 
                 (2) Traffic Volume >30,000 
   LW  Lane Width   2 (1) Lane Width < 3.2 m 
       (2) Lane Width > 3.2 m 
   Jc  Nos. of Minor Junction 2 (1) Nos. Of minor junction < 15 
       (2) Nos. Of minor junction > 15 
   LU   Adjacent Land Use  2 (1) Kampong (rural/residential) 
         (2) Shop / commercial area 
 
The structure of independent variables and their respective definitions are shown in 
Table (3-1). To find the accident rates, results from Eq. (3-4), will be used in the 
calculation as follows: 
 
      
                       ⌊
        
                        
⌋ ⌈
                      
            
⌉       
 
Therefore by considering the traffic volume, number of junctions, lane width, and 
landuse,  for the above model in this methodology enable to assess geometric factors 
contributing to accidents and select the safest route in their highway design. 
 
 
3.2.2 Number of Road Tanker Trip 
 
In Eq. (3-3), the number of road tanker trip is predicted based on the company product 







3.2.3 Probability Event from the Accident 
 
According to CCPS [11, 19-22], Health Safety and Executive, United Kingdom [8-10, 
24] and TNO guidelines [71, 76, 172] in order to estimate individual risk, various 
hypothetical events should be assessed. Each of these accident scenario events will 
have a predicted frequency of occurrence, f and a predicted number of persons 
harmed, N. The proposed TRA model will use the probability of the initiating event as 
described by Fisher et al. [174] as in appendix 3. Then from the initiating event, the 
incident will evolved to cause several potential accident scenarios outcomes, such as 
fireball, BLEVE or flash fire. The incident outcomes are depending on the sequence 
of the probability events. In Eq. (3-1), the length of release location zone j, Li, j, is 
estimated by using consequences model equation as in Eq. (A1- 1) to Eq. (A1-30) for 
explosion accident scenario, Eq. (A1- 31) to Eq. (A1-36) and Eq. (A1-81) to Eq. (A1-
119) for fire accident scenario and Eq. (A1- 120) to Eq. (A1-165) for toxic release 
accident scenario. Meanwhile the value for release size probability, Ri is taken 
according to CCPS guidelines [21, 22]. Subsequently, to estimate the frequency of a 
potential accident scenario (in order to develop the propagation sequence of various 
scenarios) and to calculate the final frequency for each type of accident consequences, 
a selected Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is employed, as shown by Rhyne [25], CCPS 
[11] and Casal et al. [67]. Here the possible event tree of release magnitudes is based 
as follows: 
 
• A rupture: release area equal to the area of a 4-inch diameter hole 
• A puncture: release area equal to the area of a 1-inch diameter hole 
• A leak: release area equal to the area of a ¼ -inch diameter hole 
 
3.2.4 Probability Damage Calculation 
In reality, the population and environment closer to the source of an event is expected 
to experience more severe consequences than those farther than the event. Thus an 
assumption of a uniform distribution of consequences across the impact area may not 
be correctly representing the actual condition of risk. The proposed model is designed 
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to be capable to stratify the severity of injury and able to predict the number of 
fatalities and injuries associated with the event [11, 21, 22, 70, 76]. As shown in Eq. 
(3-1), the level of damage probability is categorized into four conditions which are 
fatality, major injury, minor injury and no damage.  
 
In this study, the magnitude of the physical effects and the affected zone is estimated 
by using established consequences models such as in CCPS [11, 21,22], TNO [71, 
76,172], Rhyne [25], Lees et al. [64], Casal [67] and Crowl and Louvar [153]. The 
damage is addressed by vulnerability models, using dose-response relations. The level 
of damage to human and property is dependent on the dose received and distance 
from the hazardous incident. Therefore, if the impact dose received by a person is 
low, it may not cause injury or death. The impact dose received is irreversibly 
proportionate to the distance, therefore as the distance increased; the dose received 
will be decreased. In the injury zone, a person situated at a various distance, will 
experience different level of injury such as minor or major injury. 
  
3.2.5 Probit Analysis 
 In order to produce percentage of injury and fatality among humans in terms of the 
intensity of a hazardous event and duration of the exposure, probit based analysis are 
used to determine the fatality and injury levels to the exposed population.   
 
The probit equation is as follows [70]:  
                                                                                                                                           
Where, Pr is the probit and known as the probit value which is a measure of the 
percentage of the vulnerable resource which sustains injury or damage. The 
parameters, k1 and k2 are constants depending on the type of damage and derived from 
historical data published by Eisenberg et al. [173]. D is a function of the hazard 
dosage in terms of intensity and duration.  
 
The probit value can then be converted into percentage. CCPS of AIChE [11], Crowl 
and Louvar [153], TNO Green Book [172], Finney [174] and Lees [64] have provided 




The probit equations (Pr) as in Eq. (3-8) also can utilize to get the percentage of 
affected building and affected population (R, %) by using the probit table in appendix 
3. The table also can be utilized for every probit equation. Unfortunately, the 
estimation of the number of people affected by an accident by using the conversion of 
probit variable to the percentage of people affected (as taken from tables and figures 
as in the appendix 3) has caused a significant problem. The problem encountered 
when the calculations are done using a computer program where an access to the 
numerical library is required and this can cause significant errors. Moreover, the 
probit value in the table [11, 64, 153, 172, 174] range between 2.67 to 8.09 which 
represent a percentage from 1% to 99% and 99.1% to 99.9%. Therefore the probit 
table is unable to predict probit value which has a conversion less than 1%, and the 
percentage result is not in decimal point at the range of 1% to 99%. Furthermore, 
there is difficult to introduce data from figures and tables into a computer code.  
 
Even though Alonso et al. [175,176] has proposed analytical expressions to convert 
both probit variables to percentage and vice-versa by using R-Pr data from TNO 
(1989) and TNO (2005) as in Eq. (3-51), but the R values are only between ranges of 
5% to 95%. 
 
                                                                                          (3-9) 
 
Therefore, the analytical expressions are used in this study to convert both probit 
variables to percentage of injured people and vice versa, as proposed by Vilchez et al. 
[137]. The Vilchez et al. [137] analytical equation is selected due to the excellent 
agreement between the values taken from the figures and tables proposed by Finney 
[174] which are commonly used to calculate the percentage of people injured in a 
given accident. Moreover these equations can predict the percentage of people 
affected with more than 1 decimal point value. The proposed equations [67, 137] also 
provide an easy way to convert values of the probit variable into percentage of people 
injured and vice versa.  
 
The equation for the analytical expressions of probit value is shown in appendix 1, 
between Eq. (A1-43) to Eq. (A1-53). Application of the probit analysis for 
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consequences of fire, explosion and toxic exposure is presented using the following 
probit equation as in the Table (3-2).  Table (3-2) lists a variety of probit equations for 
different types of exposures. 
 
However, the probit equation as shown in the table (3-2) may not represent some type 
of injuries on human indoors such as  death due to head impact, death due to whole 
body impact, impact of fragments and debris generated by the blast and building or 
structural collapse.  Therefore, in considering the potential impacts on people and 
structures either direct and indirect effects from the blast, the probit equation in TNO 
[172] and several sources [67, 175, 176] can be used to predict the damage caused to 
these vulnerable receptor. Probit equations shown in the Table (3-3) and Table (3-4) 
are those applicable for different types of damage from explosions to building and on 
human outdoors. 
Table (3-2) Probit Correlations for a variety of exposure (The causative variable is 
representative of the magnitude of the exposure.) 
                                                                                            Probit parameters 




    Burn deaths from flash fire 
    Burn deaths from pool burning 
    First degree burn injury 
    Second degree burn injury 
    Lethality from thermal radiation 
    Protected (by clothing) 
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     Deaths from lung haemorrhage                
     Eardrum ruptures                                      
     Deaths from impact                                 
     Injuries from impact                                
     Injuries from flying fragments                
     Structural damage                                     
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     [64, 173]  
     [64, 173] 
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     [64, 173] 
Toxic release
 
     Ammonia deaths
a
                                       
     Carbon monoxide deaths
a
                        
     Chlorine deaths
a
                                         
     Ethylene oxide deaths
a
                              
     Hydrogen chloride deaths
a
                        
     Nitrogen dioxide deaths
a
                           
     Phosgene deaths
a
                                        
     Propylene oxide deaths
a
                             
     Sulphur dioxide deaths
a
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te   = effective time duration (s) 
Ie   = effective radiation intensity (W/m
2
) 
t   = time duration of pool burning (s) 





= peak overpressure (N/m
2
) 
J = impulse (N s/m
2
) 
C = concentration (ppm) 
T = time interval (min) 
 
Table (3-3) probit equations for different degrees of damage to buildings and 
structures caused by explosions  
    
Type of damage                                  Probit equations                       Eq.     References 
  
Minor damage (broken 
windows, displacement of 
doors and window frames, tile 
displacement, etc.) 
Y = 5 – 0.26ln [(
    
  
)
   
  (





















Major structural damage 
(cracks in wall, collapse of 
some walls)   
Y = 5 – 0.26ln [(
     
  
)
   
  (
   
 
)
   





Collapse (building partially or 
totally demolished) 
 
Y = 5– 0.22ln [(
     
  
)
   
  (
   
 
)
    
 ] 
 
  (3-54) 





     Toluene
a
 
     Acrolein deaths
a
                                       
      
     Acrylonitrile deaths
a
                        
     Benzene deaths
a
  
     Bromine
a
                                        
     Carbon Tetrachloride deaths
a
                              
     Formaldehyde deaths
a
                        
     Hydrogen Cyanide deaths
a
                           
     Hydrogen Fluoride deaths
a
                                        
     Hydrogen Sulphide deaths
a
                             
     Methyl Bromide deaths
a
                                
     Methyl Isocyanide
s
 
     Acrolein death
b
 
     Ammonia
b
 
     Carbon Tetrachloride 
     Chlorine
b 
     Hydrogen Chloride
b
 
     Hydrogen Flouride
b
 
     Methyl Bromide
b
 
























































































     [11, 20, 153] 
     [11, 20, 153] 
 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
     [20, 67] 
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Table (3-4) probit equations for different types of damage from explosions on human 
outdoors 
 
Type of damage                         Probit equations                          Eq.           References 
    
Eardrum rupture Y = -12.6 + 1.524 ln Ps (3-55)         [64, 172] 
Death due to head impact Y = 5 – 8.49 ln (
    
  
  
      
      
) (3-56)         [64,172, 178] 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Death due to whole body 
impact 
Y = 5 – 2.44 ln (
         
  
  
         
      
) 
Y = 5 – 4.82 ln






        [64, 177] 
 
        [172, 177] 
Death due to lung 
haemorrhage 
Y = 5 – 5.74 ln (
        
   
  
    
 
) 
Y = 5 – 6.6 ln (
      
  
  







         [177] 
 
         [64] 
 
It is realised that when different probit equations are used to estimate diverse 
consequences (for example, first-degree bums, second-degree bums, or lethality) on a 
given population, different categories will overlapped. Thus, all those individuals 
suffering second-degree burns will appear to have also suffered first-degree burns,  
and all those individuals who die due to thermal radiation will also have suffered 
second-degree burns. As a result,  the percentage of people that can be affected by the 
accident will become more than 100%. Therefore to avoid doublecounting, the overall 
damage probabilities must be equal to 1.0.  As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
existing model in the CCPS guidelines [11, 21, 22], Swiss methodology (BUWAL) 
guideline [73] and Rhyne et al. [25] unable to demonstrate the probability of injury 
and also cannot differentiate between the level of injury from the affected accident 
area, at the same given of x, y coordinate and accident scenario. For these reasons, the 
Eq. (3-2) has been modified to determine the probability of injury (by percentage) for 
different types of damage from explosions and thermal radiation on human outdoors.   
 
3.2.5.1 The damage to human from thermal radiation 
In this section, steps to determine the damage from thermal radiation to human will be 
discussed in detailed. The proposed steps  is developed to enable the estimation of the 
number of injuries as well as fatalities to the population affected from thermal 
radiation accident cases by taking into account the relationship between radiation 
intensity – time duration – distance variables as in the Eq. (3-3). To apply Eq. (3-3) 
for thermal radiation accident cases, the following steps must be carried out first in 
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order to obtained and to substituted the results of HD, MD, MiD, UED for 
CorrectedPi,j,k into Eq. (3-3). The steps are as follows: 
 
 Selected probit equations: in this case Eq. (3-12) – (3-15). Probit equations (P) 
are in general form shown by Eq. (3-8). 
                          [        ]                                                (3-61) 
In the case of thermal radiation, D is the combination of effective radiation    
intensity, Ie (kW/m
2
) and effective time duration (s), te. 
 
 Substitute the causative variable and probit parameters in Eq. (3-12) to Eq. (3-
15) into Eq. (3-61), as follows: 
                                     [        ]           for first degree burn             (3-62) 
                         [        ]         for second degree burn        (3-63) 
                                      [        ]          for   lethality                        (3-64)  
                                      [        ]         for protected by clothing     (3-65) 
 The probit value in the Eq. (3-62) to Eq. (3-65), will be converted into 
percentage by using the analytical expressions of probit value as proposed by 
Vilchez et al. [137] as shown in appendix 1, between Eq. (A1-43) to Eq. (A1-
53). 
 
 To estimate the effects of thermal flux on individual burns and the severity of 
damage will depend on the intensity of the radiation (kW/m
2
) and the dose 
received and these must be recognized. Basically the impacts rapidly worsen 
as both radiation intensity and exposure duration increase. This will affect the 
injury levels and probability of fatality.  
 
 Table (3-5) shows the approach to approximate the level of damage at 
different thermal flux [67, 179-181]. According to table (3-5), if the dose 
received by a person between 4.7 to 5.0 (kW/m
2
) and within the time duration 
of 20s to 30s, it can be assumed that the thermal flux can cause second degree 
burns. At continuous exposure with radiation intensity of 12.6 (kW/m
2
), 100% 
of population fatality can be predicted. Therefore a person who are exposed to 
radiation intensity of 2.1 (kW/m
2
), can be expected may suffer first degree 
burns. Based on the above assumptions, the impacts levels of thermal flux 
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damage is arranged from low to high impacts by using probit Eq. (3-62) to 
probit Eq.(3-65). 
 
 Results from Eq. (3-62) - Eq. (3-65) must be corrected, since they are referring 
to different degrees for the same type of damage (thermal flux impact). 
Furthermore, different probit equations are used to estimate diverse 
consequences (for example, first-degree bums, second-degree bums, or 
lethality) on a given population which will cause overlapping of results for 
different categories damage. Thus, all those individuals suffering second-
degree burns will appear to have first-degree bums and all those individuals 
who die due to thermal radiation also suffered from second-degree burns. As a 
results, the overall percentage of population injury and fatality from a single 
accident can become more than 100%. Therefore to avoid doublecounting, the 
overall percentage of damage must be equal to 100%. 
 
Table (3-5) Approximate levels of damage for different radiation intensity 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Radiation Intensity                     Impact       





1.4   Harmless for individuals not wearing special protection 
1.6   Will cause no discomfort at long exposures 
1.7   Minimum required to feel pain 
2.1   Minimum required to feel pain after 1 min 
4.0  Enough to cause pain after an exposure of 20 s; 
blistering of the skin is likely; 0% lethality 
4.7    Causes pain in 15-20 s, 2nd degree burns after 30 s 
7.0  Maximum tolerable for firefighters who are totally 
                     protected (classical protective clothing) 
11.7   Thin, partially insulated steel may lose its mechanical 
                     integrity 
12.5   Plastic insulation of electrical wires melts; melting of 
                     plastic tubing; 100% lethality 
15.0   Critical radiation intensity* for wood (flame ignition 
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without contact with the surface) 
25.0   Thin, insulated steel may lose its mechanical integrity 
35.0   Critical radiation intensity for wood and textiles 
(withoutflame ignition) 
Threshold value for the ignition of buildings 
37.5   Damage to process equipment, collapse of structures 
 
 To correct the overall percentage of damage and to categorize the impacts 
levels of thermal flux damage from low to high impacts by using probit Eq. 
(3-62) to probit Eq. (3-65) as mentioned earlier, these steps are followed. By 
considering health effects related to radiation intensity doses, the distance 
between a person to the accident scenario plays a major factor. In which, a 
person who is closer to the source of an accident is likely to receive a greater 
dose and also likely to experience severe consequences than those further from 
it. Therefore the affected zone for first degree burn is expected to be larger 
than second degree burn and lethality. This conclusion is supported by San 
Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico disaster in 1984 [57, 64] after a series of explosions 
occurred at a liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tank farm. The explosions 
demolished houses and propelled metal fragments over a distance ranging 
from a few meters up to 1.2 km, and also caused 500 to 600 people killed with 
5,000 to 7,000 suffered severe injuries. The impact shows that most of the 
people affected by severe injuries is assumed to be further from the accident 
events up to 1.2 km and expected to receive low dose than those people who 
have died.  
 
 In another case, Rashid et al. [182], estimated the impacts and effects from the 
LPG transportation accident and display the affected zones results via ArcGIS 
9.3.1 version. For the case study evaluated, a 13,000kg (34.5 m
3
) LPG road 
tanker filled to 80% of its capacity is assumed to be involved in a series of 
events. By applying the probit equations for thermal radiation, the percentage 





Table (3-6) shows the effects results of LPG transportation accident [182] 
___________________________________________________________ 
Effect      Area (range, m)         Percentage (affected) 
____________________________________________________________ 
 First degree burn              0 – 700   99.24 
 Second degree burn          0 – 450   18.87 
 Lethality        0 – 390    9.64 
  Protected          0 – 305    1.57 
                  Total (%)   129.32 > 100% 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
From Table (3-6), it is found that the different categories of effects showed 
overlap affected zone results. First degree burn shows the most affected impact 
area from the accident (0-700m). 
 
 
 Since the affected zone of first degree burn is always higher due to low 
radiation intensity, probit Eq. (3-62)  represent minor level of damage, known 
as PrMiD, followed by probit Eq. (3-63) which represent major level of damage 
and known as PrMD,. Meanwhile, probit Eq. (3-64) represent highest level of 
damage to a person, known as PrHD, and probit Eq. (3-65) which represent 
lowest level of damage, recognized as, PrLD. The general results are obtained 
as: 
 
                     [        ], the probit value PrMiD is convert into 
first degree burn percentage = RMiD%                       (3-66) 
                    [        ], the probit value PrMD is convert into       
second degree burn percentage =  RMD%                        (3-67) 
                    [        ], the probit value PrHD is convert into 
lethality percentage = RHD%                         (3-68) 
                    [        ], the probit value PrLD is convert into 




 The above results must be corrected and re-arranged from the highest level of 
damage to the unaffected impacts. The HD = Probability of the highest level 
of damage for corrected Pi,j,k  as in Eq. (3-3) is equal to the probit value 
conversion for the highest level of damage percentage, RHD% in Eq. (3-68). 
 
 The MD=Probability of major level of damage for corrected Pi,j,k (injury or 
fatality) as in Eq.(3-3) which is  equal to the probit value conversion for the 
actual effect of second degree burn percentage and also known as actual 
RMD%.  The actual RMD% of second degree burn is obtained by subtracting the 
percentage result from Eq. (3-67) – Eq. (3-68) = PrMD- PrHD , as below: 
 
PrMD - PrHD = {-43.14+3.02 ln [f (Ie.te)]} – {-36.38+2.56 ln [f (Ie.te)]}          (3-70)
  
Both probit values are converted into percentages without the need to simplify 
the Eq. (3-70) to get the actual percentage of second degree burn as in Eq. (3-
71) 
 
Actual RMD% = RHD% - RMD%             (3-71) 
 
 The MiD=Probability of minor level of damage for correctedPi,j,k (injury, such 
as first degree burn) as in Eq.(3-3) is  equal to the probit value conversion for 
the actual effect of first degree burn percentage, known as actual RMiD%.  The 
actual RMiD% of first degree burn is obtained by substracting the percentage 
result from Eq. (3-66) over Eq. (3-67) and Eq. (3-68), as below: 
 
Actual RMiD% = RMiD% - (RMD%+ RHD%)                        (3-72) 
 
 The actual percentage for protected by clothing is obtained by substracting the  
percentage result in  Eq. (3-69) over Eq. (3-66), Eq. (3-67)  and Eq. (3-68)  as 
below: 
 




All probit values (PrLD, PrMiD, PrMD and PrHD) must be converted into 
percentages before substituted into Eq. (3-73) to determine the actual 
percentage for protected by clothing as follows: 
 
The lowest level of damage, (actual RLD%) – (RMiD% +RMD%+ RHD%)   (3-74) 
 
 The UED=Probability of  no damage for CorrectedPi,j,k (no fatality and no 
injury) 
 as in Eq.(3-3) is obtained by substracting the percentage result  in  Eq. (3-66), 
Eq. (3-67), Eq. (3-68) and Eq. (3-69) from 100% as below: 
 
100% - (PrLD+PrMiD +PrMD+PrHD)             (3-75) 
 
All probit values, PrLD, PrMiD, PrMD and PrHD should first be converted into 
percentages before substituted into Eq. (3-75) to determine the actual number 
of people who are not affected in percentage as follows: 
 
The percentage, RUED = 100-(RLD+ RMiD +RMD+ RHD)               (3-76) 
 
The above methodology can also be applied to explosion accident cases. 
 
3.2.5.2 The impact of thermal radiation to human from the influence of burn size 
distribution and ages. 
 
The use of probit analysis to determine of burn mortality was introduced in 1949 by 
Bull et al. [164].  This method is utilized to determine the severity of the accident 
impact on an individual by considering the age of the affected person and the 
percentage of total body surface (TBS) area burned in the second degree burn. The 
calculations are according to the steps as below: 
 
 Result (RMD%) from equation (3-67) should be used to determine the 
percentage of total body surface (%TBS) area burned in order to estimate the 
consequence of thermal flux on individual second degree burns. According to 
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Bull et al. [163-164] and Curreri et al. [166], the probability of surviving in 
thermal radiation impact is depends on the percentage of TBS and of the age 
of the person.  
 
 Then, the probability of fatality were calculated by using binary logistic 
regression as below: 
 




                                                  (3-77) 
 where, X =  B0 + B1 (age) + B2 (%TBS burn) + B3 (age)
 2
             
(3-78) 
                and the coefficients; B0 = -5.22; B1 = -0.1041; B2 = 0.09843 and B3 = 0.002296 
 
An Eq. (3-77) and Eq. (3-78) are used to calculate the probability of a person 
surviving from second degree burn in the thermal radiation impact depending 
on the percentage of TBS and of the age of the person. 
 
 From 1946 to 1971, there was correspondingly improved survival from large 
burns after introduction of a new treatment method of burn injury [183]. 
According to Bull et al. [163, 165], Curreri et al. [166] and Martin [184] 
whom confirmed that the 50% lethal area (LA50) is raised for all age groups.  
In the case of burns, a person who is affected 30% or more of the body surface 
area is expected to go into a state of shock and may die. Probit equations in 
Table (3-7) are used to calculate (LA50) according to age.   
 
Table (3-7) Burn Mortality  
 
Age (years)           Probit equations              LA50              95% C. L.                 Eq.               
    
0-14 Y = -1.4879 + 0.0670X        62.5      55.4-69.5    (3-79) 
15-44 Y = 1.9394 + 0.485X        63.1      57.7-68.4    (3-80) 
45-64 Y = 2.8918+ 0.0553X        38.1      32.9-43.3    (3-81) 




 The actual lethality percentage, RHD% will decreased, if medical treatment for 
second degree burn injury is capable to treat more than 30% of total body 
surface area burned by thermal radiation.  
 
For the societal risk, the frequency of Fg,i,k of accident outcome, k for release size i on 
segment, g and the number of associated number of fatalities, therefore the Ng,i,k can 
be estimated as:  
                                                                           (3-83) 
                                                                (3-84) 
 
where,  
CAi, k is the consequences area associated with incident outcome k,  
PDg is the population density for g,  
PFi, k  is the probability for fatality and injury.  
 
To obtain results for the entire route, the modified expressions of individual and 
societal risk is applied to every segment of the route by using Eq. (3-3), Eq. (3-83) 
and (3-84). 
 
3.3    Consequence Analysis 
Consequence analysis involves determining the effects of the events of interest in 
terms of their physical extent and their severity. The physical extent is determined by 
calculating the maximum distances from the source at which the people are affected. 
The severity of an event of interest is expressed as a level of harm (such as injury or 
fatality). The approaches taken by HSE [8-10], TNO [172], and CCPS [11, 20-22] to 
analyze consequence  analysis  are similar to that used by most risk analysts which 
comprised a number of sub-steps:  
 
 Source term modelling (i.e., characterise the event in terms of the rate at which 
the dangerous substance is released such as the temperature, pressure, velocity 
and density of the substance);  
 Dispersion modeling (i.e., calculate how the dangerous substance will move 
through the surroundings);  
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 Fire and explosion modeling (i.e., for releases of flammable substances which 
may be ignited); and,  
 Effects modeling (i.e., determine the effect of the released will have on people 
or structures such as buildings).  
For the source term modeling, the correct phase of the outflow is important because it 
affects the flow rate estimated for a given hole in a vessel, pipe, or other containment 
device. In the case of loss of confinement such as road tanker, the hazardous 
substance will be released into the open environment. The release rate depends on the 
thermodynamic state of the substance and the geometry of the hole. Outflow from 
vessels through small holes can in general be considered to be stationery, meaning 
that the outflow is controlled by the (constant) upstream pressure. If the upstream 
conditions are changing gradually with time, the flow may be considered quasi-
stationery. In the case of total rupture of a vessel, the content is released in a very 
short time. These releases are regarded as instantaneous. All of the above situations 
are possible to be predicted by using several established consequences model in the  
CCPS [11, 77], TNO [76] and Lees [64].  
  
However, the solution became more complex if the accident phenomena occur at 
pressured liquefied gases condition and the outflow from vessel very potential to exist 
in three phases; gas outflow, liquid outflow and two phases outflow. Therefore to 
distinguish the complex scenario and predicted the basic scenario cases,  the TNO 
model [76] is the most suitable used as the estimation method for these types of the 
outflow in this thesis..  
 
Apart from that, for explosion modeling, It has been common to classify a gas 
explosion from the environment where the explosion takes place: vapour cloud 
explosion (VCE), Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE), and 
missiles. For VCE, varieties of prediction models have been developed to predict the 
blast effect at any given distance from an explosion source. However, these models 
have limited range of applications. The major explosion models can be classified into; 
numerical models, TNT equivalence model, TNO Multi-Energy model and Baker-
Strehlow method. Most of the numerical methods use the Computational Fluid 
Dynamics (CFD) approach. CFD models are not easy to use and still require 
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significant computer power. This requirement increases the cost and time needed for 
the simulation of the explosion process. Since TNT, and TNO models are simplified 
models, both models are used in this study. The rationales to use the both models are 
based on several factors such as these models were developed based on experimental 
results. These models are also easy to use and have a wide range of application, 
therefore many investigations are reported using them in risk calculation to predict a 
blast effects from the explosion hazard.  Moreover, in case of explosion models, it is 
not easy to develop a new method or to modify any one from the old models due to 
both models dependence on computational programming and series of very intensive 
experimental works. It is well to note that the blast effects from vapour cloud 
explosions  fromTNT models are determined not only by the amount of fuel burned 
but, more importantly, by the combustion mode of the cloud. For BLEVE scenario, 
point source model and solid plume model are used in this study to analyze static and 
dynamic conditions. The standard techniques as in point source model for evaluating 
the thermal radiation from BLEVE events assume that the radiant heat flux is constant 
over the duration of the BLEVE fireball. However the assumption from the point 
source model is not suitable to estimate dynamic condition and leads to overly 
conservative predictions of hazard zones for injuries (i.e., second-degree burns). Thus, 
solid plume  techniques is more realistic assessment of hazard zones and rationale 
associated with burn injuries when detailed analysis need to be conducted, due to  the 
time-dependent nature of thermal radiation generated by a BLEVE fireball. 
When a flammable gas is released into the atmosphere, different kinds of fires may 
occur depending on the release mode and the degree of delayed ignition. Thus, it is 
convenient to divide gas fires into the following types; flash fire, jet fire, pool fire and 
fireball. The established mathematical models of fires allows prediction of size and 
shapes of flames and impact of the thermal radiation incident at a target. Since the 
CCPS [11] is the most comprehensive techniques for fire modelling then it is used in 
the study by incorporated the result to Eq. (2-12) and Eq. (3.1). The rationale to used 
the models are referred on strong considerations to suit in their level of complexity 
and the extent to which they attempt to account realistically for the physical and 
chemical processes when the combustion take place. Moreover the approach of 
models correlations based upon actual incidents and large scale field 
tests.Subsequently, the assessment of accidental release and dispersion of hazardous 
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chemicals have necessitated the development of a number of techniques and 
methodologies. A release of large toxic may give rise to the following effects on man: 
death; non-lethal injury; irritation. In order to estimate the effects of a toxic release it 
is necessary to know the relationship between the concentration-time profile and the 
degree of injury [64]. Meanwhile, there are hazardous gases such as hydrocarbons, 
chlorine and ammonia, and oxygen, are capable of resulting in a gas cloud which is 
heavier than air. The density difference may be expected to have an appreciable effect 
on the behaviour of the cloud. Hanna et al., [123] and Pasquill and Smith, 
[117,118,121]   provide good descriptions of plume and puff discharges. The basis for 
the Pasquill-Gifford model is Gaussian dispersion in both the horizontal and vertical 
axes. The standard formula for dispersion during  an elevated point source assuming 
no ground absorption or reaction to reduce the uncertainties. Detailed descriptions of 
consequences modelling and an example of process calculation analysis using the 
consequences models in sequence are presented in Appendix 4. 
 
Each sub-step requires a detailed calculation. Therefore, with the availability of 
computer programming, these effects calculation models can be performed faster and 
more effective. For this reason, a software name as SMACTRA is developed. The 
development of this software is discussed in detail in section 3.7. All related 
consequences model equations used in this study could be referred in the Appendix 1 
and Appendix 2. The final sub-steps and effects modeling will require information as 
below:  
 
 The toxicological effects that the dangerous substance has on people at a 
different concentrations; or,  
 The effects of heat from fires; or,  
 The effects of blast from explosions; or  
 Other effects such as the impact by missiles generated from the explosions.  
The outcome of a particular release is depending upon a large number of factors, 
including:  
 The type and amount of dangerous substance involved;  
 The conditions under which the substance is stored;  
 The weather conditions at the time of the event;  
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 The size of the event (in terms of how quickly the material is released and the 
quantity released); and 
 The nature of the surroundings (e.g. – whether the substance is spilt on to 
concrete or water).  
 
An important factor in consequence analysis is to determine the level of harm which 
is called the „dangerous dose‟. The dangerous dose is the cause of the following 
effects to an exposed population:  
 Severe distress to almost everyone;  
 A substantial proportion requires medical attention;  
 Some people are seriously injured, requiring prolonged treatment; and 
 Any highly susceptible people might be killed.  
 
The main reason for using dangerous dose as a harm criterion instead of fatality are 
due to societal concern about risks of serious injury or other damage as well as death 
and also because there are technical difficulties in calculating the risks of death from a  
hazard to which individual members of a population may have widely varying 
vulnerabilities [64, 67]. This matter has been discussed in detail in section 2.10 and 
section 3.2. 
 
3.4 Route Segmentation 
The characteristic of a particular route such as population density, weather condition, 
topography, accident frequency and etc, could vary from point to point.  Therefore, to 
facilitate the analysis, the route is divided into different segments such as urban, rural 
or sub-urban. However, when one or more factors change, a new segment needs to be 
defined. A new segment is required whenever a small or moderate differences 
between route segments is giving significant effect on the final risk estimate [21, 22]. 
As the number of segment to be analyzed increases, the estimation of risk can become 
more accurate and better in reflecting the actual risks present along the given route. 
However, the number of incident outcome cases analysis also increases. Generally, 
the accident scenarios do not change along the route except for special locations such 
as rail yards and harbors. Meanwhile, the consequence modeling results remain the 
same unless there is a major changes in humidity, atmospheric temperature, terrain or 
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wind speed along the route. Therefore, if the meteorology and weather data remain 
the same, the main parameters that will influence the route segments are the 
population density and the accident/ release frequency. These include the differences 
in the magnitude of the consequence associated with a release in the middle of a large 
urban area versus a release in a sparsely populated rural area or a change in the road 
type.   
 
In areas where the bandwidth is large enough to encompass several population 
densities, there are two options to get the magnitude of consequences. One option is to 
create a new average population density for the whole area and another alternative is 
to determine the relative likelihood of the different potential hazard distances. If most 
of the time the hazard is significantly less than the distance associated with the worst 
case, then it may only use the density associated with the nearer zone and apply it 
throughout the bandwidth.  
In the example shown in Figure 3.3, variations in other parameters such as accident 
rates could cause the segments depicted to be further subdivided.  
 
                            Urban               Rural              Sub urban            Rural                Urban 
 
 
                        Segment 1 Segment 2   Segment 3 Segment 4        Segment 5 
 
                                                                            
Road Tanker Route 
                                                                           Bandwidth 
    
                                                                      
 











3.5 Risk Estimation 
In this section, the individual risk and societal risk are measured and explained in 
detail by using the proposed equations and parameters as demonstrated in section 3.2 
and 3.3. 
 
3.5.1 Individual Risk 
The individual risk at point Exp(x, y) is the sum of all risk sources from all links in the 
transportation route. The following steps should be employed to obtain the overall 
risk along a transportation route: 
 Summing the risks created by all points on a link, and 
 Summing the risks of all links in the route. 
 
Figure 3.4, shows that as a vehicle transporting HazMat is passing through point Q(x, 
y) on link (l), a risk is posed on point Exp(x, y). In order to calculate the annual 




    
   
 
link (l) 
Figure 3.4 Diagram shows the relationships between link (l), point of release Q(x, y) 
and point of exposure Exp (x, y). 
 
 Incident frequency.  It is a function of the following parameters: Lane width 
(x1), traffic volume (x2), adjacent of land use (x3), accident rate per kilometer 
(x4), meteorological condition (x5), surface condition (x6), truck trip (y1), 
container capacity (y2), container type (y3), type of truck (y4) and driver 
experience (y5). For a given transportation activity at a given route, all the 
parameters are constant, except the meteorological condition (x5), which is 
changing over the year. Therefore, the frequency at point Q(x, y) is a function 
of the meteorological condition or weather (x5) for a given transportation 
   
Q (x,y) 










activity. Pincident (weather) denotes incident frequency. The number of weather 
conditions is denoted by Nweather, and the probability for each weather 
condition is Pweather. However, most of the parameters changed, if the same 
vehicle transporting HazMat is passing through various point of Qn-1(xn-1, yn-1), 
Qn (xn, yn), Qn+1(xn+1, yn+1) on link (l). 
 
 Outcome probability. If a release occurs following an incident, various 
outcomes caused by different magnitudes of release are possible. The 
probability of each outcome has been estimated using ETA as described in 
Appendix 3. The total number of outcomes is marked as No, and the 
probability for each outcome is marked as Po.  
 
 Fatality. The fatality or injury probability is a function of the consequence 
and of the exposure time (the exposure time is assumed constant for a given 
consequence scenario). The consequence can be the nature of the HazMat, 
type of release outcome, weather condition or wind direction. Therefore, for 
a given HazMat transportation, the fatality probability is a function of release 
outcome and the wind direction noted as F (weather, accident rate, r, w). The 
number of wind directions is taken as Nw, and the probability of each wind 
direction is Pw.  
 
The individual risk at point Exp(x, y) which is caused by the point risk source Q(x, y) 
is calculated by integrating the consequences associated with each wind direction over 
all wind directions, release outcomes, and weather conditions. This individual risk 
caused by a point risk source is known as a point individual risk (PIR):  
    =  
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And the total number of outcome release scenario can be calculated as: 
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In Eq. (3-85), it is assumed that the vehicle is a stationary source at P(x, y). However, 
whenever the vehicles are in motion, the effect of the velocity should be included into 
the model. A linear integration along the link, with respect to time (dt), will include 
the component of travel time on the link risk value. The link individual risk (IRl) will 
then have the following form: 
 
    ∫       
           
          
                                                                                         (3-88)    
                  
The sum of IRl is along the entire transportation route will represent the total 
individual risk (IR) posed on point Exp(x, y). The total individual risk (IR) then can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
        ∑    
     
                                                                          (3-89) 
 
Eq. (3-85) till Eq. (3-88), showed how the individual risk can be calculated to obtain 
the individual risk result along the link, l = 1. Whilst Eq. (3-89) is represent the 
number of links along the entire route. To simplify the TRA calculation results, the 
route is divided into segments in which the accident rate, population density, and 
other parameters contributing to the risk calculation are approximated adequately by a 
uniform distribution. Segment lengths are typically longer than the lethal distance 
arising from the worst scenario; therefore multiplying the route segment length by the 
accident rate will overestimate the risk frequency distribution. In this methodology, 
the risks from all scenarios occurring at a single point are computed and integrated 
along the link or route segment. Therefore, mathematically, the risk along a route 
segment or link is shown in Eq. (3-89), where the link starts at (origin, l=1) and ends 
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at (l=1, ends). The effect area from a single lethality isopleths for a single scenario of 
all multiple locations along the route segment or link (l) are illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
The effects area represent the outcome from concentrated flammable source, which 
can create an explosion and fire such as fireball, BLEVE, pool fire (in ring isopleths 
shape), and toxic material dispersion (in plume isopleths shape). From Figure 3.5 it 
was showed that the exposure point of x, y coordinate is originating from points P1, 
P2, and P3, but not in  P4. All isopleths shape is identical for both fire explosion and 
toxic release accident scenario as shown in Figure. 3.5 and Figure 3.6.   
 
To simplify the effects area calculation, this method will also use the assumption by 
Rhyne [25], which implies no azimuthally dependence of the isopleths calculation.  
According to Saccomanno and Shortreed [185], the accident frequency at point x, y 
can effect twice the lethality distance (d1) of the specific scenario release times the 
accident rate. This assumption is correct if the point is near to the route or link. 
However as value y approaches to d1, the approximation decreases rapidly. Therefore, 
for a better approximation, the assumption proposed by Rhyne [25] is utilized which 
use the chord distance at x, y rather than twice the radius. The chord length at a 
distance y, from center of a circle radius r is: 
 
               √        √                                                                                      (3-90) 
 
where y = f times r (radius), 0 < f < 1. Parameter f, represent the changes probability 
of chemical release distance as value y approaches to d1.  
 
The chord length is combined with the accident rate to determine the frequency of 
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Figure 3.5 the individual risk for receptor at x, y coordinate of one scenario such as 










For the outcome of explosion and fire accident scenario such as fireball, BLEVE, and 
pool fire, the effect area for a single scenario at the point location 1as shown in Fig. 
3.6. The individual risk at x, y is same to x1, y1 because the distance was same from 
point 1 to x, y, x1, y1. In this accident scenario, the outcome effects area is not 





                     














Figure 3.6 the individual risk for receptors at (x, y) and (x1, y1) coordinates of one 









3.5.2 Societal Risk Analysis 
Societal risk is the risk to a population. It reflects the frequency of health effects 
(usually fatalities) in a specific population, as the result from exposure to a specific 
hazardous material. The societal risk is often expressed in terms of frequency 
distribution of multiple fatalities (f-N curve). The distribution of the population map 
for the transportation network is an essential input for societal risk calculation. The 
population map is composed of zones where people are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed. In this method, zones are defined based on shape, either rectangular or 
linear. Rectangular areas describe the off-route residential quarters, while linear zones 
represent the road network where motorists are present. Aggregation centers refer to 
particular areas where people are clustered, such as schools, hospitals, commercial 
centers, and other similar locations which are described as points or blocks. The total 
number of rectangle zones and the total number of linear zones in the network are 
marked as Nr and Nl, and the uniform population densities are denoted as rρ 
(persons/m
2
) and ρl (persons/m) respectively. The total number of aggregation centers 
is Nc, and the total number of persons in each center is Pc. 
The number of fatalities in a linear zone is obtained by linear integration (first 
segment of Eq. (3-94) of the fatalities along the line or route, and it is a function of an 
outcome and a wind direction noted as Fl (wind, o, w). In rectangular zones, the 
number of fatalities is obtained by integration (3-91) over the area of the rectangle 
noted as FR (wind, o, w). In an aggregation center, the number of fatalities is the 
fatality probability in the center multiplied by the number of people (third segment of 
Eq. (3-94) in the center noted as FC(wind, o, w). The number of fatalities over all 
zones, caused by a risk source Q(x, y), under given release and given wind direction is 
calculated as follows: 
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 weather,o,w  
d  ∑     
  
l x    weather,o,w                                                        (3-91) 
 
By considering and applying an Eq. (3-3) for the injury impact from the outcome 
release to Eq. (3-91), along the line, rectangular area and aggregation centers, caused 
by a risk sources Q(x, y),  the new value of N(weather,o,w) is calculated as follows: 
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In this method, f is a probability of injury and fatality for four category of damages, 
whilst o, is a function of release outcome or Si as in Eq. (3-3), which is influenced by 
parameters Ri, Li,j, m, and n for the consequences area. The probability of having N 
fatalities under a given weather condition, release outcome, and wind direction is 
estimated by Eq. (3-93): 
    weather,o,w   T.T   .TT  [
 
T   .TT  
  ] .     S x  incidentx  weather x  outcome 
  x   wind  dir.   
                 (3-93) 
By considering all wind directions, it is possible to evaluate the probability of having 
Nn (or more) fatalities for a given weather condition and release outcome: 
 
     weather,o,   ∑ [            
  
                         (3-94) 
Where 
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    weather,o,w    weather,o,w    
    weather,o,w    
 
In order to obtain the societal risk created by the motion of the vehicle over all the 
links or route segments on the consequences area is calculated as follows: 
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Figure 3.7 shows how the societal risks are calculated for all routes to find the safest 




3.5.3 Acceptability Risk 
Outcome from risk assessment is usually compared to some criteria so that a decision 
can be made whether the risk is generally acceptable, tolerable or if it is unacceptable. 
Many countries throughout the world, including United Kingdom (UK), Netherlands, 
Hong Kong and Australia, have developed risk criteria or guidelines applicable to 
specific types of hazardous substance installation. In this study, the societal risk FN 
curves for various case studies are presented using U.K and Dutch governments 
societal risk guidelines. This is due to unavailability of societal risk guidelines 
developed by the Malaysian Government. For the assessment of the individual risk, 
the risk acceptability guidelines proposed by the Department of Environment (DOE) 
state that individual risks from an assessed facility should not exceed 1x10
-6
 fatalities 
per year for residential areas and 1x10
-5
 fatalities per year at neighbouring industrial 
sites are used for the acceptability risk result comparison to any hazardous materials 
activities and installation. Table (3.8) shows comparison of a few risk acceptability set 
by authorities in other countries. 
Table (3-8) Acceptability Risk Criteria of Some Foreign Countries 
Country         Broadly Acceptable            Tolerable                  Unacceptable 
          Region                        Region                          Region 
 
United Kingdom       < 1x 10
-6




          >1x10
-5
 for public 
         >1x10
-3
for worker 
Hong Kong                   -                                 -                            >1x 10
-5
 for public 
Netherlands           < 1x 10
-6




         >1x10
-5
 for public 
Singapore < 1x 10
-6 
             >1x10
-6
 - commercial            > 5x10
-5
 for public 
                 > 5x10
-6
- industrial development 
                 5x10
-5
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Fire and explosion impact accident scenario 
OBD = Route 1 
OCD = Route 2 
ODD = Route 3 
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3.6 Population Density 
 
Population density is an important parameter in the proposed TRA model. Therefore, 
the consideration the risk of injury or damage caused by the escape of hazardous 
materials to the surrounding population and area, or that might be caused by fire is 
crucial for risk analysis study. This is because the determination of the degree of 
injury and risk, which can be sustained, will depend on the extent of the presence and 
the nature of population distribution surrounding the area. Hence, an assessment of 
societal risk would require population data and information.  
 
 As the data relating to population at risk is important in risk assessment, head counts 
are paramount and are the leading protocol of work. The number of persons present is 
differentiated according to land use type and function (residential, commercial, 
industrial and recreational) as each varies in their nature of retaining people. As the 
occurrence of risk is full of uncertainty temporally, it implies a differential extent of 
exposure with regard to time (day or night) and location (indoors or outdoors).  
 
3.6.1 Population Data 
 
Population data is basically obtainable from population censuses. However, such data 
refers to macro situation in which the smallest administrative unit given in Malaysia 
 ensus is called „mukim‟. Hence it is little use for detailed population count and 
distribution analyses which is often needed for risk assessment. Nevertheless, they are 
invaluable source of information as initial and general population distribution and 
density in the area.  
 
A more relevant source for detailed population analysis that relates to population 
census is population count at the smallest census unit (enumeration block). An 
enumeration block is a group of dwellings or households which are easily accessible 
without barrier such as crossing a major road, railway track, river, etc. Population data 
by enumeration block is obtainable on request from the Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, Department of Town and Country Planning Malaysia. Besides population 
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censuses, there are other secondary sources such as from published or unpublished 
data which are compiled in reports or files of various public or private authorities such 
as Local and Town Councils, municipalities, offices of housing developers, resort 
developers and Detailed Environmental Impact Assessment (DEIA) report.  
 
3.6.1.1 Population Data for Residential Area 
The determination of the number of people that might be affected within a calculated 
damage distance often refers to population data according to the type of residential 
area or buildings. The type of residential area or buildings requires determination of 
whether it is: 
 
 Rural or remote or urban (density indication low for remote and high for 
urban) 
 Sparse, linear or nucleated (indicative of distribution pattern) 
 
In case of restricted nature or sensitive zone area, detailed population data is 
important. For determining rural population, besides field count, information on the 
number of households at village level could be obtained from the village heads 
committee. In Malaysia, the average number of persons per household was equal to 
4.9~5.0 in the year 1991 and 4.6 in year 2000. However, it is recommended that the 
state average be utilized as the figure can vary from state to state according to the 
demographic feature of the respective state. In the case of large damage area; a more 
efficient method of data procurement would be via census with population breakdown 
according to enumeration blocks.  
 
3.6.1.2 Population Data for Commercial Area 
It is important to note on the onset of commercial activities that are present in the 
area. Generally, it is assumed that the daytime population size of the urban area or 
town of commercial areas is higher than the nighttime population. However, it is also 
important to note that townships in Malaysia often comprise shop houses, which 
signify higher night population as opposed to major central business districts that 
housed offices and shop lots which are normally devoid of population at night except 




3.6.1.3 Population Data for Industrial Area 
Population of industrial area refers to those working in the surrounding industrial 
establishments. Population data for the industrial area is least complex as they can be 
obtained quite straightforwardly from the establishments. 
 
3.6.1.4 Population Data for Recreational Area 
Population of recreational area is refers to the type of recreational activities (in 
covered or open areas) and whether involve short stays such as in camping or with 
accommodation such as in resorts. 
 
3.6.2 Population Present 
 
Although the present of the population is important to the calculation of both the 
individual and societal risk, but it is the time or when they are presence is more vital 
for risk calculation. It is known that the presence of population varies with time, as 
people travel out of their area to go to work, attend schools, window shopping or 
buying groceries and some are staying indoors. Therefore correct condition value has 
to be ascribed to calculating the time and the location of the population present. 
 
3.6.2.1 Day- time and Night- time population 
Daytime refers to the period from 7:00 hour to 19:00 hour GMT, whilst nighttime to 
the period 19:00 hour to 7:00 hour GMT. Some studies prefer 8.00 to 18.30 MET for 
day time and 18.30-8.00 MET for night time. Meanwhile, dividing the day and night 
hours to 12 hours apart each is based on the length of day and night around the 
equator which equal length of 12 hours each. As mentioned, population present varies 
with time; different values have to be used for the population during daytime and 
nighttime. In this method, residential area is defined as a land use in which the 
predominant use is housing (for habitant). These include single family housing, 
multiple family housing such as apartments, condominium, and townhomes. Zoning 
for residential use may permits some services or work opportunities or may totally 
exclude business and industry, which may either permit high density land uses or low 
density uses.  The following rules are applied to determine the presence of population 




 For residential areas the fraction of the population present during daytime (fpop 
night) is set at 0.7 and the fraction present during nighttime (fpop. night) is 1.0 [76]. 
However it is recommended that a more refined basis for calculating the 
fraction of population present during daytime or nighttime for Malaysian 
cases. For instance the population present in the residential area during 
nighttime is approximately 100% at 1.00 a.m. Therefore GIS technology 
method such as IDW (Inverse distance weighted) is used to estimate presence 
of population may vary significantly for daytime and nighttime.  
 
 The refinement refers to whether or not the residential area is rural or urban in 
nature as the occupational structure of the population in the two areas differ 
thus rendering a higher fraction for rural and a lower fraction for urban as 
more female go to work in the urban area. Even though in a low density area 
such differentiation may not be significant, in a high density area it can be 
considerable. 
 
 In an urban area at least 3 out of 5 members are assumed to be away during 
the day either at work or attending school. Thus, the population present during 
daytime (fpop. day = 0.4) and the fraction present during nighttime or (fpop. night = 
1.0). However, if the residential area is close to an industrial estate, it can be 
assumed that at least 0.05 household members are away from home working 
the night shift. In such case, the fraction of population present during 
nighttime is not 1.0 but 0.95. In rural area, the fraction of the population 
present during daytime and the fraction present during nighttime to 0.6 and 1.0 
respectively. 
 
 Another feature of residential area that has to be considered is the presence of 
either school or place of work or both. 
 
 In commercial area, the calculation of population number, as stated earlier can 
be a loose estimation at best, especially in term of the transient population 
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such as commuters, shoppers etc. The fraction present during daytime is set at 
1.0 and nighttime at 0. 
 In industrial areas, the fraction of the population present during daytime is 
equal to 1.0. If some of the establishment carries out work in night shifts, the 
fraction of the population present during nighttime is the actual figure as 
determined by the field survey or a default value of 0.2 that is found to be 
characteristics of industrial area. If no work is done in night shifts, the fraction 
is equal to 0 
 
3.6.2.2 Indoor and Outdoor 
The location of the population either indoor or outdoor is matter in the calculation of 
societal risk. Populations at outdoors are exposed to higher risk than the population 
staying indoors. This is because it is normally assumed that indoors population would 
be partially protected by structures and clothing. Hence, different values are used for 
the fractions of the population dying indoors and outdoors whereby, fractions of the 
population present indoors is known as (fpop. ind) and outdoors as (fpop. out). Generally, 
more people are staying and working indoors than outdoors irrespective of time. 
Hence, the (fpop. indoor) is higher than the (fpop. out). Default parameter values used are 
0.93 and 0.07 for day and 0.99 and 0.01 for nighttime for indoor and outdoor 
respectively.  
 
3.6.3 Corrected Population Present 
 
The estimation of population present at the studied area is differentiated according to 
the type of land and its function. There are four types of land use which are known as 
residential, commercial, industrial and recreational. The institutions such as school, 
university and hostel are considered under residential land use. Firstly in order to 
establish the population data involved in the studied area, the total population of that 
particular area must be quantified. Secondly, the ratios between the different types of 
land use which is arranged from maximum to minimum ratio are adding up and the 
result is equal to 1.0. Thirdly, by following the above rules, the fraction of the 




In rural residential area, the fraction fpop.day = 0.7 during daytime, and 0.3 is away 
from home, at work or attending school and etc. In commercial area the fraction is 1.0 
during daytime and this fraction value is also similar for industrial area and 
recreational area. The fraction value is equal to zero if the land use type was not 
existed at the studied area.  
 
  
3.6.4 Population Mapping 
The information regarding the population has to be mapped out before detailed 
distribution could be identified and determined. In this thesis, the population 
distribution is worked out into three phases:  the spatial distribution, grid distribution 
and distribution by Risk Assessment Sector Diagram (RASD). Further discussion on 
this methodology, will be explained under the Geographic Information System (GIS) 
application. 
 
3.7  Meteorology Condition 
 
The meteorological data records (Meteorological Department, Malaysia) available 
from the nearest meteorology station,  which set the average weather conditions as 
follows: average temperature between 28 and 32°C in raining season and summer 
season with 70% humidity and a wind velocity of 3.3 to 5 m/s  or 5.56 to 8.33 m/s. To 
get Malaysia meteorological condition included in transportation risk calculation, 
wind speed and stability should be obtained from local meteorological records 
whenever possible. Almost all meteorological data required can be found at 
Malaysian Meteorological Department (MMD) homepage as illustrated in Figure 3.8. 
Whenever these stability data are not available, Pasquill's simple table (Table 3-9) 
will permits atmospheric stability to be estimated from local sunlight and wind speed 
conditions. There are two type of weather combinations (stability and wind speed) 
which are used in many CPQRA guidelines such as D at 5 m/s (20 km/h) and F at 2 
m/s (10 km/h). The first type is typically used for windy daytime situations and the 
latter for still nighttime conditions. Stability class D is more frequently used than class 

















Figure 3.8 Malaysian Meteorological Department Homepage. 
 
Table (3-9) Meteorological Conditions Defining the Pasquill- Gifford Stability 
Classes [20] 
 Daytime insolation Nighttime condition Anytime 








Thin overcast  
or > 4/8 low  
cloud 







































A = Extremely unstable condition   D = Neutral conditions 
B = Moderately unstable condition                 E = Slightly stable conditions 






3.8 SMACTRA Description 
SMACTRA software is designed to be compatible with windows operating system 
(95, 98, XP, Microsoft Vista and Windows 7). The package is coded in VB language. 
The software is also designed to be able to work online by using php programming 
language to provide the accident impact analysis simulation results in the server. The 
package utilizes the latest ArcGIS version technique for geo-referencing and advance 
spatial analysis by performing the ArcGIS analytical model tool integrated with VB 
programming language under loose coupling technique.  
 
SMACTRA consists of 7 main modules, namely: data, potential accident scenarios, 
event consequences, accident frequency analysis, event impact, risk estimation and 
risk evaluation.  The data module handles general information related to the properties 
of the various chemicals, standard level of chemical risk exposure impacts and road 
characteristics. The potential accident scenario generation modules enables 
development of accident scenarios based on the properties of chemical involved, 
operating conditions and probability of the likelihood of road transportation accident 
and accident rates.  
 
The event consequences analysis module is capable to forecast the nature and the 
severity of an accident. An accident frequency analysis module is a measure of the 
expected probability or frequency of occurrence of an event. This may be expressed 
as a frequency (e.g., events/year), a probability of occurrence at a particular time 
interval or conditional probability such as the probability of wind blows toward a 
populated area following the toxic gases release. The event impact module enables the 
estimation of the accident impact on human, environment and property. The risk 
estimation module combines the consequences and likelihood of incident outcomes 
from a selected incident to provide risk measurement. The risks for all selected 
incidents are individually estimated and summed to give an overall measure of risk. 
The risk evaluation module enables the results of a risk analysis to be used to make 
decisions either through a relative ranking of risk reduction strategies or through 
comparison of risk targets such as to find the safest route.  
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The functionality mapping and accident impact simulator (e. g . online BLEVE 
simulator) was developed to allow users to use SMACTRA as an effective graphical 
tool and capable to work online via PHP language programming. Users will be able to 
define accident cases by locating them on the maps and editing and then selecting 
them from the map. Therefore SMACTRA software makes it easy for process safety 
and risk assessment professionals to identify vulnerable locations as well as to 
integrate consequences results and develop the safest route.  
The development of SMACTRA software can be divided into six distinct stages to 
enhance effective coordination of the various relevant activities: 
 Planning the application; 
 Designing the database;  
 Building the graphical user interface (GUI); 
 Writing the computer program; 
 Integrate the ArcGIS Model Builder with SMACTRA application; and 
 Testing and debugging the application (verification) through use of case 
studies. 
 
3.8.1 Planning the Application 
At this stage, the objective is to identify various tasks that the application needs to 
perform. The second step is to identify how these tasks are logically related and to 
identify objects to which each task will be assigned. The third step is to 
classify the events required to trigger an object into executing its assigned tasks. 
Finally, a sketch of the graphical user interface is prepared. The application 
should have the capability to compute the hazards analysis from hazardous 
material transportation accidents. The application must be able to save the results in 
different formats and have the capability to generate graphs.  
 
The next task was to identify information that is necessary for the execution of 
the program. The information was either user-provided information or internally 
generated information stored in a database in which the data can be retrieved. 
Analysis of this information assists in the selection of appropriate objects and 
controls therefore this information can be displayed on the GUIs and can accept 




The application was created by using some objects which were implemented through 
VB textboxes which allow data input by users and labels to provide identification of 
other objects in an interface. The VB has list boxes for displaying several 
options from which users can select the applicable options and command buttons 
that are used to initiate the event/s for each objects in the interface. Sketches of 
the GUIs for each procedure were made to show the expected structure of all 
the interfaces.  
 
3.8.2 Designing Database 
In this study, many parameters are involved in the development and designing the 
software. Generally, the parameters are divided into several main components such 
as incident frequency, consequences model, risk estimation and evaluation, risk 
decision, and chemical products database. No database is required for risk 
estimation, evaluation and risk decision. But the database is essential to calculate 
the incident frequency and consequences model.  
 
Since the hazardous transportation involved various types of chemical substances 
such as gasoline, liquefied petroleum gas, ammonia, liquefied natural gas, chlorine, 
therefore the material properties database is needed to show the physical and 
chemical properties characteristics of the chemical products. The physical and 
chemical properties data which has been used are based on the normal hazardous 
material transportation operation condition. However, the physical and chemical 
properties are dynamic according to meteorology condition such as humidity, 
atmospheric temperature and atmospheric pressure. To overcome this matter, 
several mathematical equations are used to calculate the result of physical and 
chemical properties such as density, volume, heat of combustion based on the 
meteorological changes. This is important to establish a precise result from the 
consequences model calculation. For example, to study the thermal radiation effect 
from a LPG tanker accident, the average value of the emissive power as the radiant 
heat emitted by the surface of the fireball has to be calculated. The calculation of 
emissive power is based on the theory of radiative fraction of the total heat of 
combustion as described by Robert and Hymes [20] in the Guidelines of CPQRA 
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[11, 19].  The heat of combustion     
   kJkg-1is the energy which is released as 
heat when a compound undergoes complete combustion under a standard condition. 
The heat of combustion for fuels is expressed as the height heating value (HHV) 
and Low Heating Value (LHV). For emissive power calculation, the value of heat 
combustion is taken from LHV.  The difference of the heating value depends on the 
chemical composition of the fuel. For instance, the value of the heat of combustion 





 depending on the country weather. Therefore the application uses Microsoft 
Access to store few common chemical substances in the database.  
 
Information that is already recognised such as the physical and chemical 
properties of materials, special explosion properties, fire and toxic release are 
stored in the Microsoft Access and Microsoft Excel database and is automatically 
available to the application at run time making the retrieval and modification easier. 
For incident frequency, there are parameters such as accident rate, accident force 
types and force magnitudes, which are used in the calculation. The accident rate data 
is available from MIROS in which its application uses GIS databases to store the 
number of accident per vehicles and kilometre. Population density values relevant to 
each road were evaluated based on census, master plan project development report 
and published detailed EIA reports.  
In SMACTRA, the data is store in GIS database or Microsoft Excel. However the 
phases of data acquisition and manipulation may be long, depending on the data 
format. For example different names or codes may be used in GIS database to identify 
the route segment, population density and land use activities.  Figure 3.9 shows a 
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3.8.3 Building the Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
A user interface is part of the program that is visible for human user. It can be as 
simple as a dos command line or as sophisticated as a virtual reality simulator. In the 
context of Visual Basic, the design of Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) is based on 
object-oriented programming.  It is displayed as one or more forms with attached 
tools such as text boxes, labels, buttons, picture boxes and etc. The tools are the 
objects and all the code which are associated with the object are written and attached 
to it therefore a form can be programmed. Each form has specific tasks defined by 
the functions of the objects placed on it. All the forms are logically connected. In 
all GUIs, information flows in the top to bottom and left to right fashion. VB is 
used to develop the application as front-end (GUI) and simulate the mathematical 
models for consequences modelling in the back-end (codes). The computation of the 
mathematical models for outflow, explosion, fire, toxic release, individual risk, 
societal risk are written in VB program, whilst the impact moving simulation are 
written in php online program by using JAVA script code. The main GUI component 
consists of project folder module, user create module, GUI control module and 
configuration setting module. 
 
Error message is displayed by VB to assist the user while utilizing the system during 
programming. In this study, several interfaces were used for the different type of 
hazards calculations. To create an effective programme, a common code module 
can be added to a VB application. All programs written in this module and 
variables can be used by any GUI in the application. 
3.8.4 General Interface 
The general interface is used to obtain selections for the user to evaluate the accident 
consequences. The general interface as shown in Figure 3.10 consists of eight menus; 
file, edit, view, scenarios, consequences models, risk assessment, database and help. 
These menus consist of submenus, which make “S   T  ” user-friendly software. 
It also has a tool bar for fire, explosion, dispersion and etc. Figure 3.10 represents the 
main menu and available options of SMACTRA software. Further menus can be 















Figure 3.10: The main general interface. 
 
File menu 
The file menu consists of several submenus shown as new, open, save, save as, print, 
and exit as shown in Figure 3.11. The submenus will appear by clicking on the main 
menus.  or example, “ pen” submenu will open the screen form as shown in Figure 
3.12. “Save” submenu is used to save the current application under its original name 
while “Save as” submenu allows the user to save the current application under a new 
name without altering the original file. The “ rint” submenu will print from either the 
current interface and its contents or a record from the output file. The “Exit” submenu 



























Figure 3.12: TRA interface form 
 
Edit menu 
Edit menu consists of other submenus, such as cut, copy, paste, delete and select all. 








Figure 3.13 Edit submenus. 
 
View menu 
Users can utilize the view submenus to select an image or images, to convert unit, 
calculator, toolbars, chemical and physical properties and impact. The impact 
describes the effect of transportation accident hazards to human and building 
structure. The image will display several types of chemical transportation hazards 













This application provides multiple options of accident scenario and its probability 
interest to start evaluation of the frequency of accident scenarios according to the 







Figure 3.15: Scenario submenus. 
  
Consequence models menu 
Consequence models menu consists of two main submenus which are consequences 
analysis models and vulnerability. The consequences analysis model is an important 
step in the risk management process. Therefore, after defined the accident scenario, 
source models are selected to describe how materials are discharged from the process. 
The source model describe the rate, total quantity (or total time of discharge) and the 
state of discharge either solid, liquid or vapor. For flammable releases, fire and 
explosion models will convert the source model information of the releases into 
energy hazard potentials such as thermal radiation and explosion overpressures. 
Figure 3.16 shows the example of consequences analysis model menu for heat 
radiation and combustion. From the submenus, user can define specific heat radiation 
model such as BLEVE (static case or dynamic case), fireball or pool fire. For pool 
fire, a user will have to options either pool fire analysis by using CCPS or Casal 












The applications also provide vulnerability models which can predict the effect of an 
accident on human or property. Figure 3.17, shows the vulnerability submenus for 
toxic dispersion model which is subsequently will describe how the material is 
transported downwind and dispersed to different standard limits of concentration 








Figure 3.17 shows vulnerability main submenus. 
 
Risk assessment menu 
The final risk is determined by multiplying the consequences and the frequency of the 
accidents over time. The results of quantitative risk assessment are expressed as 
individual or societal risks. Figure 3.18 shows the risk assessment menu for the 








Figure 3.18 shows the risk assessment menu. 
Help menu 
This application is designed to provide a guide for the user while using the 
SMACTRA software. It also consists of other options to make the application more 
user-friendly such as; MSDS will help users to understand the characteristic of the 
transported materials. Users are highly encouraged to review S   T  ‟s help to 




3.8.5 Incident Frequency Interface 
The incident frequency interface has various profile selection for the accident 
scenarios. It provides the user many choices of accident scenarios, however only one 
accident scenario will be displayed at a time. Figure 3.19 shows an incident frequency 
interface which consist of 2 profiles selection box; accident scenario and frequency. 
For frequency profile selection box, a user has to choose the most suitable frequency 
model based on the characteristic of transported hazardous materials and the 
sequences of the incident. Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is advocated into the software 
programming to develop the propagation sequence of each scenario and to calculate 
the final probability for every type of consequences. The sequence of the incident 
































Users can calculate the total frequency for an accident scenario by pressing on the 
scroll down button on the keyboard until the total output value become constant. 











Figure 3.20 Final frequency output from the propagation sequence of the accident scenario. 
 
Consequences scenario interface 
The consequences analysis interface is designed by using tabs control. It provides 
users many choices for selecting the type of hazards. Tab acts as an intermediate for 
other controls. Only one tab is active at a time, displaying the controls it contains to 
the user while hiding the other controls in the other tabs. Figure 3.21 shows 
consequences analysis interface which consist of four tabs; outflow, explosion, fire 
and toxic gas dispersion. The consequences analysis interface can be initiated by 

















3.8.6 Fire Interface  
Fire interface contains four buttons to estimate flash fire, jet fire, pool fire and 
fireball hazards. For example, if the user clicks on the pool fire button as in Figure 
3.21, then the application will display the pool fire hazard form. Figure 3.22 shows 
the fire and pool fire forms. The pool fire form consists of many text boxes, inputs 
and outputs which allow the user to estimate the pool fire hazards. 
 
Input Interface 
This interface contains a list of various classifications and characteristics of material 
properties. The users can select their type of hazards and key in their inputs and 
properties to run the simulation process. The input values are typed in the textbox and 

















































SMACTRA is designed to perform several calculation methods for different chemical 
hazards. The input factors are retrieved from the database and used for the analysis. 
The calculation results of pool fire hazard is presented in interfaces as demonstrated 
in Figure 3.20. The codes retrieve and process the information from the database and 
the result is displayed as GUI or text file which then can be printed or loaded in the 
Microsoft Excel or VB for plotting or GIS for mapping visualization.  
 
By using SMACTRA, users can choose 2 types of analysis to calculate the hazard 
caused by pool fire by using either Casal (as in Figure 3.23) or CCPS method (as in 
Figure 3.24) [22, 67]. Figure 3.23 is also illustrates that the liquid spills can be 
defined into two categories known as instantaneous (as shown in blue font colour) or 
continuous spills (as shown in red font colour). SMACTRA has the capability to 
distinguish the spills categories by estimating a tcr (i.e. critical time) over the duration 
and flow of the spill. Wind can have an influence on flame length however, recent 
study [67] found that the influence of wind on burning velocity, Uw is almost 
negligible at Uw < 2 m s 
-1
. Wind can also tilt the flames and alter their bottom part 
(Figure 3-21), thus causing the flames to spill over the edge of the pool and elongating  
List box 
Wind influence to pool fire 
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the flame base. This can be highly significant if there is equipment nearby, as the 
level of thermal radiation will increased. The influence of wind to pool fire can be 
shown by clicking the wind effect button as illustrated in Figure 3.23. Figure 3.25 will 

























Figure 3.25 shows the wind influence to pool fire. 
 
Jet or flare fires are characterized by highly turbulent diffusion flames. They exist 
from the accidental release of a fuel gas for example, through a broken pipe or a 
flange, from a relief valve or in process of emergency flaring. Accidental jet fires 
occurred in many parts of process plants or in transportation accidents and often 
impinge on the equipment. Therefore, large heat fluxes are produced from the high 













Figure 3.26 illustrates the calculation of jet fire hazard. 
 
Wind can have a significant influence on the jet fire. The model proposed by 
Chamberlain [203, 204] describing the jet flames by the frustum of a cone (Figure 
3.26) has been selected here. 
 
3.8.7 Explosion Interface 
The explosion interface is designed to calculate three types of hazards; Vapour Cloud 
Explosion (VCE), Boiling Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) and 
fragmentation. Each of these hazards has its own interface and each interface is 
capable of estimating different parameters. Figure 3.27 shows the parameters which 
can be calculated from the BLEVE hazard interface (i.e., the interface which appear 










Figure 3.27 illustrates the calculation of BLEVE hazard with its graph analysis and 
















Figure 3.28 illustrates peak overpressure impact over the receptor distance to 
 predict the effects of explosion to human, structure and building. 
 
Figure 3.28 shows the relative percentage of peak overpressure impact over the 
receptor distance to predict the effects of explosion to human, structure and building 
in order to understand the vulnerability impact on the human and structure from 
various amount of (e.g. LPG) during HAZMAT accident.   
 
SMACTRA can record the output result from BLEVE calculation.  Any alteration to 
the input value for parameters such as mass of TNT (mTNT), scale distance (Ze), 
peak overpressure (Po), heat combustion     
  , confined volume and energy which 
can happen to the HAZMAT material can be analyzed by using comparison of graph 
effect calculation results as shown in Figure 3.29. For instance, based on Figure 3.29, 
as the input parameter mTNT increased from 3000 to 13000 or 20000 or 37000 kg of 
LPG, the damage zone on the human and building structure will also increased. This 
comparison can also be shown for only 4 data input. However VB can be 
programmed to analyze and compare more data input in a graphic form in a single 
interface. Figure 3.29 shows comparison analysis of the explosion effects calculation 
for road tanker carrying varies capacity of hazardous material over distance impact on 



















Figure 3.29 shows comparison analysis of the explosion effects calculation of road 
tanker carrying varies capacity of hazardous material over distance impact on human, 
structure and building. 
 
SMACTRA can also perform fireball calculation by using various fireball models as 
shown in Figure 3.30. This figure also demonstrates the results of impact thermal 
radiation from fireball accident scenario towards receptor by calculating the amount 
of thermal radiation dose (DSE) in distance, time to feel pain (tp), vertical and 
horizontal thermal intensity. Graph analysis from the calculation result can be plotted 

















3.8.8 Toxic Release Interface 
Toxic release interface is designed to estimate the effect of toxic material dispersion. 
The estimations are carried out for different atmospheric stabilities (stability A, B, C, 
D, E, and F). Figure 3.31 illustrates the toxic release interface. Input data and 
analytical results are shown in the text boxes. Toxic release zone from a tanker 
accident can be analyzed and shown on graph. For example, the graph below shows 













Figure 3.31 illustrates the toxic release interface. 
 
3.8.9 Risk Impact Interface 
Figure 3.32 shows the risk impact result from road tanker explosion. Within the 
interface, severity from fireball explosion is demonstrated based on duration and 
position of receptor from the source of accident. For example, the figure below 
shows that if the road tanker accident involved 13,000 kg of LPG, the maximum 
diameter for fireball duration can reach up to 10.01 s. By using SMACTRA analysis, 
the severity of impact towards receptor according to tbleve changes and the distance of 
the receptor from the source of an accident can be shown by colour risk indicator.  
Any receptor which received the highest risk impact, red colour will be shown as the 
risk output. For example, a receptor at a distance of 100m is expected to receive a 
very high risk impact at duration of 0.9s during the fireball accident event. Even 
though the risk colour impact showed a change between 0-10.01s but the effect of 
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impact on the receptor within 10.01s duration is perceived as the worst case scenario, 
which is red colour. However if the receptor is at 100m and appeared at the even 
after 9.01s during the fireball accident, the risk impact result will show that the 
receptor only suffer low risk impact. This is because during explosion a fireball 
growth phase is observed when the time, tbleve reached, 9.01s the fireball is already 
located at 105m height from the ground level with the distance from the flame 












Figure 3.32 illustrates the risk impact interface. 
 
3.8.10 Transportation Risk Analysis Simulation (TRIS) in SMACTRA 
Simulation for transportation risk analysis as shown in Figure 3.33 till Figure 3.35 is 
for BLEVE fireball calculation case. By utilising this stimulator, the risk impact from 
fireball road tanker accident bleve can be studied for a larger area since the map for 
the studied area requires the google online map. As an example, input simulator will 
ask the user to enter the information for the road tanker route (direction origin to 
destination) then the simulator will focus on the particular area on the map which 
needs to be analyzed. By using this simulator, the entire route involved during 
transportation with the route distance will be shown in detail. The route used by the 
simulated tanker will be shown in blue colour. The advantage of using this simulator, 
it creates a more interesting and interactive informative image for example all the 
building and surrounding environment will be shown as 2D or 3D image based on 












Figure 3.33 shows the online driving simulator. 
 
The affected zone which involved the destruction of either buildings or infrastructures 























Figure 3.35 shows the BLEVE fireball impact at panoramic view. 
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3.8.11 SMACTRA Contour Panel for GIS Presentation 
The contour display panel in SMACTRA will provide with geographic based analysis 
results. For example, in Figure 3.36 after the calculation of fireball consequences in 
VB, the result can be plotted in GIS interface by pressing on the GIS button which is 
available in SMACTRA. In GIS interface the consequences result can be plotted 
based on the X, Y coordinate input. With this method, a user can predict the affected 
zone with its content (houses, industrial zone, road etc) within the fireball diameter.  
All information are integrated in GIS by creating a map that shows location of the 
object (the house) and the range of land use in a specified colour coding. Unlike the 
common GIS system where the software has to manipulate every separate layer 
manually, SMACTRA can perform this task automatically. The SMACTRA software 
will create the base map (from the combination of map layers) which is also known as 
the background map and later will project into ArcGIS map via map projection 
method to present the coordinate.  
 
In order to create and use the base map in SMACTRA consequences risk analysis, a 
user has to undergo a map projection method called georeferencing. Amongst the 
advantages of using the GIS application in SMACTRA is its capability to overlays the 
results of the models automatically on the base map at the right place and on the right 
scale. Line thickness, filling patterns and colors are set automatically and they can be 













Figure 3.36 shows GIS map analysis using SMACTRA. 
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3.9 Writing the Computer Programme 
The SMACTRA program is written in the standard Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 and 
distributed in an object format with the source code. After creating the interface for 
the SMACTRA application, a code is written to define the applications 
behaviour. VB makes code writing easier with features that can automatically fill 
in statements, properties and arguments. The computation of the mathematical 
models for the chemical hazards will be simulated using VB program (code).  
 
For instance, once the user loads the pool fire hazard analysis form (Figure 3.19), a 
connection between the hazard analysis form and the database will be established. 
The product names will be listed into the product name combo list. The next 
calculation procedures for whole operations will depend on the selected product name 
(from product name: propane).  
 
SMACTRA programme has several subroutines, which allow the users to simulate 
the scenarios. For example to estimate the impact of VCE to humans, the Run Click 
event performs two operations; first to retrieve the data from the database and second 
to run the mathematical models by using the input values. Finally it will display the 
outputs in the lists or text boxes. The graphs analyses for accident scenario output can 
be plotted by clicking on the chart button after calculate the input data.  The Save 
Click event performs three operations; first, open the save dialog, second, set the filter 
of the save dialog to document or text, and third, create the output file.  
 
3.10 Development of GIS 
GIS allows hazards of chemical materials and view all of the necessary deployment 
data in place. Data can be added, subtracted or modified with the computer mouse 
operations and the alternative plans can be created, analysed and modelled by using 
GIS. Although computerized mapping systems have been around for many years, 
recent improvements have made GIS software available on the desktop and on 
laptops. GIS software can now be used by non specialists to improve planning, 
analysis and response. These tools offer managers the ability to eliminate much of the 




3.10.1 Integrating SMACTRA Application with GIS  
 
The integration of the Visual Basic and ArcGIS 9.3.1 is required to integrate the map 





Figure 3.37 Work Flow of GIS Integration. 
 
GIS can handle two types of data, vector and raster data. Vector data are defined as a 
pair of coordinate and present very accurate coordinate geometric information with 
small data storage requirement. Raster data are defined as a grid of cells and each cell 
represents a finite portion of geographic features. In GIS data processing as shown in 
Figure 3.35, the analyst will select the specific document or maps that need to be 
digitized (either scan map or Google map in jpeg_file). Digitized is the transformation 
of raw information from analog format such as paper map to digital map, so that it can 
be stored and displayed in computer. To perform onscreen digitizing based on 
scanned topographic map, there are major tasks to be performed prior to the digitizing 
process as shown in Tables 3.38 and 3.39. These tasks are listed hereunder: 
 
3.10.1.1 Database Design 
 
 Data preparation and control point selection 
 
The analyst will select the specific document or maps that need to be digitized. 
The map should be inspected in term of scale, graphic, representation and 







 Database Design 
 
Data format Source Data Overview of Data Scheme 
 
Raster Data: (jpeg)  
• Google Satellite 
Imagery  
• Scan Map  
 
Vector Data: (shp) 
• Topographical  
• Land use Map 
• Road map 
 
Input data: (Table 
form)  
• Industry data 
• Population data 
• Wind direction 
data 
• Modeling data 
 
 
Raster Data: (jpeg)  
• Google Earth  
• Related Agencies 
 
Vector Data: (shp) 
• Land survey 
• JPBD 
• Related Agencies 
 
Input data: (Table 
form)  
• Consequences  of 
mathematical 
modelling results 
• Meteorology data 
• Modelling results 
of simulation  
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Figure 3.38 database design VB to Arc GIS. 
 
 GIS Data Processing                                                   Result and Quality Control  
 
Data format Processing and 
Conversion 
 Map Analysis Map Output 
 
Raster Data: (jpeg)  
• Google Satellite 
Imagery  
• Scan Map  
 
Vector Data: (shp) 
• Topographical  
• Land use Map 
• Road map 
 
Input data: (Table 
form)  
• Industry data 
• Wind direction 
data 
• Population data 








Vector Data: (shp_file) 
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• Overlaying data 
• Interpolation model 
IWD 
• Queries analysis 
• Manipulate and 
analyze 














horizontal and vertical location is known. The point is obtained from a known 
location with a coordinate or projection system. This study has used N. 
Sembilan map which was obtained from JPBD, DOE and related agencies 
with available data of the road, river, building, industries and topographical 
map.   
 Consequences from mathematical modeling road tanker accident results 
The accident consequences results from VB will be integrated to ArcGIS 
model builder tool via loose coupling method. This method will be discussed 
in section 3.9.2.  
 
3.10.1.2 Data Processing 
 
 Image registration and rectification  
The raw data is processed by registering and rectifying them through powerful 
computer. It is performed using geo-referencing tool in ArcMAP to prepare 
the base map to initiate screen digitizing. 
 
 Database management and layer designation 
The analyst will review the rectified image and identify the potential feature 
for digitizing such as contour, road, building, rivers, district area and etc. Then 
the database management and layer designation based on the analysis of the 
images are developed. Database management and layer designation task is 
conducted by using ArcCATALOG environment. 
 
 Digitizing and data editing 
After the layer designation and database management have been conducted, 
the rectified image is digitized either by using ArcCATALOG or ArcMap 
environment. The objective of digitizing is to transform of information from 
analog format such as paper map to digital map. Features, events, and 
activities with a spatial component are modeled as points, lines, polygon, nets 
or links to form the geographical relational database. Lines are used to 
represent road, river, rail and something like a network. Polygons are used to 
model features of an area such as location, shape, dimension and building. 
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 Attribute data editing 
Editing of attribute data is done by using ArcCATALOG which also capable 
to add new feature class to the data. This is important to extract out the 
information and do the analysis. This data is recorded in a table form and 
known as attribute data. 
 
 Map analysis and output 
Lastly, the analyst can do the analysis such as proximity analysis, buffer zone, 
and simulation, intersects and merges. Subsequently an interactive map is 
created based on the developer creativity.  
 
3.10.2 Integrate VB Output to ArcGIS Model Builder  
Geographic information systems are the powerful computer-based tools to capture, 
store, manage, retrieve, query, analyze and present spatial data. GIS ability as spatial 
data processing and analyses tools can be used to manage a wide range of 
information. GIS also facilitates the integration of disparate data sets, creates new data 
sets, develops and analyze spatially explicit variables. In this study, all equations and 
parameters in the proposed TRA model such as consequences models, effect models, 
and risk calculations are programmed in VB 6.  Loose coupling approach will be used 
to integrate the consequences and effect results calculations from VB6 to GIS. Loose 
coupling is an approach to interconnecting the components in a system so that those 
components, also called elements, depend on each other to the least extent practicable. 
The goal of a loose coupling is to reduce the risk that a change made within one 
element will create unanticipated changes within other elements. Furthermore by 
using loose coupling, all the consequences and effects from fire, explosion and toxic 
release incidents could be visualized and the entire surrounding environment such as 
schools, commercial area, residential area and industrial area can be identified. In 
order to do loose coupling, ArcObjects programming language files in ArcGIS 9.3.1 
are shared between GIS and the Model. The optimization equation generated by VB 
platform would be used as an input. Then the input which is connected to Model 
builder tool is used to integrate the mathematical models written in VB6 programming 
language to GIS base map. Model builder is used to automate GIS processes by 
linking data input from VB6 result calculations, ArcGIS tools/functions and data 
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output.  Basically, Model builder is part of the ArcGIS geoprocessing framework.  
The main advantage of using the model builder for GIS work is that the processes can 
be automated the GIS process can be saved and re-run at any time.  This is good 
especially when an adjustment to the process or analysis is required. Rather than 
repeating the entire analysis, this can be simplified by changing the related parameter 
and rerun the model to produce new results. There are several steps to be carried out 
in order to link the data input (VB6) to GIS as follows: 
 A model is built by using ArcToolbox window of ArcMap 9.4 and is named as 
Hazardous Buffer. 
 Then model properties submenu is selected from the model builder menu to 
set a more specific info and name for the developing model such as in Figure 
3. 40.  fter naming the developing model as “Hazard  egion” and label it as 
“Hazard  egion  nalysis”, a description of event will be set and the user will 










Figure 3.40 shows Model builder ArcGis submenu properties. 
 
 In order to store the GIS data and locate the output from the model, the 
location of the hazard region model directory must be set under environment 
tab as in Figure 3.41, this directory set-up is to instruct the ArcGIS system to 
create the output from the model and to execute the model analysis. Therefore 
setting up the environment is a prerequisite before performing geo-processing 
tasks.  
 














Figure 3.41 shows Hazard region analysis environment settings 
 
 
 The analysis tool is added to automate the GIS process after the model 
directory is set-up. Basically, the model will have 2 data inputs: impacts 
boundary polygons from accident consequences and hazard point locations 
(road tanker coordinate x, y). Figure 3.42 shows the 2 input layers.  














Figure 3.42 shows the boundary polygon and hazard point location. 
 
 Then 4 ArcToolbox functions is utilized under the model builder tool such as 
spatial join, select, buffer and intersect which are link together in the model to 
allow flexibility for the model analysis. All the related input parameters will 
be filled-up under input parameters form. This will allow changing of the 
buffer radius distance in the ArcMap result after a new accident consequences 
input (in VB 6) is calculated therefore the output result can be filled in the  
Boundary polygon 
represent by map 
Hazard point locations 
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GIS model builder input parameter.   Figure 3.43 shows the input setting 








Figure 3.43 shows the input setting parameter from VB calculation integrated 
into GIS model builder. 
 
 Hazards Spatial is included in the model to link and create variables from the 
parameters and join the boundary polygons and hazard point location input. 
This will give the attributes of the boundary polygons to all hazards point 
coordinate x, y within their boundaries. Hazard spatial joint tool is set under 
joint one to many, for the output class features joint operation. Therefore each 
boundary may have many hazards points. Figure 3.44 shows the selected 








Figure 3.44 shows the selected coordinate x, y in VB which represent the 
accident point data on GIS. 
 The selected coordinate x, y in VB is converted to GIS point data location at 
shape file point data as shown in Figure 3.45. The buffer radius from the 
tanker accident is generated from the selected coordinate x, y and stored in 
shape file point data as shown in Figure 3.46. 
 
VB accident consequences 
Modeling Result 
Setting VB output to display 













Figure 3.45 shows the selected coordinate x, y in VB is converted to GIS point 










Figure 3.46 shows the buffer radius from the tanker accident will generated on 
GIS map via the input coordinate x, y in VB. 
 
 If the boundary polygons and hazards point inputs in the model has no color to 
it and all elements are in white, this mean that the model is not ready to run. 
To run the model, the location of the data in the ArcGIS must be set. After 
setting the element files location, the model elements will have color to it and 
ready to be run. The blue round elements represent the inputs model, yellow 
rectangular elements are for tools and green round elements are for derived 
data for the output of the model. 
 All of the selected coordinates for tanker accident consequences locations will 
have a buffer tool at the end of the model as the last output (hazards 
selectsection.shp).  
Convert VB output and 
generate the shape_ file 
point data  
Generate the point hazard 




 All output layers are intermediate and temporarily created while the model 
runs and deleted once the final output is obtained.  
 All data which are gathered from the accident will be clipped to show the info 
involved such type of land-use or activities affected within the buffer, 
meanwhile index risk will show the severity of the impact accident within the 










Figure 3.47 shows the Clip gathered the risk input data and buffer result. 
 
 The model builder window is closed when the proposed analysis model 
created has completed.   
 The model process flow as shown in Figure 3.48 represents the integration of 






















Figure 3.48 shows the process flow to integrate the VB output to ArcGis. 
 
The above process flow summarized the stages for data model design. The blue circle 
represents the result for the process in the model by using VB output calculation. The 
result will become the input data to plot the buffer or affected zone area from the 
transportation accident that had occurred at a particular route. Clip GIS layer is used 
to demonstrate the risk for the coordinate area involved. Risk index is the risk 
calculation for the transportation activity along the selected route based on number of 
houses, industrial areas or commercial areas and also the population distribution 
(calculated based on IDW method) during day and night time. 
 
3.11  Map Projection with Georeferencing 
 
In GIS technology, geographic information can be divided into two classes: location 
and spatial data which also has known as vector and raster data. Vector data will 
record the location of a given object (point, line, or polygon) and attribute while raster 
data will describe the characteristics of an object or image. In this study, the 
information on the surrounding areas in the model is treated by adopting raster GIS 
framework. The raster framework transforms a continuous space into a discrete image 
by modelling it to tessellation of square grid cells called pixels. Tessellation refers to 
a finite number of objects/cells that cover a surface as discrete partitions. Raster is 
commonly used to approximate continuous surfaces in GIS. Raster GIS are organized 
in layers, each layer is assigned to a characteristic of interest. Raster data stored as 
raster datasets in matrix of square cells. ArcMap 9.3.1 Update version was used to 
model the HazMat release incident and the impact of the release of this toxic, 
hazardous chemical in the area surrounding. Layers including land use information 
(such as recreational area, industrial area, institutional area, development area, tourist 
area, settlement area, forest, airport and agricultural area), population density and 




Satellite images from Google earth as in Figure 3.49, which are linked to a database 
are used to view actual map of accident location occur as in Figure 3.50 (for example 
at Port Dickson). Since data from different sources need to be combined and then 
used in an ArcGIS 9.3.1 update application, it is essential to have a common 
georeferencing system.  
Georeferencing tasks are used since it capable to produce a new map by overlaying 
two or more different datasets together with the same coordinate of geographic 
locations. Georeferencing is a crucial task to make satellite image useful for GIS 
mapping application. To georeference an image, four major steps are involved, first to 
establish control points (at least 4 points) as in Figure 3.51, secondly to enter input of  
known geographic coordinates to the established control points, then to choose the 
coordinate system and other projection parameters and finally to minimize residuals.  
 
Residuals are the difference between the actual coordinates of the control points (used 
by Google Earth) and the coordinates are predicted by the geographic model which is 
created in the GIS (known as WGS 1984 Mercator coordinate system) as in Figure 
3.52. Figure 3.53 and Figure 3.54 illustrates the sequences or steps to integrate the 
transportation risk analysis accident input data with GIS application to produce an 
interactive map analysis. The Georeference process create and store control 
information that relates raster cells or vector and ArcGIS elements to a coordinate 
system and map projection. One of the easiest ways to establish georeference is to 
place control points on the input object using a reference object as in Figure 3.51 that 































Figure 3.50 Search location of accident occurs (at Middle West Coast Refinery  


















Figure 3.51 Add the lating of the position coordinate in decimal degree unit  











Figure 3.52 Projection Map from Different Spatial Reference World 
 Geographic Coordinate System 
 


































Figure 3.54 checked the coordinate residual (e.g 0.00001) subjected 













  Figure 3.55 Result after Map projection and Georeferencing analysis 
processes (Image as background layer) 
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In this study, ArcGIS is used to project the GIS data from one map projection to 
another. Map projection involves taking spatial data defined on the curved surface of 
the earth prior to transforming it to the flat surface of a map and mathematical 
algorithm is used for this transformation. Figure 3.51 to Figure 3.55 illustrate some 
graphical user interface (GUI) involved during long georeferencing and map 
projection analysis. Figure 3.55 shows the result after minimization of the residuals 
coordinate system for map projection (as in Figure 3.54).  
 
To perform a map analysis, various types of input data such as population distribution 
data, meteorology data and modeling data are used. An ArcGIS usually provides 
spatial analysis tools to calculate and carry out geoprocessing activities as data 
interpolation. Spatial interpolation is the process which uses points with known values 
to estimate values for unknown points. In this study, the technique of spatial data 
interpolation analysis is utilized to find the impact of BLEVE of hazmat of road 
transportation accident to population and surrounding environment via number of 
routes. In this research, interpolation method called Inverse Data Weighting (IDW) is 
used. Figure 3.56 illustrates how the inputs data points in ArcGIS RSO coordinates 















Figure 3.56 illustrate Inverse Distance Weighted (IDW) interpolation based on 
weighted sample point distance (left) from population density point over route.  
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In the IDW interpolation method, the sample points are weighted during interpolation 
such that the influence of one relative point (known as point A, point B, point C and 
point X) to another decline with distance from the unknown point (point U) can be 
estimated. Weighting is selected to sample points by using the weighting coefficient 
that controls how the weighting influence will drop off as the distance from new point 
increases. Within the interpolation area for unknown point U, it is noticed that the risk 
effect for the affected population is demonstrated by differentiating in color. Red 
color represent for high risk drop down to blue color for the low risk. 
 
3.12    SMACTRA Validation and Verification 
 
Developers of computer codes, analysts who use the codes and decision makers who 
rely on the results of the analyses share the same concern on the accuracy of modeling 
and simulation assessment methods. Verification and validation of computational 
simulations are the primary methods to build confidence and quantify the results. 
Briefly, verification is the assessment of the accuracy of the solution to a 
computational model. Validation is the assessment of the accuracy of a computational 
simulation by comparison with experimental data. The Validation process confirms 
that the right system is being built (i.e., that the system requirements are 
unambiguous, correct, complete, consistent, operationally and technically feasible, 
and verifiable). The Verification process ensures that the design solution has met the 
systems requirement and that the system is ready for use in the operational 
environment for which it is intended.  
 
3.13   Summary 
This chapter has been dedicated to describe the basic modeling technique and overall 
methodology. The basic idea of the proposed modified TRA methodology for 
Malaysia is to capture the matching data/databases available with TRA techniques 
and to set up an applicable framework to assess transportation risk step by step. 
Mathematical models and risk analysis techniques like ETA are employed for each 
risk component assessment. Numerical models are presented to measure individual 
risk and societal risk caused by HazMat transportation. The overall procedure to 
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develop and design a smart advisory system for hazardous materials transportation for 
Malaysia scenario could be simplified as follows: 
Identifying the hazards. In order to identify and quantify incident scenarios referred to 
each traveling risk source and to predict the consequence of each incident scenario, 
the following parameters are required: 
 
 The transportation conditions for each substance, i. e., the temperature and 
pressure values at which the substance is stored in the transportation vehicle 
container.  
 The probability of the size of the equivalent holes, which have been chosen, to 
describe all possible releases from each vehicle typology. For each vehicle 
typology and for each rupture size including its physical aspects, outcome, a 
release rate, or a release quantity either instantaneous or continuous release, 
have to be evaluated. 
 The final outcomes to which each hole size of each vehicle typology can lead 
such as toxic cloud, explosive or a pool flame, jet-fire and so on.  
 The probability of having the final outcome once a release has occurred, i.e., 
the product of the probability of the release being of a specific equivalence 
size, once the release has occurred, and the probability of having final 
outcome, once the release of this specific equivalence hole has occurred. 
 
Zoning of the route (Route segmentation): making a detailed analysis of the proposed 
route to segment it into zones of different topography, population density, (very much 
depending on the homogenous surrounding of the route), meteorological conditions, 
accident frequencies, etc.  
All the parameters influencing the effects evaluation can vary from zone to zone of 
the impact area, especially when considering very large areas. The distribution of the 
population on the impact area is an essential input for calculating societal risk. A 
population map is composed of zones, where people may be considered uniformly 
distributed, and of aggregation centre, where people are clustered. The total numbers 
of these zones and centre and their population density need to be determined. 
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Gathering accident data and movement data for the hazardous materials concerned: 
establishing the likelihood of release, and estimating the final event frequencies using 
the modification event tree analysis and yield probabilities according to statistical 
analysis from major accident hazard databases available ( in case of transportation 
accident)  
 Estimating hazard zones: application of appropriate consequences models for jet fire, 
flash fire, BLEVE, fireball, toxic dispersion and pool fire to estimate the impact zone 
of human fatality and injury and damage of the structures and buildings for each of 
the identified hazards for the various zones of the route, and hence to evaluate the 
overall impacts for each of the zones of the route. 
Estimating the route societal risk: estimates the risk to a group of people located in 
the effect zone of an accident, the result is normally represented by the Frequency – 
Number (F-N) curve. 
Time of day effects: description for the variation of population between night, when 
most people are at home and day when most people are at work and more people are 
likely to be outside 
Comparison of alternate routes: level of risk routes will be compared with risk 
acceptability criteria. 
Display the analysis by using GIS (integration): GIS software such as Arc View 9.3.1, 
ArcGiS Engine and network analyst extension of the GIS software Arc View, are used 
to store roadway data and other socio-economic data for the county, identifying 












CHAPTER 4                                                                                                                                                                          
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter evaluates and discusses on the development and performance of Smart 
Advisory System for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis (SMACTRA) software. 
This software uses mathematical models to evaluate explosion, fire, toxic release and 
risk estimation results for individual and society which have been successfully 
programmed and implemented in an interactive Visual Basic (VB) environment. It is 
also integrated with GIS visual mapping analysis and online spatial Map API for 
transportation risk analysis simulation. Since the SMACTRA software combines an 
interactive VB, GIS and Map API online, it is a very user friendly, able to assist and 
train users especially those who are non-experts in computer programming to evaluate 
hazards from chemical substances transportation. Therefore, the possibility of doing 
mistakes in the risk calculation is greatly reduced. For an expert, the software 
provides the risk information analysis of the hazardous material transportation in 
holistic approach. Furthermore, the software has the capability to identify vulnerable 
locations as well as to integrate risk consequences results and therefore the safest 
route can be selected.  
 
4.1 Software Validation 
Simulation techniques are used to prove the software‘s viability and can be used to 
compare ‗real world‘ results to those simulated by the model. Validity of SMACTRA 
software to assess either the static or moving risk sources for the transportation of 
hazardous material has been confirmed. The SMACTRA calculation results have been 
tested by using an established data and compared with the results from published 
literature and chemical risk management software to check its validity of equations 
used and programmed. The results obtained by SMACTRA are found to be consistent 
and without significant deviation as in other trials. Thus, this newly developed 
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SMACTRA tool is compatible computational software for the consequence modeling 





































Continued to next page 
Verification the SMACTRA results  
To prove the software‘s viability as a reliable program and comparison of the 
calculation results are as below: 
 Case studies and accident scenarios (as discussed in section 4.1 and 4.2) 
 Risk assessment software (Effect 8.01, Canary)  
 Other related and published data  
 
Consequences Analysis 
Vapor cloud explosion impact (as discussed in section 4.3) 




 Analyze road tanker accident hazard at various capacities – 1000, 2000, 3000, 
5000, 7000, 85000, 32000 kg of LPG  
 Compare the SMACTRA results with Baker Strehlow Tang method, TNO 
Multi Energy method calculation results. 
Pool fire impact (as discussed in section 4.3) 
 Analyze road tanker accident containing 13,000 kg of LPG at constant leakage 
rate 0.0707m3/s or 43.5 kg/s and variable leakage rate using SMACTRA 
software and compare it with another published software analysis results 
 Study the burning rate and spill time duration effect to pool fire diameter size 
during instantaneous and continuous spillage. 
 Study thermal intensity, view factor, transmissivity, and thermal radiation dose 
effect over the receptor distance from accident source. 
BLEVE fireball (as discussed in section 4.3)  
 Analyze road tanker accident hazard at various LPG capacities (4000kg and 
13,000kg) and compare the results with Effect 8.01. 
 Comparison between fireball diameters with duration as calculated by 
SMACTRA and EFFECT 8.01 software. Also experimental and calculated their 
relationship as function of mass fuel.  
 Study the time for the receptor to feel pain as a function of BLEVE fireball 
thermal radiation. 
 Study the effect of fireball height , fireball diameter and emissive power as a 
function of BLEVE fireball duration time  to receptor 
Toxic gas release (as discussed in section 4.3) 
 Analyze the consequences by using SMACTRA map API online for various 









































Figure 4.1 Software Validation 
Effects Analysis 
 Determine the effect of overpressure towards human and building structure 
from vapour cloud explosion by using SMACTRA, Effect 8.01 and Canary 
software. (as discussed in sub- section 4.3.3) 
 Determine the effect of thermal radiation towards human from pool fire, 
BLEVE, fireball using SMACTRA, Effect 8.01 and Canary software or 
compared with related or published case studies (such as PEMEX Ixhuatepec, 
Mexico City incident) and software result data (such as FRED, MAXCRED). 
(as discussed in sub- section 4.3.3 to 4.3.6) 
 Study the effect of time exposure for thermal radiation dose load from pool fire 
incident scenario towards receptor. (as discussed in section 4.3.7 and 4.3.8  
 Study the relationship between age, total body surface area burn (TBS) and 
quantity of HazMat with thermal radiation dose load from BLEVE incident 
scenario 
 Study the BLEVE probit analysis and thermal radiation dose load as a function 
of distance 
 Study the effect of toxic gas dispersion. (as discussed in sub- section 4.3.12) 
 
Risk Estimation 
 Calculate the individual and societal risk along five selected routes 
 Analyze the societal risk impact from BLEVE fireball incident for the 
minimum risk route 
 Analyze the individual risk toward the most risky route (worst case scenario) 
compared with CCPS and BUWAL Swiss method. (as discussed in section 4.4) 
 
Safest Route 
 Comparing Societal Risk results from five routes and find the safest route 
 Study the effect of route length and number of trips towards the safest societal 
risk route calculation 
 
Hazard Mapping Analysis 
 Study the effect of population density, land use activities to risk mapping 
analysis during night and day time. (as discussed in section 4.5) 
 
Summary 




4.1.1 Case Studies 
It is known that the use of SMACTRA to predict the potential consequences from 
chemical hazards necessitates the review for several accident scenarios or case 
studies. Therefore, several case studies have been reviewed by other authors and those 
softwares results were compared with SMACTRA. Case study 1 was analysed by 
using SMACTRA and compared with case study 2, 3, 4 and 5. The descriptions for 
these studies are as follows:  
 
Case study 1: Environmental Impact Assessment of LPG transportation via road 
network for MCWR Port Dickson 
In this study, risk analysis was implemented to estimate and evaluate the risk impact 
from an accident involving LPG trucks. In order to estimate the risk related to LPG 
truck accident, the actual accident scenario was used. To make this case study 
relevant, the selection of accident scenario was based on the actual events that had 
occurred in Malaysia based on the information gathered from the database in National 
Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH) and Malaysian Institute of Road Accident and 
Safety (MIROS) Bangi, Malaysia. Based on the review of NIOSH report, a specific 
accident scenario can be created according to the truck condition, time and features of 
the accident scene. During the accident, a truck with the composition 30,950 litre 
(tank volume 11995mm X 2480mm X 3500mm), carries Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
(LPG). There are few factors were considered during risk calculation such as 
Malaysia climate which is hot and wet with its temperature ranging from 28-32
o
C and 
humidity level about 70%. LPG comprises of two major components, propane and 
butane. In this case the percentage ratio of butane to propane is 70:30. 
 
The truck accident scene was analyzed for five routes which involves a daily 
movement of 34.5 m
3 
of LPG through approximately 15 to 20 km length route from 
Middle West Coast Refining (MWCR) Company in Port Dickson to Petrol and Gas 
service station in Port Dickson. The MWCR processed crude oil 55,000 barrels per 
stream day (BPSD) and produced the following products or domestic consumption for 
LPG, naphtha, mogas, kerosene, diesel and Low Sulphur Waxy Residue (LSWR). 
MCWR was built in 1963 on 101hectar area and located about 2km from Port 
Dickson. There is several residential housing close to the refinery with some of them 
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fringing the refinery fencing. Port Dickson is accessible via North South Highway and 
the coastal road along the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. Access to MCWR site 
from the north which is from Seremban is possible via Port Dickson by using 
alternative roads without having to pass through the town. Access from the south is 
along Jalan Pantai but since this is a popular tourist destination, it experiences a 
substantial increase in vehicles especially during weekends and public holidays. 
Traffic volume counts are conducted regularly by the Highway Planning Unit of the 
Ministry of Works [169]. In 1996 vehicles flow rates for segments of the Seremban – 
Port Dickson bypass varies from 810 to 1314; whilst for the Port Dickson –Lubok 
Cina bypass, the figure is 1337. It is estimated that Seremban –Port Dickson highway 
will reach over its capacity in the future based on traffic growth projections. 
Export of MCWR products by road currently generates approximately 400 lorry trips 
per day but with the commissioning of the multi product pipeline, the number of road 
trips is expected to be reduced to 219 per day. From 1998 to the year 2000, road trips 
are projected to increase by 6% per year. With the completion of the new highway 
linking Kuala Lumpur International Airport at Sepang (KLIA) to Port Dickson, it is 
expected that the road trips may increase to 8-10 % per year. At present, the loading 
activities are mainly during daytime, between 0800 and 1630 hours but this expected 
will be extend to longer hours in the future. 
 
Case Study 2: Effect version 8.01 
Effect version 8.01 software [188,189] is developed by TNO (Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research) and is used to calculate the effect and 
consequences of accidental releases for Dutch government. All the consequences 
mathematical models used in the software are originated from the Yellow Book and 
Green Book, which provide solid scientific information and are recognized 
internationally as reference works for consequence analysis. The software is renewed 
and improved based on the developments in the safety knowledge and comments from 
the user. 
 
Case Study 3: Quest CANARY 
Quest CANARY software [190] package is developed by Quest Consultancy 
Incorporated, New York United States of America and is used to perform the 
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consequence modelling. CANARY includes application-specific models for vapour 
dispersion, fire radiation and vapour cloud explosions. CANARY able defines the 
hazard endpoints (e.g. gas concentration, radiant flux, and overpressure) that 
determine the extent of toxic or flammable gases. It also produces many forms of Risk 
Assessment and analysis and it uses a simple semi-quantitative method of Risk 
Assessment called Risk ranking up through a fully-Quantitative Risk Analysis—
Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) for loads and radiation from several types of fires, or 
overpressure resulting from an explosion. This technique involves identification of 
hazardous events that could occur at a facility and estimate the possible consequences 
and probability of occurrence of each event.  
 
Case Study 4: Mexico City Ixhuatapec 
PEMEX LPG Terminal at San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico City where a disaster had 
occurred in 1984 which caused 650 fatalities and 6400 injuries. The incident occurred 
when a 200mm pipe between a storage cylinder and a sphere ruptured, releasing LPG. 
The release continued for 5 to 10 minutes resulting in a large gas cloud which ignited 
and caused an explosion and many ground fires. These ground fires led to a series of 
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions (BLEVEs) in the LPG terminal. The 
main cause for the escalation of the incident was the ineffective gas detection system 
and lack of emergency isolation. The accident also showed that BLEVEs were the 
important source of hazard. 
 
Case Studies: Others  
The results from published data such as from Lees compilation of case incident [64], 
related articles, journals [153, 191-193] and published results from risk software such 
as MAXCRED, FRED [194-202] are compared during the SMACTRA validation 
results. 
 
4.2  Accident Scenario (Sequence of Event) 
In the case of the loss of containment of a hazardous material, the possible damages 
can be due to its toxicity and/or its flammability.  The evolution of an accident 
depends on a number of parameters such as the physical properties of the substance, 
its physical conditions during transport (pressure, temperature, degree of filling), 
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location and size of the release hole which will determine whether the spill is liquid, 
vapor or two-phase. The amount of material released is a function of: 
 
 The total amount of transported material. Its depends on the size of the tank, 
and on the filling degree; 
 The size of the release area (either leak from the relief valve, a pinhole, a 
larger fracture in the vessel wall, etc.); 
 The release duration (whether it is continuous or instantaneous). 
 
In case of immediate ignition, the flammable material will form a jet fire and its 
consequences are limited to a relatively small area near the release site. Even in this 
case, serious consequences may result, either because of the presence of many people 
nearby or from its secondary effects (domino effect), such as the heating effect on the 
tank itself or the impingement of the flame on other objects (collapsible structures, 
other vessels containing hazardous materials, buildings, cars. buses and so on). 
Factors affecting the generation of liquid pool from the liquid spill are the presence of 
immediate ignition, non-flammable material or the external (ambient) conditions. A 
vapor cloud will be produced either directly from the tanker or from pool evaporation. 










Figure 4.2 show the sequence of events based on LPG road tanker accident case study 
at Port Dickson 
Population density 
Population density data are obtained from The Department of Statistics Malaysia 
records which is referred to the most recent census, 2010 and from Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) report of MCWR [ 203].  Based on the data, the population 
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hectare. Mukim port Dickson is controlled by Port Dickson District Office and for 
District of Port Dickson; the population density is 1.6079 people per hectare. The 
population distribution is divided into 2 sets of population distribution: (i) day time 
population, and (ii) night time population. Table 4.1 shows the detail information of 
population distribution by point location. 
 
Table 4.1 population distribution 
Point location            Day time population  Night time   population 
   __________________________________________________________ 
A   517    2598 
B   280    1400 
C   882    1743 
              D             408    707 
______________________________________________________________ 
Note: daytime refers to the period from 0700 hour to 1900 hour GMT, whilst 
nighttime to the period 1900 hour to 0700hour GMT. 
 
In this case study, the information in Table 4.1 was mapped out before detailed 
distribution was identified and determined. The population distribution in Table 4.1 
then was worked out into spatial distribution by risk assessment sector diagram 
(RASD) [70]. 
 
Meteorology condition  
The meteorological data records (Meteorology Department, Malaysia) are available 
from the nearby Malacca meteorology station which allowed the setting of average 
weather conditions as follows: average temperature of 28 and 32°C in winter and in 
summer, respectively, with a humidity of 70% and a prevailing wind velocity of 3.3 to 
5 m/s during hot season. The Pasquill atmospheric stability class was assumed as D 
(i.e. neutral) through the year. 
 
Release scenarios 
Two release scenarios were assumed: a spill from a hole 25 mm in diameter in the 
tank, lasting for 10-15 min and catastrophic rupture of the tank, with discharges of the 
entire content from > 250 mm hole in about 30 s. In both cases the possible 
consequences from the release include jet fire, pool fire, flash fire, UVCE and 
BLEVE fireball. The explosion of the tank, due to thermal decomposition of LPG, 
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may also occur in the event of a pool fire under the tank. The result will only show the 
explosion event for the catastrophic scenario.  
 
4.3 Output from the Case Studies  
 
4.3.1 Results of the Vapor Cloud Explosion Consequences of LPG 
Transportation Accident (at the container capacity 34.5m
3
) 
One of the main effects of an explosion is the development of a rapidly moving shock 
or pressure wave. This wave generates overpressures which can be divided into two 
categories; building damage and human damage. Blast wave damage is a common 
complication of overpressure and it is also known as a function for the rate of pressure 
rise and wave duration. Impulse is also used as a measure for blast damage. The 
principal parameters of the blast wave from Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) are the 
peak overpressure, 0p , the impulse of the positive phase duration, pi  and the duration 
of the positive phase, dt .  VCE is common consequences in transportation accident 
which can occur either in confined or unconfined area. Explosions effect modeling is 
generally based on TNT equivalence and TNO. The TNT model is easy to use for a 
known energy of a combustible fuel with an equivalent mass of TNT. The approach is 
based on the assumption that an exploding fuel mass behaves similar to exploding 
TNT with an equivalent energy basis [153]. TNT is the easier model and it is based on 
the assumption of equivalence between the flammable material and TNT, factored by 
an explosion yield term [16, 153]. The procedure of TNT calculation model is shown 
in Appendix 1 [27-33, 35]. The TNT equivalence predicts peak overpressure with 
distance. Crowl and Louvar [ 153], provides an equation for the scaled overpressure 
over scaled distance. It is noted that the pressure depends strongly on the distance 
between the place of the explosion and the structure. Therefore similar explosive 
charge may cause different overpressures depending on the location of the explosive 
charge. Pressure also depends on the location of the explosive charge above the 
ground. Table 4.2 shows the peak overpressure results at different distances for 
material release as predicted by SMACTRA and Figure 4.2 shows the comparison of 
the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a function of distance for the three 
methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency; Multi Energy method: blast strength; TNO 
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Multi Energy method using blast wave chart; Baker Strehlow-Tang method (at 
various radius from an explosion such as 25m till 500m) around LPG tank. 
 
Table 4.2 Peak overpressure vs. scaled distance for blast wave pressure from 
















25 1.07 17.30 876.35 
 
525 22.40 0.08 3.89 
50 2.13 3.53 178.90 
 
550 23.47 0.07 3.69 
75 3.20 1.41 71.50 
 
575 24.53 0.07 3.53 
100 4.26 0.78 39.46 
 
600 25.60 0.07 3.37 
125 5.33 0.51 26.04 
 
625 26.67 0.06 3.23 
150 6.40 0.38 19.13 
 
650 27.73 0.06 3.10 
175 7.46 0.29 15.05 
 
675 28.80 0.06 2.98 
200 8.53 0.25 12.39 
 
       700 29.87 0.06 2.87 
225 9.60 0.21 10.54 
 
725 30.93 0.06 2.76 
250 10.67 0.18 9.18 
 
750 31.99 0.05 2.67 
275 11.73 0.16 8.14 
 
775 33.06 0.05 2.58 
300 12.80 0.14 7.32 
 
800 34.13 0.05 2.50 
325 13.87 0.13 6.65 
 
825 35.20 0.05 2.42 
350 14.93 0.12 6.10 
 
850 36.26 0.05 2.35 
375 15.99 0.11 5.63 
 
875 37.33 0.05 2.28 
400 17.07 0.10 5.24 
 
900 38.40 0.04 2.21 
425 18.13 0.09 4.89 
 
925 39.46 0.04 2.15 
450 19.20 0.09 4.59 
 
950 40.53 0.04 2.09 
475 20.27 0.09 4.33 
 
975 41.60 0.04 2.04 
500 21.33 0.08 4.10 
 




Figure 4.3 Comparison of the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency 
(ɳ=10% at 13000 kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 
(interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using 
blast wave chart; Baker Strehlow-Tang method: Mf= 0.662 flame speed in 
Mach number). 
 
From Table 4.2, it is shown that the receptors located at the distance 25 m from the 
source of accident will received the maximum impact value at 876.36 kPa. The peak 
overpressure value is drastically dropped to 178.90 kPa at the distance of 50 m. For 
the distance between 75m to 200m, this value dropped slowly. From 375m and above 
the peak overpressure value dropped to very minimum changes and subsequently 
showing constant impact value over distances. 
 
Theoretically, the TNT-equivalency method assumes that the blast propagates in an 
ideal environment such as horizontal surface and excluding the presence of any 
obstacles. The multi-energy and the B-S-T method take into account the presence of 
congested zones to the generation of the blast. In the case of the SMACTRA –TNT 
equivalency method, it is necessary to select the explosion yield value and its result 
will change depending on the selected value. The value for explosion yield of an 
explosion event may range from 1% to 10%, but the most frequently used value is 
between ɳ= 0.03 to 0.05. For the multi-energy method, the initial blast strength must 
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flammable cloud. According to Baker-Strehlow-Tang (BST) method, the Mach 
number of the flame speed and a function of the congestion must be specified. This 
specific correlation was established from the experimental data by Baker et al. [204]. 
He stated that the combined effect of fuel reactivity, obstacle density and confinement 
was associated with flame speed. Therefore, with this method the strength of the blast 
wave is proportionate to the maximum flame speed achieved within the cloud. Based 
on Figure 4.2, it is shown that at the short distance between 20 to 70m, the multi-
energy method and BST predicts the maximum peak overpressures will be below than 
89.08 kPa.  SMACTRA predicts that peak overpressure will drastically drop from 876 
kPa at distance 25m to 178 kPa at distance 50m from an accident event. However 
SMACTRA and Baker Strehlow Tang overpressure value shows a relatively similar 
value of peak overpressure at the distance between 200 m to 500 m with the 
overpressures range between 2 and 11 kPa.  
 The comparison results also shows the same conclusion as published by Lobato et al., 
[205] who applied the TNT-equivalency, the multi-energy and the BST methods for 
the explosion of a small cloud (264 m
3
) which contain a mixture of hydrogen and air 
containing 1.08 kg of hydrogen, in a low congestion environment. According to their 
hypothesis if an explosion yield value was 10% for the TNT method (a conservative 
value); a blast strength of 10 instead of 7 due to the hydrogen explosion features for 
the multi-energy method; for the BST method, the flame expansion was assumed to 
be 2D and the obstacle density lower than 10%, so Mf= 0.662. They concluded that 
the TNT model predicts higher overpressures, while the multi-energy and the BST 
methods predict similar values but the overpressure values which were obtained were 
not significant for a very short distance (less than 70 m).  Therefore the results of peak 
overpressure as predicted by BST and SMACTRA are comparable for the VCE 
consequences of 13,000 kg of LPG at a distance between 175 m to 500 m as shown in 
Figure 4.2. However this is only applicable for the LPG capacity of 13000 kg which is 
equivalent to the commercial size of LPG road tanker with its confined volume 34.5 
m
3
. Similar comparison can also be made for other yield values, initial blast strength 
and flame speed. If those values are carefully selected, all three models will predict 
similar distances to the mid range overpressures. However, the model predictions may 
deviate substantially at higher and lower overpressures. Table 4.4 shows the results 







Table 4.3 Peak overpressure vs. scaled distance for blast wave pressure from an 
explosion (SMACTRA over other two models Baker Strehlow Tang and TNO Multi 
Energy Model at 13,000 kg of LPG. 
r(m) SMACTRA Multi Energy  
TNO 
Multi Energy     Baker Strehlow 
25 876.35 14.49 89.08 75.21 
50 178.30 6.59 36.31 33.47 
75 71.50 3.55 19.39 23.61 
100 39.46 2.84 13.05 18.76 
125 26.04 2.53 9.88 16.11 




175 15.05 1.52 6.54 
 
11.86 
200 12.39 1.22 5.62 10.43 
225 10.54 0.98 4.89 9.36 
250 9.18 0.91 4.29 8.49 
275 8.14 0.79 3.87 7.76 
300 7.32 0.73 3.51 7.13 
325 6.65 0.70 2.68 6.62 
350 6.10 0.61 2.92 6.19 
375 5.35 0.54 2.70 5.81 
400 5.24 0.48 2.50 5.47 
425 4.89 0.47 2.33 5.16 
450 4.59 0.46 2.20 4.95 
475 4.33 0.43 2.08 4.75 
500 4.10 0.41 1.97 4.54 
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4.3.2 Results of the Vapour Cloud Explosion from LPG Transportation Accident 
at various truck capacities. 
 
Based on the previous works on transportation risk assessment, almost all works were 
conducted for fixed (constant) truck capacity. Hence it is crucial to evaluate the 
accuracy of the SMACTRA software compared to the other models. Therefore in this 
chapter, the study decided to look into the impact of vapor cloud explosion for 
SMACTRA peak overpressure result. In order to do that the truck capacities of LPG 
must be varied. Therefore in this study, LPG trucks with the capacity of 1000, 2000, 
3000, 5000, 7000, 8500 and 32000 kg were chosen. Figure 4.3 till to 4.10 show the 
comparison of peak overpressure results at a given scenario predicted as a function of 
distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency (ɳ=10%); Multi 
Energy method: blast strength= 7 (interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO 
Multi Energy method using blast wave chart; Baker Strehlow Tang method: Mf = 
0.662 flame speed in Mach number). The flame speed at 0.662 was used in the 
calculation, because the vapor cloud was enclosed beneath the storage tank and the 
flame can only expand in two directions.  
 
In this study similar results were observed for SMACTRA and multi energy model 
(for the VCE consequences) at the distance of 20 m to 500 m with 1000 kg of LPG as 
shown in Figure 4.3. The analysis showed that the SMACTRA model predicts higher 
overpressures while TNO multi energy and Baker Strehlow Tang models predicted 
maximum peak overpressure that are less than 34.5 kPa when the distance is greater 
than 45 m. Predicted distances for the overpressures between 20.7 kPa to 6.9 kPa 
were quite similar for SMACTRA and Baker Strehlow Tang. At the lowest 
overpressure at 1.0 kPa, the distance predicted by the TNO and Baker Strehlow Tang 
models were nearly 44.9%-51.6% and 3.2%- 21.2% greater, especially at the distance 
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Figure 4.4 Comparison of the overpressure in a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency 
(ɳ=10% at 1000kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 
(interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using 
















Figure 4.5 Comparison of the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency 
(ɳ=10% at 2000kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 
(interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using 





Figure 4.6 Comparison of the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency 
(ɳ=10% at 3000kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 
(interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using 
blast wave chart; Baker Strehlow-Tang method: Mf= 0.662 flame speed in 
Mach number) 
 
Figure 4.7 Comparison of the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency 
(ɳ=10% at 5000kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 
(interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using 
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Figure 4.8 Comparison of the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency 
(ɳ=10% at 7000kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 
(interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using 
blast wave chart; Baker Strehlow-Tang method: Mf= 0.662 flame speed in 
Mach number) 
 
Figure 4.9 Comparison of the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency 
(ɳ=10% at 32000kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 
(interpolation from scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using 
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Figure 4.10 Comparison of the overpressure at a given scenario predicted as a 
function of distance for the three methods (SMACTRA –TNT- equivalency (ɳ=10% 
at 8500 kg propane); Multi Energy method: blast strength= 7 (interpolation from 
scaled overpressure); TNO Multi Energy method using blast wave chart; Baker 
Strehlow-Tang method: Mf= 0.662 flame speed in Mach number) 
 
Based on the observation in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5, it is observed that the peak 
overpressure generated by SMACTRA software has a close approximated value to 
TNO Multi Energy VCE model, which is best at 2000 kg of LPG tanker capacity. 
However when the LPG capacity range is between 3000 to 8500 kg (Figure 4.6 till 
Figure 4.8, and Figure 4.10) the peak overpressure of SMACTRA result approaching 
to Baker Strehlow Tang model with the closest capacity at 8500 kg. With the value 
between 8500 to 32000 kg of LPG the approximation for peak overpressure value is 
decreasing and deviate further after 32000 kg of LPG from TNO Multi Energy and 
Baker Strehlow- Tang models (as shown in Figure 4.9). Therefore it can be concluded 
that SMACTRA software is applicable for commercial use in transportation risk 
analysis. Table 4.5 summarizes the comparison between the peak overpressure of 
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Table 4.4 Summary of the comparison between the peak overpressure result region 
for SMACTRA and the two models (TNO Multi Energy and Baker Strehlow Tang). 
Result                 Range         Quantity            Approximation to Model 
P
o 
(kPa)      Radius (m)      (kg) 
1.98-9.00      125 – 500     1000            SMACTRA < TNO Multi Energy 
1.90-10.05      125 – 500      2000            SMACTRA ~ TNO Multi Energy 
2.08-12.08            175 – 475       3000            SMACTRA > TNO Multi Energy 
5.60- 16.0             125 – 300       5000            SMACTRA < Baker Strehlow T. 
5.00- 18.05           125 – 375       7000            SMACTRA ~ Baker Strehlow T. 
4.00 – 20.0           125 – 500       8500            SMACTRA ~ Baker Strehlow T. 
                              500            > 32000           SMACTRA deviate further 
 
 
4.3.3 Results of the Vapor Cloud Explosion Consequences of LPG 
Transportation Accident to Human and Structural Building Effects of Exposure 
to Overpressure 
The magnitude of damage from an accident depends on various parameters such as 
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amount of energy released, type of hazardous material released and the degree of 
exposure. For example, the more the amount of toxic material and the longer the time 
of exposure the worst the effect can be expected.   
 
The severity of damage from overpressure depends on the peak overpressure that 
reaches a given structure and the structure material. Similarly, the physiological effect 
of the overpressure depends on the peak overpressure that reaches human. Exposure 
to high overpressure levels may be fatal. For persons located outside the flammable 
cloud when it ignites it will expose them to a lower overpressure levels than persons 
who stay in the explosion cloud. Theoretically, if a person is far enough from the edge 
of the cloud, the overpressure is incapable to cause fatal injuries however in reality 
fatality can still occur due to injury from flying fragments or debris. In this study, the 
vapor cloud explosion overpressure analyzed by SMACTRA was also compared with 
CANARY software by Quest suite of models. Unlike potential fire hazards, persons 




Health and Safety Executive, United Kingdom [8] has published probit relationship 
based on peak overpressure over fatality. Table 4.6 presents the probit results at range 
(0% to 100%) fatalities or for 1%, 50% and 99% fatalities. The graphical form of the 
overpressure probit result is presented in Figure 4.11 till 4.17.  In this section, 
SMACTRA results is compared and validated with results from other published 
literatures and risk analysis softwares, such as EFFECT 8.01 and CANARY. 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Comparison of the overpressure probit relation generated from an 
explosion of a road tanker containing 13000kg of LPG as a function of 
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Table 4.5 Comparison of mortality percentage (1%, 50% and 99%) to human from an 
explosion of a vessel containing various capacities of LPG as function of distance by 
using SMACTRA and EFFECT Version 8.0 software 
 
Capacity Percentage            Distance (m)           
  (kg)                                 ________________________________________________   
                                             SMACTRA                 Effect 8.01                    CANARY     
13,000  99% 32 3(max. 57%) 3 (94%) 
  50% 67 59 26.4 
    1%                    164 133.2 122.5 
9119  99% 28 6(max. 57%)  6(94%) 
  50% 60 44.5 21 
    1% 146 118 96.5 
7000  99% 24 (max. 57%) 
  50% 54.7 31.5 19.2 
   1% 134 108 88.4 
5000  99%  20.3 (max. 57%) 
  50%  49 28.1 17.2 
    1%  119.4 96.5 79 
3000  99%   18.3 (max. 57%) 
  50%   41.3 23.6 14.5 
    1%   100.5 81.5                                 66.7 
2000  99%    16.5 
  50%    36.1                           34.1 12.7 
    1%     88                               85.2 58.2 
1000  99%         13.2                            (max. 57%) 
  50%         28.7 16.4 10.1 
    1%  70 56.5 46.3 
 





Figure 4.12 Comparison of the overpressure probit relation generated from an 
explosion of a road tanker containing 2000kg of LPG as a function of distance 
predicted by SMACTRA with others software. 
 
Figure 4.13 Comparison of the overpressure probit relation generated from an 
explosion of a road tanker containing 3000kg of LPG as a function of distance 























































Figure 4.14 Comparison of the overpressure probit relation generated from an 
explosion of a road tanker containing 5000kg of LPG as a function of distance 
predicted by SMACTRA with others software 
 
Figure 4.15 Comparison of the overpressure probit relation generated from an 
explosion of a road tanker containing 7000kg of LPG as a function of distance 
























































Figure 4.16 Comparison of the overpressure probit relation generated from an 
explosion of a road tanker containing 8500kg of LPG as a function of distance 
predicted by SMACTRA with others software 
 
Figure 4.17 Comparison of the overpressure probit relation generated from an 
explosion of a road tanker containing 9119 kg of LPG as a function of distance 






















































In order to compare the results of the vapor cloud explosion consequences for LPG 
transportation accident over the physiological effects of overpressure exposure, LPG 
truck with capacities of 13000, 2000, 3000, 5000, 7000, 8500 and 9119 kg of LPG 
were selected. Figure 4.11 to 4.17 show the comparison results of the overpressure 
probit generated by road tanker explosion containing various quantity kg of LPG to 
the function of distance as predicted by SMACTRA and others software. The analysis 
is important to determine the minimum safe operation distance between road tankers 
to human or building.  
 
Table 4.6 and Figure 4.11 show the percentage of mortality from explosion from truck 
vessel containing 13,000 kg of LPG as predicted by SMACTRA. The result is 
consistently approximated to EFFECT 8.01 software results for fatality which ranges 
between 3-100% for the distance ranges between 0 m to 75 m from the road tanker 
explosion containing 13,000 kg LPG. However it is shown that the mortality rate 
results for both SMACTRA and EFFECT softwares deviate from each other as the 
distance increased and when the receptor point reaches more than 70 m. Probit results 
by SMACTRA show 1% fatalities at a distance of 164m. Meanwhile mortality rate for 
EFFECT 8.01 and CANARY is 1% fatalities at the distance of 133.2 m and 123.5 m 
from the accident point. Both SMACTRA and EFFECT 8.01 softwares calculated 
50% fatalities between 59 to 67 m distance and 26.8m by CANARY software. With 
the distance greater than 185 m and on the curve for less 1% fatalities of the mortality 
rate, the result for both SMACTRA and CANARY are consistently approximated to 
each other.  
 
Meanwhile Figure 4.12 shows the graph curves for the mortality rate are approaching 
each other for the 3 softwares up to 2% fatalities. It is also shows that CANARY has 
calculated the explosive impact from 2000 kg of LPG road tanker explosion at a 
distance 110 m will cause 1% fatalities. In summary, the accident impact 
consequences results produced by SMACTRA and EFFECT 8.01 approximated to 
each other at 3000 kg of LPG tanker. Figure 4.13 to 4.17 showing the comparison 
between the effects of overpressure probit generated by SMACTRA, EFFECT 8.01 
and CANARY for different LPG fuel capacity at 3000, 5000, 7000, 8500, and 9119 
kg. Based on the mortality analysis from the accident impact of road tanker with 
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various capacities, it is demonstrated that the greater the amount of LPG content 
involved in the accident the larger the unsafe area for human. Based on the 
overpressures impact analysis it has been shown that the fatality percentage at 99%, 
50% and 1% over distance increased exponentially with the increasing LPG capacity. 
For instance, for the 50% fatality curve from SMACTRA it is recognised that unsafe 
distance for hazardous material transportation of LPG increased from 36.1 m at 2000 
kg, 41.3 m at 3000 kg, 49 m at 5000 kg, 54.7 m at 7000 kg, 57 m at 8500 kg, 60 m at 
9119 kg and 67 m 13,000 kg as shown in Table 4.6. 
 
Comparison between SMACTRA, EFFECT 8.01 and CANARY output analysis on 
the probabilities of accident impact to human physiology such as eardrum rupture, 
lung haemorrhage and to physical damage such as glass breakage and structural 
damage are shown in Table 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. Table 4.7 shows the comparison between 
SMACTRA, EFFECT 8.01 and CANARY probabilities impacts towards human and 
building generated from a vessel explosion containing 13000 kg of LPG. It is shown 
that the impact percentage of overpressure leading to glass breakage is highest for 
SMACTRA and CANARY. From this table it is shown that the percentage of glass 
breakage from both models at the distance of 500 m is more than 50%. It is also 
shown that the predicted impact percentage towards human for eardrum rupture and 
lung haemorrhage is within 100 m and less than 25 m from the source of explosion.  
The above phenomenon is comparable with other studies [64, 67,179]. The percentage 
of glass breakage is still high even at the long distance due to its characteristics as the 
weakest part of the building and easily broken at a low pressures, 0.15-0.55 psi [64, 
67, 179-181] compared to other components such as floors, walls, or column. It is 
reported from the literature [64, 67] that glass breakage may extend for miles from a 
large external explosion. Table 4.8 also shows the same characteristic of accident 
impact scenario as in Table 4.7 for a vessel explosion containing 2000 kg of LPG, but 
the unsafe zone is reduced. Even though fatal injury rate is demonstrated to be low by 
the 3 models as shown in Table 4.7- 4.10, the percentage is much greater in other 
reports [64, 67, 181, 206]. This is due to the high velocity glass fragments may 
become a major contributor to injuries in such incident. According to evidence based 
emergency medicine [206], it is reported that the flying projectiles can produce blunt 
trauma, depending of the size of the projectiles and the speed at which they travel. 
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According to SMACTRA it is estimated that the person who is standing at the 
distance of 500 m from explosion has the potential of having secondary blast injury 
from flying glasses at the percentage of 2.14% (4.09 kPa).  
 
Secondary blast injury is the most common cause of death in blast victim. The flying 
glass causes 50% of secondary blast injury to human at a distance 250m for the 
capacity of 13,000 kg of LPG. This finding is consistent with the VCE case in 
Flixborough and Ixhuatepec, Mexico City [64], which showing that more than 40% of 
people injury is caused by secondary glass breakage effect.  It is reported in the 
literatures [64, 181, 206, 207] that the penetrating injuries occur most often in the 
exposed areas, such as the head, neck, and extremities. Thoracic and intraabdominal 
injuries may occur when the fragments penetrate [64, 181, 206, 207]. It is estimated 
that up to 10% of blast survivors will have ocular injuries which can cause blindness 
and ruptured globes. The percentage of building structure damage is estimated to be 
50% at 150 m distance by using SMACTRA and at 98 m with CANARY. The 
percentage of eardrum rupture is 50% for population at distance up to 90 m by using 
SMACTRA and 40 m by using CANARY for 13,000 kg of LPG explosion. 
Meanwhile none will get lung haemorrhage based on SMACTRA analysis at 55 m or 
more and at 25 m using CANARY. This result is consistent with explosion effect as 
proposed by Clancey and Glasstone [179-181] which shows that ear is the most easily 
damaged from primary blast injury.  
 
According to Wightman et al. [208],  most likely mechanism of primary blast injury  
is due to the irreversible effect related to the differences in tissue tensile strength and 
speed of the blast wave through the different tissues. Stress that exceeds tissue tensile 
strength probably predominates when blast surface loading exceeds velocities of 80-
90 m/sec [208]. At the pressure of about 35 kPa (5 psi), human eardrum may rupture. 
With an overpressure of 100 kPa (14 psi), almost all eardrums will be ruptured. 
Meanwhile  lungs are particularly susceptible to damage due to the extensive air/lung 
tissue interfaces. Blast lung is a direct consequence of the supersonic pressure wave 
generated by a high explosive [64, 67, 179-181]. It is the most common fatal injury 
caused by the primary blast among the survivors of the explosion. Eventhough, lung 
injuries may not be apparent immediately or externally, but the effect may lead to 
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death if not diagnosed and treated promptly [209, 210]. An overpressure of about 40 
psi will cause lung injuries.  
 
Table 4.9 comparing the result between SMACTRA and CANARY of 13,000 kg of 
LPG and EFFECT 8.01 at 2000 kg of LPG. Based on Table 4.7, Table 4.8 and Table 
4.9 it is shown that the difference between the software results is in the range of 20%, 
up to 500 m distance is more than 80% fitted with the results with both CANARY and 
EFFECT 8.01 software. Table 4.9 will further re-emphasize on the result conclusion. 
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Table 4.6 Comparison of probabilities impacts to human and structural building generated from an explosion of a vessel containing 13000kg  
of LPG as function of distance by using SMACTRA and CANARY software  
                                                                   
                                                            SMACTRA                                                                                                                                           CANARY 
 
r(m) Po (%)ovrp-ear1 (%)ovrpl-hae (%)ovrp-gls (%)ovrp-strucd  Po (%)ovrp-ear1 (%)ovrpl-hae (%)ovrp-gls (%)ovrp-strucd 






















75 71.50 83.46% 0.00% 100.00% 99.99% 
23.61 12.17% 0.00% 100.00%  72.65% 
100 39.46 43.06% 0.00% 100.00% 98.22% 
18.76 5.37% 0.00% 99.99%  47.26% 
125 26.04 16.42% 0.00% 100.00% 81.28% 
16.11 2.85% 0.00% 99.99%  30.40% 
150 19.13 5.79% 0.00% 99.99% 49.52% 
13.71 1.34% 0.00% 99.98%  16.63% 
175 15.05 2.09% 0.00% 99.99% 23.79% 
11.90 0.64% 0.00% 99.90%  8.09% 











225 10.54 0.32% 0.00% 99.70% 3.99% 
9.36 0.16% 0.00% 99.21%  1.80% 
250 9.18 0.14% 0.00% 99.08% 1.56% 
8.51 0.09% 0.00% 98.41%  0.87% 
275 8.14 0.06% 0.00% 97.84% 0.61% 
7.76 0.05% 0.00% 97.05%  0.41% 
300 7.32 0.03% 0.00% 95.77% 0.24% 
7.13 0.03% 0.00% 95.07%  0.19% 
325 6.65 0.02% 0.00% 92.76% 0.10% 
6.62 0.02% 0.00% 92.59%  0.09% 
350 6.10 0.01% 0.00% 88.80% 0.04% 
6.20 0.01% 0.00% 89.63%  0.05% 
375 5.63 0.00% 0.00% 84.02% 0.02% 
5.83 0.01% 0.00% 86.21%  0.03% 
400 5.24 0.00% 0.00% 78.57% 0.01% 
5.50 0.00% 0.00% 82.36%  0.01% 
425 4.89 0.00% 0.00% 72.66% 0.00% 
5.25 0.00% 0.00% 78.72%  0.01% 
450 4.59 0.00% 0.00% 66.51% 0.00% 
5.01 0.00% 0.00% 74.88%  0.00% 
475 4.33 0.00% 0.00% 60.31% 0.00% 
4.78 0.00% 0.00% 70.50%  0.00% 
500 4.10 0.00% 0.00% 54.22% 0.00% 
       4.55         0.00% 0.00% 65.56%  0.00% 
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Table 4.7 Comparison of probabilities impacts to human and structural building generated from an explosion of a vessel containing 2000 kg 
of LPG as function of distance by using SMACTRA and EFFECT Version 8.0  software  
                                                              
                                                                         SMACTRA                                                                                                                                           Effect Version 8.0 (TNO) 
 
r(m)                    Po                (%)ovrp-ear1    (%)ovrpl-hae       (%)ovrp-gls    (%)ovrp-strucd                Po              (%)ovrp-ear1         (%)ovrpl-hae         (%)ovrp-gls     (%)ovrp-strucd 
25 210.50 99.89% 99.53% 100.00% 100.00% 89.08 91.88% 0.04% 100.00% 100.00% 
50 45.32 53.69% 0.00% 100.00% 99.39% 36.31 36.87% 0.00% 100.00% 96.85% 
75 21.46 8.84% 0.00% 100.00% 62.68% 19.39 6.11% 0.00% 100.00% 51.13% 
100 13.70 1.33% 0.00% 99.97% 16.17% 13.05 1.05% 0.00% 99.96% 12.97% 
125 10.05 0.25% 0.00% 99.55% 2.94% 9.88 0.22% 0.00% 99.48% 2.62% 
150 7.97 0.06% 0.00% 97.52% 0.51% 7.85 0.05% 0.00% 97.26% 0.45% 
175 6.62 0.02% 0.00% 92.56% 0.09% 6.54 0.01% 0.00% 92.09% 0.08% 
200 5.67 0.00% 0.00% 84.42% 0.02% 5.62 0.00% 0.00% 83.83% 0.02% 
225 4.96 0.00% 0.00% 73.95% 0.00% 4.89 0.00% 0.00% 72.52% 0.00% 
250 4.42 0.00% 0.00% 62.47% 0.00% 4.29 0.00% 0.00% 59.28% 0.00% 
275 3.98 0.00% 0.00% 51.17% 0.00% 3.87 0.00% 0.00% 47.79% 0.00% 
300 3.63 0.00% 0.00% 40.88% 0.00% 3.51 0.00% 0.00% 37.40% 0.00% 
325 3.33 0.00% 0.00% 32.01% 0.00% 2.68 0.00% 0.00% 27.75% 0.00% 
350 3.08 0.00% 0.00% 24.67% 0.00% 2.92 0.00% 0.00% 20.18% 0.00% 
375 2.87 0.00% 0.00% 18.78% 0.00% 2.70 0.00% 0.00% 14.45% 0.00% 
400 2.68 0.00% 0.00% 14.16% 0.00% 2.50 0.00% 0.00% 10.19% 0.00% 
425 2.52 0.00% 0.00% 10.59% 0.00% 2.33 0.00% 0.00% 7.16% 0.00% 
450 2.38 0.00% 0.00% 7.88% 0.00% 2.20 0.00% 0.00% 5.23% 0.00% 
475 2.25 0.00% 0.00% 5.84% 0.00% 2.08 0.00% 0.00% 3.70% 0.00% 
500 2.13 0.00% 0.00% 4.32% 0.00% 1.97 0.00% 0.00% 2.68% 0.00% 
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Table 4.8 Comparison between SMACTRA result probabilities impacts to human and structural building generated from an explosion of avessel 
containing 2000 and 13000kg of LPG as function of distance over CANARY and EFFECT Version 8.0  software (within 20%  
difference from SMACTRA region value) 
                                                              
                                     CANARY     (at 13000 kg of LPG)                                                                                   EFFECT Version 8.0 (TNO) (at 2000kg of LPG)               
r(m)         (%)ovrp-ear1    (%)ovrpl-hae       (%)ovrp-gls                 (%)ovrp=strucd                                (%)ovrp-ear1          (%)ovrpl-hae          (%)ovrp-gls        (%)ovrp=strucd 
 
25 in region 75% in region in region in region 74% in region in region 
  
50 44% 68% in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
75 46% in region in region 2% in region in region in region in region 
  
100 13% in region in region 26% in region in region in region in region 
  
125 in region in region in region 26% in region in region in region in region 
  
150 in region in region in region 8% in region in region in region in region 
  
175 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
200 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
225 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
250 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
275 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
300 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
325 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
350 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
375 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
400 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
425 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
450 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
475 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
500 in region in region in region in region in region in region in region in region 
  
 
Note:‖in region‖ = the differences value is within or below than 20% from SMACTRA result. 
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Table 4.9 Comparison between predicted peak side on overpressure versus distance curves for vessel containing 13000 kg of LPG using three models   
SMACTRA, CANARY and EFFECT Version 8.0  software 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 
                                     Peak Overpressure                                                                                                              Percentage of result difference  
                                                                                                                                        _____________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                                                                   |(a-b)/a|x100%                        |(a-c)/a|x100%                       |(b-c)/ b|x100% 
___________________________________________________________             _____________________________________________________________________                                                                                     
 
              r(m)         SMACTRA(kPa)a    CANARY (kPa)b    EFFECT 8.01  (kPa) c                         (%)SMACTRA / CANARY          (%)SMACTRA/EFFECT      (%) CANARY/EFFECT 
 
25 876.36 75.21 98.47 91% 89% 24% 
50 178.90 33.47 47.51 81% 73% 30% 
75 71.50 23.61 24.90 67% 65% 5% 
100 39.46 18.76 16.30 52% 59% 13% 
125 26.04 16.11 12.12 38% 53% 25% 
150 19.13 13.71 9.68 28% 49% 29% 
175 15.05 11.90 7.97 21% 47% 33% 
200 12.39 10.43 6.83 16% 45% 35% 
225 10.54 9.36 5.91 11% 44% 37% 
250 9.18 8.51 5.27 7% 43% 38% 
275 8.14 7.76 4.67 5% 43% 40% 
300 7.32 7.13 4.20 3% 43% 41% 
325 6.65 6.62 3.86 0% 42% 42% 
350 6.10 6.20 3.56 2% 42% 43% 
375 5.63 5.83 3.29 3% 42% 44% 
400 5.24 5.50 3.04 5% 42% 45% 
425 4.89 5.25 2.83 7% 42% 46% 
450 4.59 5.01 2.64 8% 42% 47% 
475 4.33 4.78 2.49 9% 43% 48% 
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Figure 4.18 Consequences of an explosion from a road tanker containing 13000 kg of 
LPG as a function of distance predicted by SMACTRA software 
 
Figure 4.19 Consequences of an explosion from a road tanker containing 9119 kg of 
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Figure 4.20 Consequences of an explosion from a road tanker containing 2000 
kg of LPG as a function of distance predicted by SMACTRA software. 
 
Table 4.10 shows the comparison of overpressure percentages between 
SMACTRA/CANARY, SMACTRA/EFFECT and EFFECT/CANARY. The result for 
mortality percentages between SMACTRA/CANARY shows a huge difference at 
91% for the distance of 25m. However this percentage drops drastically to 52% for 
the distance of 100m. At the distance 170 to 500m the mortality percentage difference 
is below 0% at 325m and 11% at 175m. The combination of SMACTRA/ CANARY 
at 13,000kg of LPG explosion impact shows a closer approximation compared to 
other combination (SMACTRA/EFFECT and EFFECT/ CANARY) with the 
percentage difference of 40% at the distance between 200 to 500 m.   
Figure 4.18 to 4.20, showing the graph analysis for consequences from a road tankers 
explosion containing 2000, 9119 and 13,000 kg of LPG against distance by using 
SMACTRA. From the graph, the impact of the accident is clearly observed in Table 
4.6 and 4.9, therefore it can be concluded that people who are staying within a radius 
of 62 m to 95 m from the incident are highly potential to have 50% chance of lung 
haemorrhage at 120 kPa and eardrum rupture at 42 kPa (13,000 kg of LPG). 
Meanwhile, most of the building is 50% damaged within the radius of 100 m to 200 m 
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distance 460 to 500 m. For the 2000 kg LPG, 50% of the glass damaged can be 
observed at 300 m distance. Based on the analysis on the impact of road tanker 
various capacities it can be concluded that the greater the amount of LPG content 
involved in the accident the larger the unsafe zone for human living and 500 m is 
considered the best distance of buffer zone for any transportation hazardous materials 
activities. 
 
4.3.4 Comparison results of the vapour cloud explosion consequences using 
SMACTRA with published case studies and software risk analysis results. 
Comparison between vapour cloud explosion consequences results predicted by 
SMACTRA with other established risk application softwares such as Effect 8.01 and 
Canary is discussed in section 4.2 and 4.3. Based on this comparison, it is concluded 
that SMACTRA results are comparable with the two softwares. However, those 
results analysis only done for accident cases involving tanker carrying different LPG 
capacities as demonstrated in case study 1. Therefore in this section, additional 
analysis is made on different type of hazardous material such as butadiene and 
propane by using SMACTRA and the outcomes are compared with published case 
studies and software risk analysis results as shown in Table 4.11. This section will 
also discuss on the effect calculation towards receptor and the results are also 
compared with other published result of impact explosion towards human and 
building structure as shown in Table 4.12 to 4.14. The overpressure, impulse and 
shock wave duration have been estimated by SMACTRA software against distance 
are compared with other results from previous softwares and reported data from 
various accidents scenarios is shown in Table 4.10. According to the results in Table 
4.11, for an explosion took place in a tank which contains 9,119 kg propane,  the peak 
overpressure duration from SMACTRA is at 6.54 kPa whereas the results from FRED 
software is 7 at kPa. The overpressure impulse for an explosion involving 100,000 kg 
butadiene is at 0.4 kPa/s by using SMACTRA software, whereas the result from 
CANARY and MAXCRED software is at 0.223 kPa/s and at 0.6 kPa/s, which is 
closer than FRED result which is at 3.5 kPa/s. Meanwhile the result for LPG is 
comparable to other published results such as FRED and EFFECT. The explosion 
incident at PEMEX in Ixhuatapec at Mexico City is summarized in Table 4.11.
198 
 















        CANARY 
 
EFFECT, 2009 
 Analysis of Mexico City, 1984 SMACTRA 
  TNO                          TNT  TNO            Baker et. al., 1983  
Chemical: Propane 
Quantity stored (kg): 9119 
Volume of flammable gas/air cloud (m3 ): 119,719 
Receptor distance (m): 293 
Peak Overpressure: (kPa) 
Overpressure impulse: (kPa/s)  













13.5                                   7.00 
 -                                        0.01 
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Quantity stored (kg):   
Volume of flammable gas/air cloud (m3 ): 1200 
Receptor distance (m): 50 
Peak Overpressure: (kPa) 































Quantity stored (kg):  250,000 
Receptor distance (m): 300 
Peak Overpressure: (kPa) 
Overpressure impulse: (kPa/s)  







































Quantity stored (kg): 100,000 
Storage pressure(atm): 3.5 
Storage temperature: -25oC 
Type of cylinder: pressurized cylinder 
Volume of flammable gas/air cloud (m3 ):810,000 
Receptor distance (m): 500 
Peak Overpressure: (kPa) 
Overpressure impulse: (kPa/s)  



















-                                             - 
6.90 (efficiency=1%)        3.50 




















































Table 4.11: Comparison the probabilities of fatalities from lung haemorrhage for a 
given overpressure. 
Probability of fatality 
                  Peak overpressure (kPa) 






      99.97                                 - 
    120.66                                 - 
    141.34                        (137.9-172.4) 
    175.82                                 - 











Peak overpressure (kPa) 
Eisenberg, et. al.,   Crowl & Louvar     G. Wells              FRED                ATF                HSE  
      [173]                          [153]                   [201]              [195]                 [191]               [192] 
SMACTRA 





    1.70                        -                   -                  -                    -                  - 
       -                         2.07                -                  -                  2.07              - 
       -                           -              (1.4-3)            2.00                 -         (0.552-1.3) 










                                Peak overpressure (kPa) 
Clancey            G. Wells            FRED                  HSE  






          -                         -                   -                       - 
       17.20                35.00                -                (27.58-48.26)     





Table 4.12 shows the comparison of physiological effect towards human and property 
from an explosion between SMACTRA software with results predicted by Eisenberg 
et al. [173] and FRED software [195]. As shown in Figure 4.18 and 4.20, the risk of 
lung haemorrhage are 10% and 99%  for an overpressure of 120.17 kPa at a distance 
52.8 m  and 205.08 kPa at a distance 41.9 m as predicted by SMACTRA. This result 
is comparable with other researchers and published software results as shown in Table 




Table 4.13 and 4.14 shows that, almost all probability results for glass breakage at 
low overpressure from other researchers and safety institutions are consistent with 
SMACTRA probability result [8, 9, 10, 153, 173, 179, 191,192, 195, 201]. Table 4.13 
shows the probability results predicted by SMACTRA for glass breakage are 1% and 
99% at very low and very high overpressure which are almost similar to Eisenberg 
[173], whereby results of 10%, and 50%, are comparable with Crowl and Louvar 
[153] and Wells [201] results. Comparison of the probabilities for construction 
damage at a given overpressure is shown in Table 4.14 and the results are comparable 
to the results published by Clancey [179]. 
 
4.3.5 Results of the radiant heat from pool and torch fires of LPG transportation 
accident (at the container capacity 34.5m
3
) 
Pool fires are one of the most common occurrences in the process industries. This 
incident is normally occurring due to accidental releases of flammable material from 
storage or in transport situation. However, it is observed that for every release cases 
which are discussed in this study, the vapor cloud hazard zone is larger and more 
hazardous than the pool fire therefore the pool/flash fires rarely give an adverse affect 
the public.  
 
Basically, pool fires occurring in industrial accidents are characterized by turbulent 
diffusion flames on a horizontal pool of fuel that is vaporized. The spillage liquid 
receives heat from the flames by convection and radiation and may lose or gain heat 
by conduction towards/from the solid or liquid substrate under the liquid layer. Once 
the fire reaches its steady state, there is a feedback mechanism that controls the 
feeding of fuel vapor to the flames. The amount of heat transferred between the fuel 
and the underlying interface will depend on the fuel and the substrate conditions. To 
analyze pool fire characteristic, a series of simplified relations key parameters are 
measured such as pool fire diameter and area, flame, length, angle of the flame drag 
and sag, radiation release, convective heat flux and hazard to human and structural 
building from heat radiation. These analyses were obtained by simulating several 




For any LPG truck tanker collision release, there is a possibility of either torch fire, 
flash fire or pool fire may occur. As shown in Table 4.15 and 4.16, the pool fire size 
depends on the duration and the flow rate of the spill. Table 4.15 illustrated the effect 
of burning rate to pool fire as predicted by SMACTRA. From Table 4.15 it is 
observed that, the effect of burning rate results is consistent with Blinov and 
Khudiakov [211] conclusion on pool fire diameter characteristics, where the highest 
burning rates corresponded to the smaller pool diameters. 
 
Table 4.14: Effect of burning rate of pool fire to pool fire diameter using SMACTRA 





              Burning rate         Diameter (pool fire)           time  











 28.68 45.91 
1.48 x10
-4
 29.35 47.34 
1.41 x10
-4
 30.06 48.89 
1.34 x10
-4
 30.83 50.56 
1.27 x10
-4
 31.67 52.39 
1.20 x10
-4
 32.57 54.40 
1.13 x10
-4





In SMACTRA, the liquid spill is divided into two categories, recognized as 
instantaneous spills and continuous spills. If the LPG spill is instantaneous, the pool 
fire will grow until it meets a physical barrier. However in the case of a continuous 
spill, the pool fire will grow until it finds a physical barrier or until the vaporization 
velocity or whenever it‘s burning rate is equal to spill rate. Therefore to differentiate 
between instantaneous and continuous spills, several researchers proposed a criterion 
[67, 213, 214]. SMACTRA differentiate the liquid spill based on criterion as proposed 
by K. Mudan et al. [212].  According to this criterion when critical time, tcr < 2 x 10
-3
, 
spill is considered instantaneous and when tcr > 2 x 10
-3
 the spill is continuous. . Table 
4.15 shows the results effect of time spillage to pool fire size diameter using 
SMACTRA. Table 4.16 shows the effect of time spillage to pool fire diameter at 






Table 4.15: Effect of time spillage to pool fire diameter at constant burning rate using 
SMACTRA 
Mass burning 





  Duration of Spill    Critical time                       Diameter (pool fire)  























































































refer instant. Case 









 refer instant. Case 
380 2.37x10
-3 





















































































































The results in Table 4.16 show that, when the duration of spill is at 380 s and above, 
the spill is considered as continuous cases. The pool diameter will decrease while the 
pool size becomes smaller. Blinov and Khudiakov [211, 215] studied the behaviour of 
pool fires with different type of fuels and pool diameter and concluded that all fuels 
showed the same pool fire characteristic. Therefore it is expected that, the pool fire 
scenario will show similar result conclusion as shown in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 if 




As illustrated in Table 4.17 and Table 4.18, the radiant heat from pool fire can cause 
secondary fires of other combustible materials, structural damage and injuries to 
exposed persons. The secondary fires can occur as the radiant heat from pool fire 
engulfed the tanker and heated the LPG inside the tank leading to the release of partial 
depressurized liquid as gas at atmosphere temperature. If the gas releases continue for 
a period of time, there is high possibility of an explosion to occur. Majority of 
explosion cases explosion such as BLEVE, fireball and VCE will leave a serious 
impact since the thermal radiation dose received by the receptor is high and the 
affected area is large.  
 
Table 4.17 is related to the case study accident analysis for a road tanker containing 
13,000 kg of LPG as predicted by SMACTRA software for release of 40.65 kg/s 
LPG. By applying an input of release rate (40.65 kg/s) to assess pool fire by using 
SMACTRA  software, it estimates the flame length is equal to 40.72 m, the pool fire 
diameter is equal to 20 m, the area of the circular shaped pool is 314 m
2
 and the tilt 
from vertical (43.86 deg.). The output results from SMACTRA (as shown in table 
4.16) have been compared with FRED software and the results are summarized in 
Table 4.18.  
 
From Table 4.18, it can be concluded that the pool fire burns with cylindrical shaped, 
the flame height is usually twice the pool fire diameter (as shown in Table 4.17, when 
the diameter of pool fire is 20 m, the flame length is 40.72 m). The same findings 
















 Value Unit 
Input parameters   
   
Material name: Gasoline (petrol) 
Material release rate (=0.0707m
3
/s) 
Heat of Combustion 









Mass of material released (10-20%) before  explosion 
Boiling point of liquid 
Ambient temperature 
Liquid density 
Constant heat capacity 


















Radiation fraction 0.325 - 
Exposure time (sec) 4.5 sec 
Distance from pool fire   
Modified heat vaporization 
Vertical burning rate 
Mass burning rate 
Diameter of pool 
Area of pool 
Flame H/D 
Flame height    





























a) Point source model 
 
Point source height 
View factor 
Transmissivity 
Thermal radiation at receptor 
Thermal dose at receptor 
 
b) Solid plume radiation model 
 
Source emissive power 
Flame radius 
Flame H/R ratio 
View factor 
Transmissivity 
Thermal radiation to receptor 

























































Table 4.17: Comparison of the pool fire output results between SMACTRA and 
FRED software. 
 
4.3.6 The effect from the radiant heat pool fire of LPG transportation accident 
(at the container capacity 34.5m
3
) to receptor. 
To study the above effect, few parameters such as view factor, transmissivity, thermal 
flux and distance from receptor to pool fire are looked into detail. Based on the 
predicted result by SMACTRA (as shown in the Figure 4.21) whenever the distance 
from receptor to pool fire increased, thermal radiation flux reduced significantly. 
However the fire geometry is noted to be reduced and slightly constant.  In this case, 
the atmospheric transmissivity is accounts as the absorption of the thermal radiation 
by the atmosphere, essentially by carbon dioxide and water vapour. From that factor, 
it is observed, the radiation is attenuated significantly, especially when reaches the 
target surface.  
 
Meanwhile, view factor is a parameter which appears in practically in all thermal 
radiation calculation. By definition, view factor is the ratio between the amount of 
thermal radiation emitted by a flame and the amount of thermal radiation received by 
an object not in contact with the flame. Apart from that, this ratio is also dependent on 
the shape and size of the fire, the distance between the flame and the receiving 
element and the relative position of the flame and target surfaces. Therefore, 




Pool fire parameters  
Results 
FRED (2004) SMACTRA 
Fluid: LPG commercial (30:70 propane: butane % 
mol) 
Pool fire Diameter (m) 
Flame length (m) 
Flame clear length (m) 
Area of pool fire  2m  
Flame angle from vertical (Deg.) 
Surface emissive power  2mkW  
























Figure 4.21 Thermal radiation intensity, view factor and transmissivity as a 
function of distance generated from consequences of pool fire from a road 
tanker containing 13,000 kg of LPG at leakage rate 0.0707m
3
/s or 43.5 kg/s 
(predicted by SMACTRA software)  
 
Graph in Figure 4.22 showing the analysis of leakage rate versus thermal dose. In the 
first condition known as Es (t) 2, leakage rate was constant at 0.0707m
3
/s. This has 
lead to a constant pool diameter and pool area. However, the distance of the receptor 
is getting further away from fire source. These also contribute to the reduction of 
transmissivity and view factor. With regard to view factor, when the fuel volume 
reduced, the fire size became smaller. However, for the second condition known Es (t) 
3, the distance between fire source and receptor was nearer. As the leak rate increased, 
the area also became larger and getting nearer to receptor. It was shown, as in Figure 
4.22, that thermal radiation intensity for second condition Es (t) 3 is higher than the 
first condition, Es (t) 2. Therefore, based on SMACTRA predicted result as in Figure 





-s, when the leak rate is increased and the receptor distance is getting 
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Figure 4.22 Thermal radiation intensity as a function of leakage rate 
release generated from consequences of pool fire from a road tanker 
containing 13000 kg of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA software)  
 
Figure 4.23 Thermal radiation dose loads as a function of distance 
generated from consequences of pool fire from a road tanker containing 
13,000 kg of LPG at leakage rate 0.0707m
3
/s or 43.5 kg/s (predicted by 
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4.3.7 The pool fire time exposure effect on thermal radiation dose load for LPG 
tanker incident (in capacity of 34.5m
3
) to Receptor 
Figure 4.24 to 4.30, demonstrate the probit function for pool fire thermal radiation at 
various exposure time 43.5s, 60s, 90s, 180s, 900s, and 1200s by using SMACTRA. In 
the analysis, the association between duration of exposure and thermal radiation dose 
which is received by a human being is observed. According to accident and 





 degree burn and even mortality Based on the analysis, when the amount 
of dose thermal radiation received by an individual is increased, the percentage 





 degree burn and lethality percentage are accelerated when the distance 
between the receiver and the source of explosion decreased. 
 
Figure 4.28 and 4.29 show that at exposure time 900s (15 minute) and 1200s, 
approximately 100% of people around the accident zone (within 500m) will 
experience first degree burn. This is further confirmed by comparing the probabilities 
impact curves of thermal radiation as shown in Figure 4.24 to 4.29, the longer the 
time of exposure to thermal burns the more the thermal dose will be absorbed by the 
victim. The extent of burn damage depends on surface temperature and contact 
duration [218, 219]. Eventhough 1
st
 degree burns are not life threatening, but it can 
cause a significant amount of pain for the victim. It is also observed that the dose 


















.s. The above results are important to analyze the 
level of effectiveness for different agency/ies involved in emergency response from 
major accident hazard. Graph  analysis  in Figure 4.30  shows  prediction by using 
SMACTRA and the result is compatible to other literatures as reported by Mudan 
[212].  According to Mudan the time elapsed before one can feel pain is a function of 
the heat flux.  From Figure 4.30 it is estimated that at 5 kW/m
2
 which is the time 
before one can feel pain is approximately 13s and by using SMACTRA for poolfire 
leakage is at 43.5 kg/s or 0.0707 m
3





Figure 4.24 Probit functions for pool fire thermal radiation (at exposure time 




s (predicted by SMACTRA software).  
 
 
Figure 4.25 Probit functions for pool fire thermal radiation (at exposure time 
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Figure 4.26 Probit functions for pool fire thermal radiation (at exposure time 




s  (predicted by SMACTRA software).  
 
 
Figure 4.27 Probit functions for pool fire thermal radiation (at exposure time 
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Figure 4.28 Probit functions for pool fire thermal radiation (at exposure time 








Figure 4.29 Probit functions for pool fire thermal radiation (at exposure time 
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In summary,  the larger the exposure to dose thermal radiation to the human being, the 
higher the percentage of serious injury which may also lead to cost implication such 
as the treatment cost and insurance for compensation.  Therefore the level of Key 
Performance Index (KPI)  emergency response to accident between 900s and 15 to 20 
minute should be re-evaluate due to, at the the particular time, individual or many 
people life may be jeopardice or possibility of acute, chronic or irreversible injury is 
high. Moreover, according to accident and emergency (A & E) medical research, the 
external heat can transfer from skin to internal organ including vascular system. 
Therefore, if a person stays for a long duration at a high thermal radiation area, this 
will cause an increase in core body temperature leading to severe dehyration and its 
complication [183]. 
 
Figure 4.30 Time before one feels pain as a function of thermal radiation at 
43.5kg/s or 0.0707m
3
/s caused from pool fire (predicted by SMACTRA 
software). 
 
4.3.8 Results of the BLEVE fireball consequences of LPG transportation 
accident  
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) is the explosive release of 
expanding vapour and boiling liquid when a container holding a pressure-liquefied 
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releases its contents nearly instantaneously [221-223]. According to Lees [64], the 
cause and effects of a BLEVE depends on whether the liquid in the vessel is 
flammable or not. The initial explosion generates a blast wave and missiles. The 
flammable material causes a fire, which either transfer heat or form a vapor cloud and 
subsequently gives rise to a second explosion. A BLEVE can occur, due to sudden 
failure of containment allowing superheated liquid to flash and usually involves 
overheating of the container by fire. The combination of sudden expansion of 
compressed vapor in a large quantity will rapidly produce a large ball of liquid 
droplets and vapor. The formation of a road tanker BLEVE usually initiated by the 
external flame impinging on the shell of a vessel which is often above liquid level.  
Sudden rupture of tanker shell can happen if a tanker is exposed to fire for 30 minutes 
due to loss of tensile strength of the container and the fall of shell bursting pressure.  
The major risk of BLEVE is the radiation of heat from the fireball. The radiation of 
heat from the fireballs is characterized based on the size and dynamics of fireball. The 
standard techniques for evaluating the thermal radiation from BLEVE events assume 
that the radiant heat flux is constant over the duration of the BLEVE fireball. 
However, this assumption leads to overlyconservative predictions of hazard zones for 
injuries (i.e., second-degree burns).The SMACTRA software is designed by using 
Martinsen and Marx method [224]  and method of TNO [76] to estimate the fireball 
height,  to estimate the diameter and duration of fireball which account for the time-
dependent nature of thermal radiation generated by aBLEVE fireball,  and leading to a 
more realistic assessment of hazard zones associated with burn injuries.  
 
There are several fireball formulas which have been considered in SMACTRA 
calculations. Further comparisons of the models correlations given by Bagster and 
Pitblado [225] showed  that the TNO-model showed the best overall curve fit of the 
results. Comparison between seven different empirical models and software are 
shown in Figure 4.31 and 4.32. As predicted by SMACTRA, the fireball increases in 
diameter whenever the mass increases. The values predicted by SMACTRA as shown 
in Figure 4.31 and 4.32 are almost equal to the experimental works by Hardee et al. 





Figure 4.31 Comparison of Fireball diameters between SMACTRA over 
EFFECT 8.01 software and experimental and calculated relationship as 
function of mass fuel.  
 
Figure 4.32 Comparison of Fireball duration time(s) between SMACTRA over   
EFFECT 8.01 software and experimental and calculated relationship as 
function of mass fuel. 
 
Figure 4.33 and 4.34 are showing the time elapsed before one can feel pain as a 
function of the heat flux. From the Figure 4.33 it is estimated that at 5kW/m
2













































































before one feels pain is approximately  11s. The time before one feels pain results for 
BLEVE is shorter than the pool fire case. From Figure 4.34, it is observed that the 









 . The area zone for second degree burn and 
lethality curves is higher than the pool fire for the same capacity of LPG. 
 
 
Figure 4.33 Time before one feels pain as a function of BLEVE fireball 





































Figure 4.34 Probit functions for BLEVE fireball thermal radiation (at exposure 




s at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG 
(predicted by SMACTRA software).  
 
4.3.9 The BLEVE time exposure effect over age and thermal radiation dose load 
for LPG tanker incident (in capacity of 34.5m
3
) to receptor 
Figure 4.35 to 4.47 show the effect of duration of exposure towards probabilities 
impact percentage of thermal radiation to human. The analysis also include the 
discussion on the effect of total burn surface area (TBS) and age factor with fatality. 
The medical treatment and management for burns injury are the most commonly 
observed aspect in research works such as by Bull et al.[163-165, 183], Curreri et al. 
[166] and others [220,230-233]. So far, none of the available risk analysis software 
can be utilised to predict and evaluate the fatality injury before the accident happens. 
Eventhough few risk analysis softwares such as SAFETI, EFFECT(TNO), CANARY, 
Risk plot, Riskcurves, ALOHA are capable to predict the effect of human mortality 
from thermal radiation, but these softwares did not include few factors such as age, 
TBS and medical related factors such as cost of treatment, insurance and the socio 
economic impact to the country. This confession is proved by TNO (which developed 
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In this section, few observations have been made on the effect of BLEVE towards 
age, TBS and LPG capacity by using SMACTRA software as follows: 
 
 Analysis on the effect of age  (69, 55, 45, 35, 15) towards 2nd degree burn 
injury at a constant TBS, 30%  when a tanker is carrying 13,000 kg of LPG as 
shown in Figure 4.35 to 4.39.  
 Analysis on the effect of age (69, 45, 15) towards 2nd degree burn injury at a 
constant TBS, 50%  when the tanker is carrying 13,000 kg of LPG as shown 
in Figure 4.40 to 4.42. 
  Analysis on the effect of age (69, 45, 15) towards 2nd degree burn injury at a 
constant TBS level, 10% when the tanker is carrying 13,000kg of LPG as 
shown in Figure 4.43 till 4.45. 
 To study on the survival potential from 2nd degree burn injury at a different 
TBS level 10%, 30% and 50% (based on the comparison from the analysis as 
demonstrated in Figure 4.35 to 4.45 for age 15, 45 and 69). 
 Analysis on the effect of age (80, 15) as shown in Figure 4.46 to 4.47, 
towards 2
nd
 degree burn injury at a constant TBS, 10% when the tanker  is 
carrying 4,000 kg of LPG.  
 Analysis on the effect of age (80, 15) as shown in  Figure 4.44 to 4.45, 
towards 2
nd
 degree burn injury at a constant TBS, 10% when the tanker is 
carrying 13,000 kg of LPG. 
 
The aim of the above analysis is to study on the survival potential for difference age 
groups; young, intermediate and old age. Therefore the age group range is selected 
according to Bull et al. [163-165, 183] and Curreri et al. [166]. The analysis will 
explain the effect of TBS when the level is higher or lower than the general standard 
30% as proposed by Bull [163-165, 183] (this is the upper limit of survival potential 
for patient sustain 2
nd
 degree burn based on the current advanced in medical 
treatment). The analysis is also to see the impact of  LPG capacity towards survival 
potential. 
 
Based on the graph analysis in Figure 4.35 to 4.47, as the thermal radiation dose curve 
shifted to the right on axis X, this mean the receptor will be exposed to a higher 
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radiation dose and possibly situated nearer to the source of accident. Meanwhile, as 
the probabilities of accident impact to human increased, the percentage value will be 
shifted upward on axis y. In general, receptor with 1
st
 degree burn injury is shown in 
the left most curve (b1) which receive a low thermal radiation dose. The next curve is 
for receptor with 2
nd
 degree burn injury and the last curve is for the protected receptor 
for example those in the building.  
 
In the graphs, it is shown that two types of 2
nd
 degree burn injury curve are 
overlapping to each other (red and black curves). The 2
nd
 degree burn injury curve 
with black curve line is observed to end at the probality impact value 10%, 30% and 
50%. The last point of this curve is noted to overlap on the TBS indicator dotted line 
which represent the percentage of total body surface area, which means the receptor 
may die if present above the dotted line. The blue curve represents the unprotected 
receptor which is located very close to the source of accident, therefore having a slim 
survival chance. 
 
Figure 4.35 shows that the older age group receptor who sustain 2
nd
 degree burn (69 
years old) with TBS 30%, the survival potential from BLEVE accident scenario is 
lesser compared to the younger age groups for example 55, 45, 35,15 years old as 
shown in Figure 4.36 to Figure 4.39. This is proven by the analysis in Figure 4.39, for 
younger age group such as 15 years old the blue curve is moving away from the red 
curve which mean better chance of survival. Meanwhile, for age 55 (as in Figure 
3.36)  and 45 (Figure 3.37), the blue and red curve nearly overlap to each  other which 
mean the survival potential is 50:50. Younger patients with 2
nd
 degree burn at TBS 
50%  have a higher survival percentage compared to older patient such as 69 years 
old, as shown in Figure 4.42 and Figure 4.35. Figure 4.35 to 4.39 analyzed the effect 
of age  (69, 55, 45, 35, 15 years old) towards 2
nd 
degree burn injury at a constant TBS, 
30% and it can be  concluded that younger  age victims with 2
nd 
degree of burn injury 
have high survival potential from 13,000 kg of LPG truck tanker explosion.   
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Figure 4.35 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 69 for 
BLEVE fireball thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec. and thermal 




s at truck containing 13,000 kg of 
LPG (predicted by SMACTRA software): b1=1
st





 = lethality after revised (unprotected); P= protected.  
 
 
Figure 4.36 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 55 for 





s at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA 
software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn survived; unP
new
 = lethality 










Dotted line represent for case  
of burns affecting 30%  or 
more  of the body surface area,  
which the person may die  







































Dotted line represent for 
case  of burns affecting 30%  
or more  of the body surface 
area,  which the person may 
die  
































Figure 4.37 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 45 for 





s at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA 
software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn survived; unP
new
 = lethality 
after revised (unprotected); P= protected. 
Figure 4.38 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 35 for 





s at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA 
software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn survived; unP
new
 = lethality 










Dotted line represent for case  of 
burns affecting 30%  or more  of 
the body surface area,  which the 
person may die  







































Dotted line represent for 
case  of burns affecting 30%  
or more  of the body surface 
area,  which the person may 
die  
































Figure 4.39 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 15 for 





s at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA 
software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn survived; unP
new
 = lethality 
after revised (unprotected); P= protected. 
 
Figure 4.40 to  4.42 analyzed the effect of age  (69, 55, 45, 35, 15 years old) towards 
2
nd 
degree burn injury when the percentage of TBS is increased to 50% while when 
the percentage of TBS is reduced to10%, the analysis is shown in Figure 4.42 to 4.44. 
As shown in Figure 4.40, 4.41, and 4.42 , when the % of TBS is increased to 50%, 
more life are salvaged which is probably due to the advancement in medical treatment 
for burn patient.  This finding will become more obvious if the comparison of results 
for the age of 69 is made as in Figure 4.35 and 4.42. However, if the treatment ability 
is inadequate or poor, SMACTRA predicted the survival percentage for 2
nd
 degree 
burn injury will be reduced and the fatality percentage will be increased. Based on the 
SMACTRA result analysis as shown in figure 4.35 to 4.39 and 4.46, young age group 
victims have a higher survival potential most likely due to their body capability to 
fight bacteria infections toward burn injury is better than those age 60 and above 
[184]. This result is consistent with most of the literatures in burn emergency 










Dotted line represent for case  
of burns affecting 30%  or 
more  of the body surface area,  
which the person may die  

































Figure 4.40 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 14 for BLEVE 
fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 50% total burn surface area 




s ) for a truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted 
by SMACTRA software). 
 
Figure 4.41 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 45 for BLEVE 
fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 50% total burn surface area 















 Red line represent for case  of burns 
affecting     50%  or more  of the body TBS 
Dotted line represent for case  
of burns affecting 30%  or 
more  of the body surface area,  
which the person may die  







































Dotted line represent for case  of 
burns affecting 30%  or more  of the 
body surface area,  which the person 
may die  
Thermal radiation dose (kW/m2)-4/3 
Red line represent for case  of burns 

































Figure 4.42 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 69 for BLEVE 
fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 50% total burn surface area 




s  at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted by 
SMACTRA software). 
 
Figure 4.43 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 69 for BLEVE 
fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 10% total burn surface area 















Dotted line represent for case  of 
burns affecting 30%  or more  of the 
body surface area,  which the person 
may die  







































Dotted line represent for case  of 
burns affecting 30%  or more  of the 
body surface area,  which the person 
may die  




























Red line represent for case of burns 
affecting 50% or more of the body TBS 
Orange line represent for case of burns 





Figure 4.44 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 45 for BLEVE 
fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 10% total burn surface area 




s) for a truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted 
by SMACTRA software). 
 
Figure 4.45 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 14 for BLEVE 
fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 10% total burn surface area 




s) for a truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted 










Dotted line represent for case  of burns 
affecting 30%  or more  of the body 
surface area,  which the person may 
die  






































Dotted line represent for case  of 
burns affecting 30%  or more  of the 
body surface area,  which the person 
may die  
Thermal radiation dose (kW/m2)-4/3 
Orange line represent  for case of 






























Orange line represent for case of 




Figure 4.45 shows that if % TBS body area at or less than 10% and young age of 
victims, the percentage of survival potential is greater. It is also shown that the new 
lethality curve does not cross of curve for 2
nd
 degree burn. If the lethality curve 
crosses the curve for 2
nd 
degree burn, the lethality percentage will increase while 2
nd
 
degree burn survival potential will reduce. 
 
Subsequently the analysis is made on the effect of truck tankers explosion towards 
victims if the LPG quantity is reduced to 4,000 kg from 13,000 kg at the same 
duration of 10.01s. As shown in Figure 4.46 and and in Figure 4.47, when the quantity 
of transported hazardous material is low,  the severity of 2
nd
 degree of burn injury is 
also low and the survival potential for victim age 80 tahun is higher.  This result 
analysis is consistent with inherent safety analysis by Khan [216], Lees [64],Kletz 
[235]  who concluded  that as the hazardous material quantity is minimized, the 
hazard becomes lesser. 
 
Figure 4.46 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 14 for 
BLEVE fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 30% total burn 




s) for a truck containing 4,000 kg 










Dotted line represent for case  
of burns affecting 30%  or 
more  of the body surface area,  
which the person may die  
































Figure 4.47 Probability of surviving from 2
nd
 degree burn at the age of 80 for 
BLEVE fireball  thermal radiation (at exposure time 10.01sec., 10% total burn 




s) for a truck containing 4,000 kg 
of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA software). 
 
In conclusion, for all developed and developing countries such as United States 
America, United Kingdom and other european country including Malaysia, many 
medical research are conducted to optimized patient health level through various 
treatment modalities such as antibiotic. This may not be applicable to underdeveloped 
countries in which the government budget is mainly for other things such as food and 
education. Therefore there is the possibility of delay in treatment, poor healing due to 
undertreatment from  in adequate facilities and medication. Therefore socio economic 
factor of particular country or countries is a major contributor towards a better 
outcome for the burn injury victim. In general, with the development of SMACTRA 
burn analysis it is hoping that it can become a tool to save life and minimized the 














Dotted line represent for case  
of burns affecting 30%  or 
more  of the body surface 
area,  which the person may 
die  
































4.3.10 The BLEVE probit analysis and thermal radiation dose load as a function 
of distance for LPG tanker incident (in capacity of 34.5m
3
) to receptor 
 
This study is to analyze the effect of distance over the thermal radiation dose impact 
to human. Figure 4.48 till 4.53 showing the comparison between the effects of 
BLEVE fireball thermal radiation probit generated by SMACTRA, at different LPG 




Figure 4.48 Consequences of BLEVE fireball thermal radiation as a function 




s , exposure distance 
(m) and probit functions at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG (predicted by 
SMACTRA software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn; unP = lethality 

























































Figure 4.49 Consequences of BLEVE fireball thermal radiation as a function 




s , exposure distance 
(m) and probit functions (10% below) at truck containing 13,000 kg of LPG 
(predicted by SMACTRA software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn; 
unP = lethality (unprotected); P= protected 
 
Figure 4.50 Consequences of BLEVE fireball thermal radiation as a function 




s , exposure distance 
(m) and probit functions at truck containing 9119kg of LPG (predicted by 
SMACTRA software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn; unP = lethality 
















































































































Figure 4.51 Consequences of BLEVE fireball thermal radiation as a function of the 




s , exposure distance (m) and probit 
functions (10% below) at truck containing 9119 kg of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA 
software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd




4.52 Consequences of BLEVE fireball thermal radiation as a function of the dose 




s , exposure distance (m) and probit 
functions at truck containing 3000 kg of LPG (predicted by SMACTRA software): 
b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
















































































































Figure 4.53 Consequences of BLEVE fireball thermal radiation as a function 




s , exposure distance 
(m) and probit functions (10% below) at truck containing 3000 kg of LPG 
(predicted by SMACTRA software): b1=1
st
 degree burn; b2=2
nd
 degree burn; 
unP = lethality (unprotected); P= protect 
 
Based on the mortality analysis on the impact of road tanker at various capacities, the 
greater the amount of LPG content involved in the accident, the larger the unsafe area 
for human living. BLEVE thermal radiation impact analysis with the lethality 
percentage curve 100% at a distance 100 m and below is shown in Figure 4.48. 
However, the percentage reduced exponentially with the increasing distance. At 210 
m radius, SMACTRA predicted less than 1% mortality.  Although the percentage of 
death from thermal radiation impact is low at 210 m, the percentage for first degree 
injury case is almost 100%. It is also predicted from SMACTRA analysis that an 
individual may experience second degree injury between 100 m to 210 m. The 
distance between 350 to 500 m is considered to be the safe zone from accident impact. 
At 10% mortality and below, all probabilities results are declining, while protected 
curves  shows the  probability is 100% safe. When the transportation tanker carrying 
capacity decreased, all curves in Figure 4.48 to 4.53 are shifted to the left direction; 


























































4.3.11 The Effect of fireball height, fireball diameter and emissive power as a 
function of BLEVE fireball formation time for the LPG tanker incident (in 
capacity of 34.5m
3
) to receptor 
 
This study will analyze the effect of fireball formation time over the fireball height, 
diameter and emmissive power. Figure 4.54 till Figure 4.56 showing the comparison 
between emissive power, fireball height and fireball diameter as a function of time, 
for BLEVE (1195 mm X 2480 mm X 3500 mm) truck tanker generated by 




Figure 4.54: Emissive power, fireball height and fireball diameter as a 
function of time, for BLEVE of 3,000kg of LPG (1195 mm X 2480 mm X 

































































Figure 4.55: Emissive Power, fireball height and fireball diameter as a 
function of time, for BLEVE of 9119kg of LPG (1195 mm X 2480 mm X 
3500 mm) truck tanker. 
 
Figure 4.56: Emissive Power, fireball height and fireball diameter as a 
function of time, for BLEVE of 13,000kg of LPG (1195 mm X 2480 mm X 



















































































































The results of the atmospheric transmissivity (t) between the fireball and the target are 
estimated by using the equations as described in the references [64, 67, 200, 35-52]. 
As shown in Figure 4.54 to Figure 4.56, during the early part of a fireball‘s formation, 
the dynamic model treats the fireball as a sphere that increases in diameter with time 
with the remaining tangent to grade as it grows. At the end of the growth phase, the 
fireball will reach its maximum diameter and begins to rise into the air. 
 
The fireball is assumed to achieve its maximum diameter at the end of the first third 
of its formation duration. This is also the time at which lift-off is assumed to occur (i.e 
t = td/3) These assumptions are based on:  experimental data from Hasegawa and Sato 
[236] and Maillette and Birk [222, 223], which indicate that peak radiation output 
occurs at the end of the first third of the fireball‘s duration;  the work of Roberts 
[227], who noted that peak radiation output occurs when the fireball has grown to its 
maximum diameter; and experimental data from Hasegawa et al. [236] and Hardee at 
al. [226], which show the fireball begins to rise into the air once it reaches its 
maximum diameter. Thus, the center of the fireball moves upward at a constant rate 
from its pre-lift off position (one maximum radius above grade) to three times that 
elevation in the last two-thirds of the fireball‘s existence.  
 
Based on SMACTRA analysis results as shown in Figure 4.54 to 4.56, it is observed 
that when the LPG transportation capacity is increased,  the fireball height, fireball 
diameter and surface flux is increased significantly. The persons who are exposed to 
excessive radiation heat from the fire may receive a fatal burn injury. Combustible 
structures might be ignited if expose to radiant heat flux of 31.5 kW/m
2
 or more [32, 
64, 67,79-181]. Therefore for the worst case scenario of 13,000 kg of LPG, fatality is 
expected for all persons who are within 31.5 kW/m
2
 isopleths or greater with duration 
less than 9.2s. 
4.3.12 The effect of toxic gas disper sion as the result of propane and ammonia 
release from transportation accident by using SMACTRA Map API online. 
This section will discuss on the dispersion of cloud of toxic gases into the atmosphere. 
The discussion will emphasis more on the consequences of toxic gas dispersion as the 
result of propane and ammonia release from transportation  accident. The dispersion 
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models is classified according to the release sources for hazardous material either 
instantaneous or continuous. For instantaneous sources, the affected zone usually 
displayed as a circle shape which indicate that the released hazardous materials from 
truck accident will only burn for a short duration between 15 to 30s  [64] before 
detonation of tanker occur. Meanwhile for continuous source, usually the released 
hazardous materialy is displayed as a plume shape. Usually the liquid material which 
is released from the tanker to atmosphere will be depressurized as gas. The gas which 
is released usually travel farther from the accident source known as downwind 
distance. Downwind distance is very much dependent on the influence of few 
parameters such as wind direction, wind velocity, atmospheric stability, material 
release rate and density towards air, humidity and meteorological condition.  Figure 
4.57 shows the accident location when a road tanker transporting hazardous material 
via Jalan Ampang after supplying the material at Petronas gas station and Hulu 

















Figure 4.57 shows the accident location at Jalan Ampang involving a road tanker 















Figure 4.58 represents buffer zone from the impact of truck tranker explosion 
 
Figure 4.57 represents buffer zone from the impact of truck tranker explosion in an 
accident while carrying propane by using SMACTRA map online driving simulator. 
In order to recognize the severity of the condition experience by human and stucture 
within the affected buffer zone, different buffer zone colour coding will be shown on 
the online map as shown in Figure 4.57 dan Figure 4.58. Figure 4.57 shows that for 
the case of propane fireball, receptor located within red buffer zone is expected to 
receive a lethal thermal radiation dose load at 10 kW/m
2 
 at diameter 296 m. 
Meanwhile for a receptor located at diameter (418m - 296m) and (650m - 418m), the 















   
   


















Figure 4.60 demonstrates an instantaneous case from ammonia gas release 
 
Figure 4.59 and Figure 4.60 show the outcomes from an accident of truck tanker 
carrying liquid ammonia. Figure 4.59 demonstrates an instantaneous case from 
ammonia gas release just prior to tanker explosion. Human presence within the radius 
352 m to 289 m from the explosion will experience a serious injury, with its highest 
peak of overpressure approximately at 3.5 psi and majority of the building within the 



















For the second case, the location of longitude and latitude is similar to Figure 4.59. 
Figure 4.60 shows ammonia dispersion from truck tanker explosion, with wind 
direction to South East (SE), at 4 m/s. In this case, ammonia release did not explode 
but the gas disperses till 650 m from point of truck tanker accident. The effect of 
ammonia gas very much depending on its concentration level which reach a receptor. 
This phenomenon happens when ammonia is stored in a liquid form under 
refrigerated or pressurized condition is released and forms an aerosol or droplets 
along with ammonia vapor. Generally, ammonia gas has a density of 0.778 kg/m
3
 
which is lower than air. However due to its aerosol formation, the effective density of 
ammonia gas becomes higher than air. Hence the dispersion of ammonia is treated as 
dispersion of heavy gas. The toxic exposure limits, which is defined as the toxic 
concentrations which lead to harmful effects to people who are exposed to ammonia.  
 
In this figure, if the receptor is at 917 m from the plume isopleth source, a person has 
a possibility to experience either faint or no irritation after exposed to ammonia 30 
ppm for 10 minute. However, according to Acute Exposure Guidelines Levels 
(AEGL) for selected airborne chemicals by National Research Council of United 
States (NRCU), it is expected that the toxic effect will not become more severe with 
the duration of exposure because adaptation will occur after prolonged exposure. To 
validate the result for plume isopleth of SMACTRA Map API online, result from 
ammonia explosion case in Houston, Texas in May 1976 [60] is used as a comparison. 
During the accident, the trailer was carrying 7,509 kg (19 tons) of ammonia,  during 
spring season with temperature 26 degree celcius, humidity 79%, and wind velocity 
was 5.8 mph. Figure 4.60 shows the outcome map API online at  Petronas Twin 




Figure 4.62 shows the outcome map API online at  Petronas Twin Tower, Jln Pinang, 
Kuala Lumpur 
 
Based on National Transportation safety Board of Houston in United States, ammonia 
toxic release accident at concentration 10,000 ppm ammonia cloud stretched up to 
650 meters long and 350 meters wide, and at 1200 ppm ammonia concentration the 
cloud dispersed up to 1,200 meters long. By using the SMACTRA map online it 
shows that at concentration 10,000 ppm of ammonia is dispersed  up to 709 meters, 
this value is comparable to the NTSB incident report [60] for houston texas ammonia 




Table 4.18: SMACTRA input and output parameters for ammonia gas release. 
Input: 
Location: PETRONAS Twin Tower, Malaysia. 
Chemical Name: Ammonia.                
Molecular Weight: 17.03 g/mol 
AEGL-1(60 min): 30 ppm   AEGL-2(60 min): 160 ppm   AEGL-3(60 min): 1100 ppm  
IDLH: 300 ppm      LEL: 160000 ppm     UEL: 250000 ppm 
Ambient Boiling Point: -33.5° C 
Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm 
Wind: 5.8 miles/hour from SSE at 3 meters 
Air Temperature: 26° C                 
Stability Class: E 
Relative Humidity: 79% 
Leak from hole in horizontal cylindrical tank  
Flammable chemical escaping from tank (not burning) 
Tank Diameter: 2.48 meters              
Tank Length: 11.99 meters 
Tank Volume: 57.9 cubic meters 
Tank contains liquid                   
Internal Temperature: 26° C 
Chemical Mass in Tank: 19.1 tons        
Tank is 49% full 
Circular Opening Diameter: 0.25 meters 
Opening is 0.12 meters from tank bottom 
Release Duration: 1 minute 
Max Average Sustained Release Rate: 287 kilograms/sec 
      (averaged over a minute or more)  
Total Amount Released: 17,212 kilograms 
Note: The chemical escaped as a mixture of gas and aerosol (two phase flow). 
 
Outcomes  
Model Run: Heavy Gas  
Red   : 709 meters --- (10000 ppm) 
Orange: 1.6 kilometers --- (1200 ppm) 





4.4 Risk Analysis for Hazardous Materials Transportation 
 
As mentioned earlier, the main objective of this study is to develop SMACTRA which 
capable to perform risk analysis for hazardous materials transportation.  The expected 
results able to classify road by risk ranking, able to analyze and simulate the day and 
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night risk impact from data interpolation and spatial analysis. In this section, the 
discussion is limited to the BLEVE and fireball impact. 
 
4.4.1 Results of the road tanker accident analysis carrying 13,000kg of LPG (at 
the container capacity 34.5m
3
) 
The trend of the curves for road transportation (either via motorway, express highway 
or main road), depend on the relative probability for the final accident events and on 
the consequence analysis due to the high average value of the accident rate. The total 
risk with time is shown in Figure 4.62 which represents the overall individual risk at a 
particular time and distance. The area under the individual risk curves in Figure 4.62 




 degree burn, lethality risk and probability risk 
towards an individual who is protected by clothing and building. Figure 4.62 shows 
the total risk curves for road transport (route 1) with an individual risk value of 
2.49x10
-4 
km/year at 3.2s, which is higher than  individual risk at 0.9s, 1.0s, 1.8s, 2.8s, 
3.01s, 3.5s and 9.61s. The individual risk value increases from time 0.9s to 3.1s and 
slowly decreased from time 3.5s to 9.61s. This value is constant from > 0 m up to 200 
m distance from the source of accident. The individual risk starts to reduce from 
1.25x10
-4 
km/year at 200m distance and drastically reduces to a negligible value at 
400 m to 500 m with the individual risk value of 3.51x10
-16 
km/year. At 300 m the 
value is safe for human, building and property with the individual risk value of 
4.19x10
-7 
km/year. This value is less than the tolerated value as stated in Malaysia 
guidelines for individual risk value which is at 1.0x10
-6 
km/year fatalities per year. 
Therefore at distances greater than 300 m, the risk value at 4.17x10
-7 
km/year injuries 
and fatalities indicates public acceptance of the existing risk. Based on these results, it 
can be concluded that the individual thermal radiation risk value is maximum at 3.2s 
and the ―safe‖ zone starts at 290 m from the point of release.  
 
To select the minimum risk for these five routes additional analysis is required to 
calculate societal risk. Societal risk results must be measured since most of 
transportation explosion incident usually give impact towards a group of people at 
that particular area. Therefore an input such as individual risk results as shown in 
Figure 4.62 is still insufficient. Usually input from individual risk results will be 
utilized to identify the worst acceptable risk by an individual at a particular time and 
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location from the source of accident. Further analysis is required to estimate safe 
buffer zone before any hazardous activity can be allowed for example to justify the 
safest route for the transportation of explosive material, radioactive or toxic. In this 
study, individual risk input is needed to calculate societal risk therefore safest route 
for HAZMAT transportation can be obtained. Kletz theory [235] such as ‗worst case 
scenario‘ is used to simulate the condition and worst consequences which might occur 
from a disaster before any decision for the HAZMAT transportation safest route can 
be made and utilized. In this case study, the societal risk calculation for the worst case 
scenario was at 3.2s will be used as the reference in this analysis. The duration 3.2s is 
acceptable since 9.61s for a fireball incident is too short for an individual to escape to 
a safe place escape and therefore may suffer serious injury from the explosion 
incident. 
 
From Figure 4.63 it is obvious that the F–N curve obtained for total impact from a 





  degree burn, lethality and protected). This results outcome is 
comparable with the outcomes results by other researchers such as Casal J. [67]. In 
Figure 4.63, the total societal risk result 8.74x10
-4 
/year is higher than the total 
individual risk results 2.49x10
-4 
/year as in Figure 4.62 at 3.2s. Therefore, it is 
expected all protected societal risk drastically increased and became unsaved from the 
accident impact between the duration of 0.1s to 3.2s. This phenomenon may be due to 
the maximum radiant heat emitted from the surface of the fireball between 0s and 3.2s 
as proposed by Martinsen and Marx [224]. According to a model proposed by 
Martinsen and Marx [224], Casal J. [67], fireball height, diameter and emissive power 
change as a function of time. The fireball reaches its maximum diameter during the 
first third of the fireball formation duration. At this point, the fireball tends to rise into 
the air and the diameter remains constant until the fireball dissipates. According to 
U.K. standards (Health and Safety Commission, 1991), the individual risk for road 
transport modalities run almost entirely in the ALARP zone, being higher than 10
-4
 
fatality/year with the number of fatalities and injuries increase to 1000 individuals. 
The road transport falls into the so called unacceptability zone (10
-3–10-4 fatality/year) 
which is only applies to ALARP zones. The societal risk level appears globally higher 
than the individual one. The curves for road transport, which is the most hazardous 
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transport modality, fall within the UK limits for ALARP zone (Health and Safety 
Commission, 1991) (dotted lines). However, assuming the limits proposed by Dutch 
regulations (Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan, 1989) (dashed lines), it is 
observed that almost all curves exceed in their final part (i.e. in the high mortality 




Figure 4.63 Individual risk vs. the distance from the route 1 for the LPG 
transport case varies with time. 
 
This analysis provides an input for the decision-making process. The risks along each 
route can be compared and a decision on which route to be use is based solely on the 
fatality risk, environmental impacts and delivery time. If none of the results is 
tolerable, mitigation or a more rigorous analysis can be considered. Societal risks are 
used to define the routes. As shown in Figure 4.64, the fatality percentage is greatest 
for route 4.  The lowest risk is route 2. Initially the societal risk is about the same for 
routes 1, 2, and 3; however the risks slowly become less than those for routes1 and 3. 
The maximum number of fatalities is limited to roughly 1000. Thus, if the goal is to 
reduce consequences, route 2 is the best choice. MCWR [203] will consider the 















































Figure 4.64 Societal risk for the LPG transport case at route 1; dashed lines: 




Figure 4.65 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison 
 
4.4.2 Comparing results of societal risk route from LPG transportation 
accident (at the container capacity 34.5m
3
) 
In this section, the societal risk impact from LPG transportation accident by using 







































N, Number of Injuries and Fatalities 
Route1-BLEVE fireball
impact at 3.20s (1st burn)
Route1-BLEVE fireball



















































Figure 4.66 Societal risk for the LPG transport case at route 2; dashed lines: 
limits of the Dutch ALARP zone; dotted lines: limits of the U.K. ALARP 
zone. 
 
Figure 4.67 Societal risk for the LPG transport case at route 3; dashed lines: 








































N, Number of Injuries and Fatalities 
Route2-BLEVE fireball
impact at 3.20s (1st burn)
Route2-BLEVE fireball














































N, Number of Injuries and Fatalities 
Route3-BLEVE fireball
impact at 3.20s (1st burn)
Route3-BLEVE fireball









Figure 4.68 Societal risk for the LPG transport case at route 4; dashed lines: 




Figure 4.69 Societal risk for the LPG transport case at route 5; dashed lines: 
limits of the Dutch ALARP zone; dotted lines: limits of the U.K. ALARP 
zone. 
 
From figure 4.65 till 4.68, SMACTRA predicted that all impacts of BLEVE, such as 



















































































































region. This graph analysis results is shown in Table 4.16. From the table it is 
observed that the societal risk for route 4 and 5 are greater than 1x10
-5
 fatalities/injury 
per year (according to Malaysian standard). In conclusion route 2 is the safest route 
and the other routes are considered not saved for the transportation of 13,000 kg of 
LPG. 
 
Table 4.19: Comparison results of five routes societal risk from BLEVE impact using 
SMACTRA. 
Fluid: Malaysia LPG commercial (30:70 propane: butane % mol) 
 
    N, Number of fatalities                                                         Results 
                                          ______________________________________________________________ 
                       1
st
 degree       2
nd
 degree        lethality          protected            total 
 








































1 4.43x10-4 9.76x10-5 1.46 x10-4 1.86 x10-4 8.74 x10-4 
25.85 4.43x10-4 9.76 x10-5 1.46 x10-4 1.85 x10-4 8.74 x10-4 
77.55 4.30x10-4 8.94 x105 1.39 x10-4 1.85 x10-4 8.74 x10-4 
193.87 4.30x10-4 8.94 x10-5 1.39 x10-4 1.85 x10-4 8.74 x10-4 
271.42 4.30x10-4 8.94 x10-5 1.39 x10-4 1.45 x10-4 8.74 x10-4 
426.52 4.30x10-4 8.94 x10-5 1.39 x10-4 1.45 x10-4 8.74 x10-4 
581.62 3.07x10-4 8.94 x10-5 6.79 x10-5 1.45 x10-4 8.74 x10-4 
710.87 3.07 x10-4 8.94 x10-5 6.79 x10-5 1.45 x10-4 8.73 x10-4 
930.60 3.07 x10-4 2.90 x10-5 6.79 x10-5 0.00 8.59 x10-4 
1098.62 8.39 x10-5 2.90 x10-5 6.79 x10-5 0.00 4.97 x10-4 
 
1 3.35 x10-4 7.37 x10-5 1.05 x10-4 1.40 x10-4 6.60 x10-4 
25.85 3.35 x10-4 7.37 x10-5 1.05 x10-4 1.40 x10-4 6.59 x10-4 
77.55 3.24 x10-4 6.75 x10-5 1.05 x10-4 1.40 x10-4 6.59 x10-4 
193.87 3.24 x10-4 6.75 x10-5 1.05. x10-4 1.40 x10-4 6.59 x10-4 
271.42 3.24 x10-4 6.75 x10-5 1.05 x10-4 1.09 x10-4 6.59 x10-4 
426.52 3.24 x10-4 6.75 x10-5 1.05 x10-4 1.09 x10-4 6.59 x10-4 
581.62 2.32 x10-4 6.75 x10-5 5.12 x10-5 1.09 x10-4 6.59 x10-4 
710.87 2.32 x10-4 6.75 x10-5 2.19 x10-5 2.19 x10-5 6.59 x10-4 
930.60 2.32 x10-4 2.19 x10-5 5.12 x10-5 0.00 6.49 x10-4 
1098.62 6.33 x10-5 2.19 x10-5 5.12 x10-5 0.00 3.75 x10-4 
 
1 4.30 x10-4 9.47 x10-5 1.42 x10-4 1.81 x10-4 8.47 x10-4 
25.85 4.30.x10-4 9.47 x10-5 1.42 x10-4 1.80 x10-4 8.47 x10-4 
77.55 4.17 x10-4 8.67 x10-5 1.34 x10-4 1.80 x10-4 8.47 x10-4 
193.87 4.17 x10-4 8.67 x10-5 1.34 x10-4 1.80 x10-4 8.47 x10-4 
271.42 4.17 x10-4 8.67 x10-5 1.34 x10-4 1.40 x10-4 8.47 x10-4 
426.52 4.17 x10-4 8.67 x10-5 1.34 x10-4 1.40 x10-4 8.47 x10-4 





4.4.3 Analyze the effect of route length over societal risk from LPG accident (at 
the container capacity 34.5m
3
) by using SMACTRA 
 
The aim of this study is to analyze the effect of route length over societal risk from 
LPG  accident. As concluded above,  route 2 is the safest route, therefore  this route 
can be used  as a reference for the societal risk analysis effect at different length route. 
Based on the result of this analysis, the safety along route 2 can be monitor for 
HAZMAT transportation. Figure 4.69 till 4.74 showing the comparison between the 
effects of societal risk route at different route length as generated by SMACTRA, for 

































710.87 2.98 x10-4 8.67 x10-5 6.58 x10-5 1.40 x10-4 8.47 x10-4 
930.60 2.98 x10-4 2.81 x10-5 6.58 x10-5 0.00 8.34 x10-4 
1098.62 8.13 x10-5 2.81 x10-5 6.58 x10-5 0.00 4.82 x10-4 
 
 
1 4.06x10-1 8.94 x10-2 1.34 x10-1 1.70 x10-1 8.00 x10-1 
25.85 4.06 x10-1 8.94 x10-2 1.34 x10-1 1.70 x10-1 8.00 x10-1 
77.55 3.93 x10-1 8.19 x10-2 1.27 x10-1 1.70. x10-1 8.00 x10-1 
193.87 3.93 x10-1 8.19 x10-2 1.27 x10-1 1.70 x10-1 8.00 x10-1 
271.42 3.93 x10-1 8.19 x10-2 1.27 x10-1 1.32 x10-1 8.00x10-1 
426.52 3.93 x10-1 8.19 x10-2 1.27 x10-1 1.32 x10-1 8.00 x10-1 
581.62 2.81 x10-1 8.19 x10-2 6.22 x10-2 1.32 x10-1 8.00 x10-1 
710.87 2.81 x10-1 8.19 x10-2 6.22 x10-2 1.32 x10-1 7.99 x10-1 
930.60 2.81 x10-1 2.66 x10-2 6.22 x10-2 0.00 7.87 x10-1 
1098.62 7.68 x10-2 2.66 x10-2 6.22 x10-2 0.00 4.55. x10-1 
 
1 1.78 x10-1 3.93 x10-2 5.88 x10-2 7.49 x10-2 3.52 x10-1 
25.85 1.78 x10-1 3.93 x10-2 5.88 x10-2 7.45 x10-2 3.52 x10-1 
77.55 1.73 x10-1 3.59 x10-2 5.58 x10-2 7.45 x10-2 3.52 x10-1 
193.87 1.73 x10-1 3.59 x10-2 5.58 x10-2 7.45 x10-2 3.52 x10-1 
271.42 1.73 x10-1 3.59 x10-2 5.58 x10-2 5.81 x10-2 3.52 x10-1 
426.52 1.73 x10-1 3.59 x10-2 5.58 x10-2 5.81 x10-2 3.52 x10-1 
581.62 1.24 x10-1 3.59 x10-2 2.73 x10-2 5.81 x10-2 3.52 x10-1 
710.87 1.24.x10-1 3.59 x10-2 2.73 x10-2 5.81 x10-2 3.51 x10-1 
930.60 1.24 x10-1 1.17 x10-2 2.73 x10-2 0.00 3.46 x10-1 





Figure 4.70 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison on 
route 2 at length 34 km 
 
 
Figure 4.71 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison with 























































































Figure 4.72 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison on 
route 2 at length 14 km 
 
Figure 4.73 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison on 






















































































Figure 4.74 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison on 
route 2 at length 4.458 km 
 
 
Figure 4.75 Societal risk for the LPG transport case at route 2, 4.458 km; 
dashed lines: limits of the Dutch ALARP zone; dotted lines: limits of the U.K. 
ALARP zone. 
 
For the first scenario, SMACTRA predicted that the societal risk for route 2 is 
comparable to route 5 as the length for route 2 of LPG transportation increases from 
















































































N, Number of Injuries and Fatalities 
Route2-BLEVE fireball
impact at 3.20s (1st burn)
Route2-BLEVE fireball






total impact at 3.20s
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Therefore, when the length for route 2 increases, it is observed that the risk is also 
increased and at the journey of 34 km the risk level of route 2 is equivalent to risk 
level of route 4. 
 
For second scenario, if route 2 length is reduced to 14 km, SMACTRA analysis 
predicted that about 50% reduction of risk level for route 2, from intolerable region to 
tolerable region. In UK legislation, Health and Safety Executive at work, 1974 
guidelines [64], tolerable is also known as ―As low As Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP)‖. It is define as the possible cost involved such as infinite time, effort and 
money to reduce the risk and would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit. 
Therefore, in order to reduce the risk factor for route 2, other than to reduced its 
length, but also other factors such as training to the drivers, production of the safe 
cryogenic tanker container and etc. For the third scenario, with the same journey 
surrounding, the length is reduced and approximated to route 5, which is 4.458 km. 
As a result, it is observed from Figure 4.73, that the risk is reduced further lower than 
the previous road tanker journey, which is 10 km for route 2. This value is totally 
lower than route 1 and 3 at 10.458 km as in Figure 4.72. Further analysis shown that 
when the length of a route 2 is reduce, the BLEVE impact to human is also reduce. 
Based on Figure 4.74, it is predicted that all probabilities impact of burn injury to 
human are shifted to a low tolerable region compared to societal risk analysis as in 
Figure 4.65.    
 
In summary, route length should not become the sole risk indicator either high or low, 
since risk assessments involved many unforeseen or other factor which is can be 
unpredictable throughout the journey. . According to population distribution, taking 
into account outdoor and indoor population ratio, the surrounding environment 
between assigned localities generally does not change much for road trip in rural area, 
but it is vice versa with higher risk for transportation via urban zone population 
Therefore results obtained from Figure 4.69 to Figure 4.74 shows that when the 
surrounding environment along route 2 is constant, whenever the length route change, 
the societal risk also will change. 
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4.4.4 The trips effect over the societal risk for five routes of LPG tanker 
incident (in capacity of 34.5m
3
) to receptor 
 
The purpose of the analysis is to see the societal risk impact from five routes, when 
the number of transportation is increased or decreased than normal operation of 
MCWR. 
 
Figure 4.76 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison on 
route 2 at 600 trips per day 
 
Figure 4.77 F-N curves for LPG tank truck via five routes as comparison on 






















































































From figure 4.75, the number of trips for transportation of 13,000 of LPG tanker is 
increased from 400 to 600 trips.  Whenever the transportation trip increased, the 
individual risk is also increased, and this is due to an increment in time contact per 
year. Route 2 in Figure 4.75, showing the societal risk curves is moving upward. 
Route 4 and 5 are observed situated at intolerable region with the value of 1.0x10
-1 
fatalities per year. Meanwhile the other three routes (1 to 3) are shifted greater than 
1x10
-4
 fatalities per year which is still within UK tolerable region. As the trip is 
reduced to 50 trips, societal risk also reduced from the most risky to a tolerable risk. 
Whilst for several routes, the societal risk result is predicted changed from tolerable 
risk to acceptable risk, when the fatalities is below than 30 people. This result can be 
observed for route 2, as shown in Figure 4.76. 
 
4.4.5 Comparison the individual risk and societal risk results between 
SMACTRA, BUWAL and CCPS 
 
In this section, the individual and societal risk results as predicted by SMACTRA are 
compared with the results produced by BUWAL [73] and CCPS [21, 22] method. 
Figure 4.77 till Figure 4.79 shows the comparison for individual risk result between 
SMACTRA/ BUWAL/ CCPS (AIChE). Meanwhile Figure 4.80 shows the 
comparison for societal risk results of SMACTRA/ BUWAL/ CCPS (AIChE).  
 




































Figure 4.79 comparison the total individual risk results SMACTRA/ BUWAL/ 
CCPS (AIChE). 
 
Figure 4.80 comparison the individual risk results SMACTRA/ BUWAL/ 
CCPS (AIChE). 
 
Figure 4.78 shows that total individual risk results by SMACTRA (lethality) and 
CCPS (AIChE)- Bubbico et al. [101, 103,104] are overlapping to each other. 
However, the total individual risk result by BUWAL method is noted to be lower than 
SMACTRA (lethality) and CCPS. Meanwhile in figure 4.79 it is shown that total 
individual risk result SMACTRA is higher compared to total risk results by 









































































impact from an accident is varies depend on distance from the accident source which 
is contradict to CCPS [21]. In reality, the population and environment closer to the 
source of an event is expected to experience more severe consequences than those 
farther than it. As the distance from the event increases, the consequences of such an 
event decreases. Thus the assumption of uniform distribution across the impact area 
used as in Eq.(2-10) – (2-12) in CCPS [21,22],  as in Eq. (2-8) in Rhyne [25], and as 
in Eq. (2-2) – (2-4) in Swiss risk methodology (BUWAL) [73] may note correctly 
represent actual condition and may lead to a misrepresentation of risk which take risk 
impact is similar. Regardless of the receptor location, (as long as it‘s within the 
affected buffer zone) the receptor is considered to have a similar individual risk. 
SMACTRA will calculate the probability of injury, as shown in Figure 4.78 and 
Figure 4.79 meanwhile the probability of no-injury as shown by graph analysis in 
Figure 4.77. Result in Figure 4.77 and 4.79, shows that total risk individual for 
SMACTRA (lethality) and CCPS (AIChE)- Bubbico et al. [101] is overlapping. By 
using SMACTRA, the individual risk for 2
nd
 degree and 1
st
 degree burn injury is 
shown under SMACTRA blue curve line. Figure 4.79 shows that the individual risk 
calculated by SMACTRA (unaffected), without any injury and survive are very slim 
between 0 till 150m from source of accident. At the distance more than 250 m from 
an accident event, it is expected that most of the people are saved.    
Figure 4.81 comparison the societal risk results SMACTRA/ BUWAL/ CCPS 



































From Figure 4.80, the societal risk results for SMACTRA are higher than BUWAL 
and CCPS. However results for SMACTRA (lethality) and CCPS is observed to be 
overlapped.  
 
4.5 Hazard Mapping Analysis 
The use of information contained in the GIS application, coupled with those of the 
consequences transportation  model calculation  of  SMACTRA  can be of great help 
in managing transportation risk analysis and emergencies. In fact, it is possible to 
view directly on the map the effect zones relevant to the various outcome cases 
possibly originated by an accident. Moreover, the impact areas shown on the map can 
take into account the severity of the accidental scenario (medium or catastrophic 
release) and local meteorological conditions at that moment, including wind direction. 
Since the trucks move along the road an accident could occur anywhere along this 
corridor, therefore there is an infinite series of possible sources of hazards. From 
Chapter 3 method,  presents the routing hazard zone as a series of a circle around the 
series point of release from the source. People exposed closer to the road are exposed 
to more possible hazard sources than who are nearly 500 m from the road width.  
Previously this series of circle round presentation, referred to as a vulnerability zone, 
is misleading since everyone within the circle would be exposed to the same impact of 
the accident. Therefore with the proposed method in Chapter 3, and at least it will 
reduce the unnecessary gap of the impact results to human injury or at least this 
methodology can distinguish accident effect according to age and level of total body 
burn surface area.   
 
Hazard zones can easily be displayed graphically on local maps that show vulnerable 
populations such as nearby houses, schools, nursing homes, businesses centers, parks 
and recreational areas. A more realistic illustration of the potential hazard zones as a 
series of accident events along the road is given by the following Figures 4.81 to 
Figure 4.85.  The buffer zone in Figure 4.81 illustrates the hazard footprint that is be 
expected after the rupture of a 13, 000 kg LPG tanker occurs. People who are exposed 
to explosion overpressures within the range of 0 to 75 m may die due to the high 
impact of overpressure (from 205.99 kPa to 876 kPa). More details about VCE, pool 



















Figure 4.82 Vulnerable zone at the 300 m buffer from route 5 at 4.4024 km 
length (Grey color = residential zone, orange color= commercial zone, 

















Figure 4.83 Vulnerable zone at the 300 m buffer from route 4 at 9.16 km 
length (Grey color = residential zone, orange color= commercial zone, cyan 



















Figure 4.84 Vulnerable zone at the 300 m buffer from route 3 at 9.7 km length     
(Grey color = residential zone, orange color= commercial zone, dark blue 

















Figure 4.85 Vulnerable zone at the 300 m buffer from route 2 at 7.548 km 
length (Grey color = residential zone, orange color= commercial zone, green 



















Figure 4.86 Vulnerable zone at the 300 m buffer from route 1 at 10 km length 
(Grey color = residential zone, orange color= commercial zone, yellow color = 
industrial zone). 
 
Figure 4.81 show routes 5 is land use contributed with high residential zone area, 
followed by commercial and industrial area. Based on comparison to the land use area 
it is estimated that route 4 is the most occupied with the land use activities. The result 
is consistent with the results for population density distribution under the influence of 
wind as discussed in previous section. However, based on Figure 4.82 to Figure 4.85, 
the potential hazards from high to low based on area affected along the route is 
ranked, started with route 4 > route 3 > route 2 > route 1 > route 5 as in Table 4.21. 
Route 5 was concluded as the safest route since it has the smallest area. However, this 
conclusion is irrational since most of the time the HAZMAT truck will come across 
land use activities along 4.4024 km road. Table 4.22 shows that the potential hazards 
in m
2 
/km from high to low based on area affected per km  the route is ranked, started 
with route 5 > route 4 > route 2 > route 1 > route 3. In this analysis, it is observed that 
the safety for HAZMAT transportation not only will depend on the route length but 




Table 4.20 Comparison results of five routes based on area affected using SMACTRA  
and GIS Application. 
 
Table 4.21 Comparison results of five routes based on area affected per km using  
SMACTRA and GIS Application 
     Area affected (m
2 
) per km 
                          __________________________________________________________________ 
Route (R)  R1  R2  R3  R4  R5 














Residential 945 393543 1605 740520 2259 1064070 
Commercial 173 62395 365 109540 464 134556 





879270 2724 1286164 





 Residential 1053 378823 1897 732619 2773 1117960 
Commercial 271 118629 469 214764 651 272565 





988833 3431 1493268 





 Residential 1072 442457 1878 848451 2742 1240130 
Commercial 97 71255 299 139984 469 170764 





1018655 3212 1501114 





 Residential 828 280524 1627 578622 2398 962776 
Commercial 347 99672 533 170492 660 224550 





790715 3065 1289770 





 Residential 1386 598402 2353 1096794 3065 1440272 
Commercial 242 115105 406 202444. 602 254598 





1325120 3668 1773362 
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4.5.1. The effect of population distribution to transportation risk hazards 
during day and night activities 
This risk analysis is based on the population distribution using GIS application. From 
chapter 3, author has used Inverse Distance Weighted (IDW) interpolation technique 
based on weighted sample point distance from population density point over route. 
Interpolated IDW surface from elevation vector points (right). In the IDW 
interpolation method, the sample points are weighted during interpolation such that 
the influence of one point relative (known as point A, point B, point C and point X) to 
another declines with distance from the unknown point which can be created. 
Weighting is assigned to sample points through the use of a weighting coefficient that 
controls how the weighting influence will drop off as the distance from new point. 
The risk levels are rank by color. Red represented for highest risk route and dark blue 
for the lowest risk route. From Figure 4.86, it is predicted that most of residential area 
is considered as the most risky place to leave at night. Most probably, this is due to 
people culture, which was normally spent a lot of time at home, after struggling at the 
work place for the whole day. Therefore most of red color risk indicator is always 
come from residential area. Meanwhile, Figure 4.87 showing risk level distribution 
during day time, and it is noted that most of industrial and commercial area is 
predicted have more people, due to human activities in  schools, offices, 











(a)  Night time                                                                           
 













(b) Day time 
 
 
Figure 4.88 show the transportation risk hazards based on population density point 
at day time . 
4.5.2 The effect of LPG capacity during transportation accident using GIS 
application  
In this section, effect of LPG tanker capacity will be study towards buffer hazard 
mapping using GIS application. Figure 4.89 shows buffer hazard from truck tanker 
fireball explosions when carrying 13,000 kg of LPG at coordinate, x (latitude: 
422450.13 meters) and coordinate, y (longitude: 280858.05 meters). For 13,000 kg of 
LPG tanker explosion, may cause the buffer impact distance within 140.08 m 
diameter. If the quantity of transported LPG is added to become 50,000 kg, the impact 
diameter will also increase to 218.14 m as in Figure 4.90. By using GIS application, 
type of landuse activities, landuse area and other detail profile related to buffer hazard 
can be analyzed as shown in Table 4.23. In this analysis, the affected number of 
landuse activity is counted depending to the buffer size. Therefore, as the diameter for 
hazard area is increased, the affected number of landuse activities will be also 
increased. However, the effect of LPG tanker explosion towards the number of 
landuse activity is less obvious compare to the effect may be occur from explosion of 





































Table 4.22 showing the characteristics of land use activities within the hazard point 
































Figure 4.91 showing the detail characteristics of land use activities within the 




















Figure 4.92 showing the detail characteristics of land use activities within the 
possible series sources of hazard point buffer along the transportation route. 
In Figure 4.91 it is shown that the number of activities at landuse is 1895. The actual 
number probably more if recent data can be gathered. Detail of landuse activities 
within the possible series sources of hazard point buffer along the transportation route 














Figure 4.93 showing the detail characteristics of land use activities within the possible 
series sources of hazard point buffer (two rings) along the transportation route. 
Large buffer (273m dia.) is 
explosion impact from 
100,000kg of LPG 
Small buffer (213m dia.) is 


















Figure 4.94 showing the effect of land use activities within the possible series 
sources of hazard point buffer along the transportation route at 100,000 kg of 
LPG. 
Figure 4.94 shows an increasing point buffer diameter when LPG quantity increases.  
4.6 Summary 
This section summarizes, evaluates and discusses the performance results of 
SMACTRA software. SMACTRA software uses mathematical models to assist in 
evaluating consequences from an explosion, fire, toxic release and to provide risk 
estimation result for individual and society during HazMat transportation. The 
validation on the SMACTRA application is performed by comparing it‘s results with 
other risk softwares such as Effect 8.01, CANARY Quest, published results from 
several transportation accident case study such as PEMEX Mexico city, Houston 
Texas, published risk software results such as BIS, FRED, MAXCRED from journal, 
articles and books. It can be concluded that the results produced by SMACTRA 
software is comparable with the established risk analysis software in the market such 
as Effect 8.01 and CANARY.  
Even though there is a large variation results (as discussed in section 4.3) for vapor 
cloud explosion case involving 13,000 kg of LPG tanker and noted that the peak 
overpressure value SMACTRA is much greater than Effect 8.01 and CANARY at 50 
m from source accident, the scenario is observed to be more approximate. This is due 
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to at 50m usually the receptor has a fatality potential from severe internal organ 
concussion. At the distance more than 100 m, the value of peak over pressure (kPa) 
for both softwares is noted to be appropriate to quantity of transported LPG. The main 
advantage of SMACTRA result it‘s provide a package software which capable to 
analyze both type of risk analysis such as static and moving risk sources in Malaysia. 
Other advantages of SMACTRA are the application of TBS parameter, age factor, 
duration pain to identify the level of 2
nd
 degree injury burn. This matter is approved 
by one of the TNO safety expert in his email to answer the researcher question during 
this study regarding the weakness in Effect 8.01, as shown in appendix 4. The impact 
analysis will consider the above parameters in order to estimate the level of 2
nd
 degree 
burn injury towards receptor which is exposed to the fire and road tanker explosion. 
This will make the risk value results for any transportation accident to be more 
accurate and closely approximated to the actual scenario.  For example, if age 
distribution and the receptor location along route five are known, therefore the 
survival probability for 2
nd
 degree burn victim can be estimated, according to TBS 
percentage experience by the victim. As mentioned in this chapter, the larger the 
quantity, the more flammable and the more reactive the transported HazMat, the 
unsafe zone along its route will be increased and become more risky.  The results are 
closer to the actual scenario compared to CCPS by assuming all victim 2
nd
 degree 
burn are acceptably well, even though the victim suffer the effect of more than 30% 
TBS burn injury, however this is contradict with the statistic analysis for the burn 
injury survival at 30%TBS, which was proposed by burn injury analysis expertise 
such Bull et al. [163-165, 183], Curreri et al. [166] and Martin et al. [184]. They 
studies on the potential treatment for burn injury and antibiotic to cure patient with 
severe burn injury patient. Furthermore,  SMACTRA is capable to calculate the 
individual and societal results and the safest HazMat route. In general, the societal 
risk usually will consider fatality probability as produced by CCPS and BUWAL [21, 
73]. However, total individual risk calculated by SMACTRA has been shown to be 
higher compared to CCPS and BUWAL, since SMACTRA will consider individual 
who might suffer injury when an accident occurs. The probability for an individual to 
be safe from an accident is also demonstrated in this analysis. SMACTRA lethality 
results on individual risk are shown to be comparable with individual risk fatality by 
CCPS. Meanwhile BUWAL individual risk and societal risk always produce lower 
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results than SMACTRA and CCPS. This is contributed by coefficient or constant in 
BUWAL method which referred to the lower Swiss transportation traffic network and 
this is discussed in chapter 2. The usage of model builder ArcGIS in loose coupling 
technique with VB and ArcMap facilitate the calculation and therefore VB able to 
produce the outcome buffer hazards zone in ArcMap.  SMACTRA also capable 
analysis of accident impact and plot the results on Map API online. The advantage of 
this map is that the point of accident can be moved to any location on it, therefore a 
new result will be displayed for the new potential damage of accident. SMACTRA 
also able to analyze risk and export the relevant data to GIS (Geographical 
Information Systems) for example ArcView ArcInfo, on line spatial Map API for 




CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
 
SMACTRA is a Smart Advisory System (SAS) which is designed and developed to 
perform risk analysis for road hazardous material transportation. Below are the 
conclusions which can be drawn from this study: 
  
 Since the development of SAS for Hazmat TRA is dependent on the type of 
TRA model which is being used, therefore a thorough analysis must be 
undertaken on the existing TRA model before it can be applied and 
programmed in SAS. In this study, after reviewing various existing TRA 
models, a modified TRA model has been successfully developed. This 
modified TRA is integrated with the all possible requirement as discussed in 
Chapter 2 and 3 in this thesis, before a proposed SAS can be designed and 
developed for transportation of hazardous materials applicable for Malaysia 
scenario.  
 
 In this modified TRA model, the individual and societal risk calculation for 
Malaysia accident data is established by using Eq. (3-2) to Eq. (3-5) (which 
were developed by Radin et al. [169]) as shown in Chapter 3 to forecast the 
number of Malaysia road traffic deaths. A detailed discussion on the 
rationality to use this model compared to the other popular model can be seen 
in section 3.2.1. Based on the discussion in section 3.2.1, the main reason for 
the use of Radin model [169] compared to other model is because the 
assumptions parameter and criteria used in Radin model is closest in 




 Some modifications for the road tanker trip parameters are discussed in 
Chapter 3, in which the frequency of trip is predicted based on the company 
product sales performance over the years. If the sales increase, the number of 
trips to sent the products will also increase. Therefore in this new model, the 
risk projection for the hazardous materials transportation for the next 2, 5 
and10 years can be analyzed. For example, to analyze the risk for LPG 
transportation between year 2013 to 2023 (10 years in the future), the 
statistical data for the  LPG company sales performance from the previous 
years (1990 to 2010) must be reviewed (for example linear regression (Y: 
sales performance/ by year = (M:rate over year). (X: road tanker trips over the 
years ) + (C: constants)). Therefore the data can be utilized as a basis; to study 
the effects of trip toward the future trend of company transportation of 
hazardous materials risk analysis.  
  
 Previously in order to analyze the impact from an accident, most TRA model 
such as CCPS, and Rhyne will only consider the number of death from the 
affected zone with the fatality probability between 0 till 1.0 and the standard 
transportation quantitative risk assessment focuses mainly on calculating the 
number of fatal victims as well as calculating the areas to be evacuated. The 
number of injured people is seldom evaluated, as this would involve 
significant additional effort. Therefore, in most cases little or no information 
on this is available. As discussed in chapter 3, the severity of injury for the 
victims is not uniform across the impact area. The severity of injury varies 
depending on several factors such as the distance of victims from the source of 
explosion; therefore a person closer to it will receive a higher chance of death 
or bad injury. Whilst other victim who are farther from the source of accident, 
the severity of injury will depend on few factors such as the percentage of 
body surface affected, the depth of burn and the age of the victim. Therefore, 
these factors which contribute to the variation in severity of injury are 




 Different TRA model will have different approach and assumption and some 
of the reasons for these differences, are due to the variation in geographical 
factor, economic growth, infrastructure and road networking development and 
industrial growth of one country. In addition, risk calculation methods for road 
transport is more complex compared to stationary installations, therefore 
several differences exist between the basic principles in risk calculations for 
transport and for stationary installations. For instance, the frequency of 
catastrophic outcomes from road tanker transport is higher compared to 
stationary tanks. The impact of road tanker accident to the surrounding  is not 
constant or unpredictable and varies depend on road tanker coordinate location 
on the geography. As discussed in Chapter 2, to develop an effective SAS for 
transportation of hazardous materials risk analysis, TRA model, consequences 
model and GIS are integrated into the system since various parameters such as 
meteorological condition, release scenario, and specific data  such as accident 
rate and population distribution are need to be considered in the calculation. 
Therefore, to minimise error in the SAS TRA result calculation, all equations 
and parameters in the modified TRA model such as consequences models, 
effect models and risk calculations which are developed by using VB 6, have 
successfully integrated with ArcGIS9.3.1 geoprocessing data tool known as 
ArcGIS Model Builder. This integration technique is also known as loose 
coupling approach. 
 
 The detail framework for developing and designing HazMat transportation 
risk analysis software is described in Chapter 3. The software is called Smart 
Advisory System for Chemical Transportation Risk Analysis (SMACTRA). 
The SMACTRA software is designed to be compatible with windows 
operating system (95, 98, XP, Microsoft Vista and Microsoft 2007). The 
software is also designed to be able to work online by using php programming 
language to produce accident impact analysis simulation results in the server. 
 
 In order to validate results from SAS SMACTRA, by using combination of 
modified TRA model, consequences model and GIS; analysis of a simulated 
accident can be created such as when an accident involve LPG road tanker 
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with the capacity 13,000kg and 50,000kg. This is shown in Figure 4.89 and 
Figure 4.90, in which if the road tanker accident creates a BLEVE fireball 
explosion, it is calculated that the buffer radius for the hazard impact will 
increase from 140.08m diameter to 218.14 m diameter. This result proven that 
the modified TRA model and consequences model which are programmed 
with SAS TRA able to perform the risk calculation analysis in  VB program 
and again has successfully display the result in ArcGIS as a hazard mapping 
results.  
 
 To calculate transportation risk along the route,  SMACTRA is used to 
analyze the detail of land use activities at various  hazard point buffer, as 
shown in Figure 4.92 till Figure 4.94. It is shown that, the results from the 
road tanker explosion cases will provide a detail condition regarding the 
population distribution from the affected zone and along the affected route. 
However, when some area in the hazard radius buffer are free from any 
landuse activities, or probably are not included and plotted in the map, this 
will make the population area affected within the total actual area for landuse 
activities for every radius buffer along route 2 (382014m
2
), as shown in Table 
4.21 is smaller compared to the hazard radius of explosion cases created at 16 
point buffer along route 2 (695345m
2
). In the calculation for societal risk 
along the route, this input is more accurate when fatality over consequences 
area affected is predicted based on the existence of population area affected 
not the hazard zone area.  
 The validation of the SMACTRA application is performed by comparing it‘s 
results with other risk softwares such as Effect 8.01, CANARY Quest, 
published results from several transportation accident case study such as 
PEMEX Mexico city, Houston Texas, published risk software results such as 
BIS, FRED, MAXCRED from journal, articles and books. It can be concluded 
that the results produced by SMACTRA software is comparable with the 
established risk analysis software in the market such as Effect 8.01 and 
CANARY. Even though there is a large variation results (as discussed in 
section 4.3) for vapor cloud explosion case involving 13,000 kg of LPG tanker 
and noted that the peak overpressure value SMACTRA is much greater than 
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Effect 8.01 and CANARY at 50 m from source accident, the scenario is 
observed to be more approximate. This is due to at 50m usually the receptor 
has a fatality potential from severe internal organ concussion. At the distance 
more than 100 m, the value of peak over pressure (kPa) for both softwares is 
noted to be appropriate to quantity of transported LPG.  
 Meanwhile, for the case of ammonia toxic release, the same input and 
condition as  Houston Texas incident are used in the calculation. By using the 
SMACTRA map online, it shows that at concentration 10,000 ppm of 
ammonia is dispersed  up to 709 meters, this value is comparable to the NTSB 
incident report [60] for houston texas ammonia incident in 1976 690m. The 
detail outcome of analysis is shown in Table  4.19 as in Chapter 4. 
 To validate the effect of thermal radiation on the pathological and 
physiological effect towards the survival of burn injury by using SMACTRA, 
Figure 4.35 shows that the older age group receptor who sustain 2
nd
 degree 
burn (69 years old) with TBS 30%, the survival potential from BLEVE 
accident scenario is lesser compared to the younger age groups for example 
55, 45, 35,15 years old as shown in Figure 4.36 to Figure 4.39. This is proven 
by the analysis in Figure 4.39, for younger age group such as 15 years old the 
blue curve is moving away from the red curve which mean better chance of 
survival.  
 Meanwhile, for age 55 (as in Figure 3.36)  and 45 (Figure 3.37), the blue and 
red curve nearly overlap to each  other which mean the survival potential is 
50:50. Younger patients with 2
nd
 degree burn at TBS 50%  have a higher 
survival percentage compared to older patient such as 69 years old, as shown 
in Figure 4.42 and Figure 4.35. Figure 4.35 to 4.39 analyzed the effect of age  
(69, 55, 45, 35, 15 years old) towards 2
nd 
degree burn injury at a constant TBS, 
30% and it can be  concluded that younger  age victims with 2
nd 
degree of burn 
injury have higher survival potential from 13,000 kg of LPG truck tanker 
explosion.  As conclusions, the above results show that the older the victim, 
the lower the capability to recover from illness and the effect of TBS.  The 
survival level for burn injury victim will be better if the efficacy of medical 
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treatment can be improved to treat burn injury patient who sustained TBS 
more than 30%. 
 Since the new TRA model will include the injury effect such as thermal 
radiation effect, therefore the injury risk for 1st degree burn, second degree 
burn, lethality and burn wound can be calculated for societal risk and 
individual risk as shown in Figure 4.79 and Figure 4.80. 
 Other main objective for this study is to design and develop a SAS TRA, 
which can become a useful risk assessment tool to identify the safest route for 
hazardous material transportation. In this study, the truck accident scene was 
analyzed along five routes which involves a daily movement of 34.5 m
3 
of 
LPG through approximately 15 to 20 km length route from Middle West Coast 
Refining (MWCR) Company in Port Dickson to Petrol and Gas service station 
in Port Dickson as in the map of Figure 4.81 till to Figure 4.85. Based on the 
discussion in section 4.43, 4.4.4 and 4.5 (as in Table 4.21), the affected area 
does not depend on the length of the route. This is due to the division of the 
area which can be divided into three parts which are the residential, 
commercial and industrial zone. Thus, it does not mean that the longest route 
can affect larger area and vice versa. This explains why even though route 5 is 
the shortest in length but still is the second highest risk route; because along 
this route, there are a large residential area, a larger residential area means 
higher possibility for people involve in the accident consequences 
 
In reference to the above conclusions, SMACTRA is a comprehensive quantitative 
tool for assessing process plant and HazMat transportation risk. It is capable to 
analyse complex consequences from accident scenarios based on local population and 
weather conditions and also capable to quantify the risks associated with the release 
of hazardous chemicals. The software also capable to analyze risk by calculating 
means of the most dominant contributor, construct all types of societal and individual 
risk curves, display risk contours, calculate transport risk per kilometer of route and 
export relevant data to GIS (Geographical Information Systems) like ArcView 




The application is made user friendly by using software such as; MSDS for each 
material to help users understand and possess some knowledge about the materials, 
conversion units to convert units without using any external reference, internal help 
to guide users on how to use the software. Therefore SMACTRA software is a useful 
tool and user friendly for environmental and safety professionals to identify hazards 
associated with accidental releases, fires, explosions and then describe the potential 
impacts of those risks.  
 
The results, equations and programmes from the application is extensively validated 
with other commercial softwares such as EFFECT 8.01 (developed by TNO, 2008), 
BIS (developed by ThermDyne Technologies Ltd, 2003), CANARY (developed by 
QUEST 2009) and few other established data.The results for the SMACTRA software 
is found to be consistent without any significant deviation from other trials. Thus, the 
developed smart TRA tool is good computational software for the consequence 
modeling of transportation of hazardous material. The SMACTRA benefits to users: 
 Provide accurate risk estimation with a substantial cut of  time required to 
perform the analysis, simplify the data input step,  possibility of displaying the 
results on the area map together with other information and useful in the case 
of an emergency (location of fire brigades stations, hospitals, etc.). 
 Can be use for the future policy making processes and regulations related to 
transportation of hazardous material.  
 Able to identify vulnerable locations as well as to integrate consequences 
results and develop the safest route with the minimum risk.  
 Provide safety, health and environmental enforcer, environmental auditor 
CHRA assessor more information about HazMat transportation in a holistic 
approach. 
Finally, this product is ideal for real-world applications, especially to assist in the 
decision making process for land-use planning to locate suitable hazardous 
installations, transportation of hazardous material and emergency response plan 
(ERP). It‘s also can be used as a teaching tool in process safety and environmental 






Recommendation for Future Work 
Although this research has achieved it‘s objective, it can be improved in order to 
extend the objective and include an analytical representation of waste management. 
For future research, this application still has to undergo a deem research to be more 
competent and consist more functions. The following recommendations are listed 
here: 
 Extent the lethality probit analysis impact of human burn injury towards 
patient medical treatment and in antibiotic without limitation with age and 
total burn surface body area factors only. Perhaps other parameters which may 
contribute to the lethality probit analysis can be considered in the future.  Even 
though it is reported in medical literature that patient with 30% TBS would 
survived, but there is recent medical treatment technology which capable to 
save people life which affected with more than 30% TBS of second degree 
burn injury.    
 Extent the lethality probit analysis impact of human blast overpressure 
towards patient‘s treatment and not limited to prediction of  getting lung 
haemorrhage, eardrum rupture and etc 
 Integrate local government agency database to the similar type of software 
development. Therefore, the data can be easily updated and accessible by the 
hazardous material transportation and public transportation authority.  
 Extent the transportation risk analysis to transportation hazardous material 
using aircraft, ship, train and pipelines. 
 Develop online simulation methods to estimate appropriate composition 
region by using verified 3D-computational fluid dynamics (CFD) or any 3D 
tools in the market. 
 Develop transportation risk analysis software for Emergency Response Plan 
using all related agency KPI (Key performance Index) benchmark with 
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Appendix 1:  shows the consequences models use in the physical effect calculation 




Explosions effect modelling 
is generally based on TNT 












The radiation received by a 
target (for the duration of 
the BLEVE incident) 
 
 
TNT model is based on the 
assumption of  equivalence 
between the flammable material 
and TNT, factored by an explosion 
yield term. The TNTequivalence 











The atmospheric transmissiity 
accounts of the thermal radiation 
by the atmosphere. The 
atmospheric transmissivity depends 
on distance between the flames and 
target, temperature and 
atmospheric humidity. 
 
The BLEVE equations (5-17) is 
given by Pieterson and Huaerta 
(1985), Robert (1981) and TNO 
(1992) by considering the radiation 
received by  a target for the 
duration of the BLEVE accident. 
 
The radiation fraction, Frad was 
given by Roberts (1981), is equal 
to 0.25-0.4. As the effects of a 
BLEVE mainly relate to human 
injury, a geometric view factor for 
a sphere to the surface normal to 
the sphere (not the horizontal or 
vertical components) should be 
used (Pieterson and Huaerta, 
1985). 
      
TNT Equivalency calculation involved:- 
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TNT overpressure curve or  by equation  (1, 2) 
 
TNO Multi Energy Explosion 
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Point source model: 
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The path length, distance from flame surface to 
target is: 
   (      
     )     (       ) 
Thermal radiation is usually calculated using 
surface emitted flux, E: 
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The thermal radiation 
generated from a BLEVE 
fireball is estimated using a 
solid flame model that 
assumes that the fireball is a 
spherical ball that rises into 
the air as the flammable 











Pool fire and jet fire are 
common fire types resulting 
from fire over pools of 
liquid or from 






The effects of thermal 




The time dependent diameter 
and height of the fireball and 
the duration of the fireball are 
estimated using empirical 
relationships. 
The duration of combustion (td) 
for the BLEVE fireball was 
estimated from (Martinsen and 
Marx, 1999). 
The fireball diameter is time-
dependent. The fireball grows 
to its maximum diameter 
during the first third of the 
fireball duration, remaining at 
this diameter for a short time 
until the fireball dissipates. 
 
 
The mass burning rate per unit 
area for an infinite pool    is 
equal to 0.099 and it is 
dependent on the diameter of 
the pool, D and specific fuel 
type, 




Probit analysis is a function 
that relates the magnitude of an 
action ( for example, thermal 
radiation from a fire, to the 
degree of damage it causes.The 
probit variable Y is a measure 
ofthe percentage of a 
population subjected to an 
effect at a given intensity (V), 
which will suffer a given 
damage. 
     
Solid model:- 
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Pool fire model: 
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The flame high can be estimated as follows: 
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Probit equations- thermal radiation impacts;- 
 
1st degree burns: Y = -39.83 + 3.02ln (Qdose
4/3 t) 
 
2nd degree burns: Y =  - 43.14 + 3.02 ln (Qdose
4/3 t) 
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The protective effect of 
clothing. By considering the 
threshold value of the ignition 
of clothing (t = 20s) is 
approximately 35 kW.m-2, The 
thermal radiation from BLEVE 
fireball by a point source target 
is known as Q (kW/m-2). 
 
Personnel injuries resulting 
from exposure to a BLEVE 
fireball are dependent upon the 
thermal dose (Qdose). 
 
Person feels pain when the skin 
reaches a temperature of 45oC 
at a depth of 0.1mm 
 
Analytical expressions for 
converting both probit 
variables to percentages 
affected people and 
percentages ofaffected people 
to probit variables [137]. 
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4/3, time elapsed before one feels pain in 
seconds 
 








   
  
    
          
From  equations (43)and (44) expressed the 
expressions below[  ]: 
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effects to human 











projectiles and debris. 
The distance reached 
by projectilesfrom 
cylindrical tanks is 
usually greater than 
that reached by 
fragments from 
spherical vessels.   
 
The probit equation for 
eardrum rupture. 
 




The probit equation for 
glass breakage. 
 
The probit equation for 
large building and 
structures. 
 
A simple model for 




The prediction of the 




The prediction of initial 
fragment velocity for 
cylindrical vessels 
bursting. According to 
Baker et. al [178 ], 
requires knowledge of 
the internal pressure (P), 
internal volume (Vo), 
mass of container/ 
fragment (Mc), ratio of 
gas heat capacities (γ), 
and the absolute 
temperature of the gas at 
burst (To). 
 
Y =  - 15.6 + 1.93 ln Po 
or 
Y =  - 12.6 + 1.524 ln Po 
 
Y =  -77.1 + 6.91ln Po 
 
Y =  -18.1 +2.79 ln Po 
 




rd = 634 (m) 0.1667 
where : 









rs is the safety distance from missiles, (90 m minimum) 
Hp is the average fatality probability for humans 
For tanks < 5m3 in capacity: I = 90. M0.33 
For tanks >5m3 in capacity: I = 465. M0.1 
Find velocity of fragments (vessel rupture): 
        
(    ) 
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)1/2 
K= 1.306 x (Fragment Mass Fraction )+0.308446 
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The effects of 



















Estimate the flying 






effects on humans. Two 
types of fragments 
areessentially 




penetrate the skin. Non- 
cutting fragments or 
debris, e.g. a brick-cause 
high compressive 
stresses in the body. 
 
The dose received by an 
individual who escapes, 
for an open area. 
 
The wind can have a 
significant influence on 
the jet fire. The model 
proposed by 
Chamberlain [186, 187], 
relatively complex, 
describing the jet flames 
by the frustrum of a 
cone 
 
Measured flame length 
Under wind influence, 
Ojv is the angle 
between the hole axis 
and the wind vector 
(o). 
 
    
  
   
 , to determine ambient air density 
Calculate the surface area of the fragment, 
 
    
   
 
 
        
        
 
   
 
        
        
  
, where, r is actual range 




The probability of fatality for mass fragment > 4.5 kg 
Y = -13.19 + 10.54 ln    
For mass fragments, 0.1 kg < mf < 4.5 kg 
Y = -17.56 + 5.30 ln S 
where : 
S = ½ mf .
   
2 
For mass fragments, 0.001kg < mf < 0.1 kg 
Y = - 29.15 + 2.10 ln S, where : 
S = mf  .   
5.115 
or 
          
       
   
       , where : 
    = penetration velocity at which 50% of fragments penetrate the skin. 
 
Dose =   
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Lift off distance 
 
Rw is the ratio of wind 
speed to jet velocity. 
 
Length of the flames 
(length of frustrum) 
 
If Rw <- 0.05, the tilt 
angle can be calculated 
using Eq. (92) 
 
and if Rw > 0.05, using 
Eq. (93) 
 
where RiLbo is the 
Richardson number 
based on Lbo, 
  is the angle between 
the wind direction and 
the normal 
perpendicular to the 
pipe in the horizontal 
plane; 0j is the angle 
between the hole axis 
and the horizontal in 
the vertical plane. 
Finally, the width of 
frustrum (base and tip, 
respectively)can be 
calculated with Eq. 
(89) 
 
Rids is the Richardson 
number based on the 
source diameter and C' 
is a function of Rw 
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View factor analysis 
 
 
The radiant intensity 
from the flame center is 






The thermal radiation 
field around a fire is 
based on the radiation 







Eq. (103) till Eq. (105), 
show how the contour 
integral approach has 
been used to determine 
the geometric view 
factors. 




The vertical view factor 
Fv and the horizontal 
view factor Fh are given 
by the following 
expressions as in Eq. 
(106) till  
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When the angle of tilt is 
zero, Eq. (106) and in 
Eq. (107), the view 
factors is reduce to the 
following Eq.(108) and 





When the observer is in 
the erossind direction 
(i.e., perpendicular to 
the direction of tilt), the 
horizontal and the 
vertical view factors are 
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In determining thermal 
radiation hazard zones, it 
is customary to use a 
view factor maximized 
as regards the orientation 
of the receiving element. 
The maximum view 
factoris the vectorial sum 
of the horizontal and 
vertical view factors 
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Where;  P=2H/L and Q=2X/L 
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The analysis is 
applicable to compute 
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Where NDV% and DV% represent the percentages of 
 
 
























































































Radius of the plume 
 
 























The model was used to 
simulate particle transfer 




The EF are calculated 
using experimental data. 
The EF defined as the 
mass of specific 





The calculation of the 
plume rise and 
subsequent dispersion of 
the plume in the 
atmosphere. 
 
It is assumed thet the 
plumes from individual 
cells forming a bank of 
cooling towers interact 
with one another to form 






The dilution of the water 
vapour plume after 
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The pressure integral in 
the mechanical energy 
balance can be integrated 








The equation assumes an 
ideal gas, no heat transfer 
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External Fire to 
Vessel 
 











dispersion  as in 















dispersion  as in 




Two-phase flow usually 
requires a larger relief 
area compared to all-
vapour venting. 
 
NFPA58 basically covers 
LPG of molecular weight 
btwn 30 to 58. 
 
 
The Puff model describes 
near instantaneous 
releases of material. It 
depends on the total 
quantity of material 
released, the atmospheric 
conditions, the height of 
the release above ground 
and the distance from the 
release.  
 
If the coordinate system 
is fixed at the release 




This model describes a 
continous release 
material. It depends on 
the rate of release, the 
atmospheric conditions, 
the height of the release 
above ground and the 
distance from the release. 
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Max ground level release 
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Table 3 in appendix 2 
show the curve fit for 
downwind distance  








*dense gas dispersion 
 
Table 4 and 5 in 
appendix 2 provides 
equations for the 
correlation  of dense 
cloud plumes and 
puffs        
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Note: The distance downwind units x, is in meters 
 
 
Table 2: Recommended Equations for Pasquill-Gifford Dispersion Coefficients for 
Puff Dispersion 
Pasquill- Gifford Stability 
Class 




























































                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     
                     




      
      
                     
                     
                   
                    
                    
      
                     







Table 3:  Curve fit equations for downwind reach and isopleths area. These values are 
used in the equation form: 
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B 1.28868 0.037616 -0.0170972 0.00367183 





F 2.76837 0.0340247 0.0219798 0.00226116 
    
 
     
 
 
B 1.35167 0.0288667 -0.0287847 0.0056558 
D 1.86243 0.0239251 -0.00704844 0.00503442 
F 2.75493 0.0185086 0.0326708 0.00392425 
 
Table 4: Equations used to approximate the curves in the Britter-McQuaid 
correlations provided for plumes 
Concentration Ratio 
Cm/Co 
Valid range for 
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Table 5: Equation used to approximate the curves in the Britter-McQuaid correlations 
provided for Puff 
Concentration Ratio 
Cm/Co 
Valid range for 
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Table 7: Relationship between percentage of body area burned, age and  mortality by 






                   timing of        outcome    hazard 
          Immediate               delayed explosion   outcome    probability area (m
2
) 
          Ignition   Ignition                         
               
                         yes    detonation/deflagration       0.165    0.021 
            0.33 
            yes  
            0.5           no     fireball        0.335    0.010 
             0.67 
              
                         yes    VCE – early ignition       0.083      0.033  
                                                                     early     0.33 
Large                                                              0.5   no      vapour cloud flash fire-      0.167    0.012 
Propane                                                                                    0.67    early ignition 
Release   yes                 VCE – intermediate       0.050    0.050 
                                                                intermediate   0.33                 ignition                                              
             0.3                     no     vapour cloud flash fire-      0.100    0.029 
                         0.67      intermediate ignition 
                         yes                 late ignition        0.017    0.080 
          late        0.33 
                                                                       0.1         no                  vapour cloud flash fire-                  0.033    0.059  
                                                              0.67                late ignition 
 
                                              No ignition                                   no adverse consequences      0.050                  0   
                                   0.1                1.000 
                                                                            





Large              Wind to              UVCE      Ignited jet 
 LPG             Immediate         Populated           Delayed              or      points at 
Leakage          ignition               area                 ignition        Flash fire         LPG tank 
    A                     B               C                        D               E                    F 
            Outcome    Frequency 
                    Yes (0.2)      BLVE     ABF  2 x 10-6/year 
           Yes (0.1) 
                    No (0.8)       Local Thermal hazard AB ̅  8 x 10-6/year 
                               Yes (0.5)       VCE                A ̅CDE              6.1 x 10-6/year 
             Yes (0.9)           Yes (0.2)     Flash fire and BLEVE            A ̅CDEF 1.2 x 10-6/year 
          Yes (0.15) 
   No (0.5)              
1 x 10
-4
/yr                        No (0.8)        Flash fire               A ̅CDEF 4.9 x 10-6/year 
       
               No (0.1)         Safe dispersal  A ̅C ̅   1.4 x 10-6/year 
                         No (0.9)                           
                 Yes (0.5)       VCE    A ̅ ̅DE 39.5 x 10-6/year 
 
              Yes (0.9)          Yes (0.2)     Flash fire and BLEVE A ̅ ̅D ̅  6.9 x 10-6/year 
                   No (0.5)  
                                 No (0.8)     Flash fire   A ̅ ̅D  ̅̅̅̅             27.5 x 10-6/year 
 No (0.85) 
  
                No (0.1)         Safe dispersal  A ̅  ̅̅ ̅̅                 7.6 x 10-6/year 




Figure 2 Event tree outcomes for LPG tanker accident (by CCPS) [11, 20-22] . 
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                Probability     Accident 
                    percent **     index 
 
                                                              *Soft objects* cones, animals, pedestrians              3.4002   
                                                                0.0521 
                                                                Motorcycle     0.8093  2 
    Nonfixed        0.0124 
                                         object            Automobile     43.1517 3 
                                         0.8805           0.6612 
               Truck, bus     13.3201 4 
               0.2041 
               Train      0.7701  5* 
                                                   0.0118 
               Other      3.8113  6 
               0.0584 
                                                                                     Water   0.1039  7* 
                                                                                      0.20339 
                                                                                                  Railbed / roadbed  0.3986  8* 
                                                                                                  0.77965 
                    Bridge railing           Clay, silt   0.0079  9* 
                                                                 0.0577                      0.015486 
             Hard soil, soft rock  0.0006  10* 
             0.001262 
             Hard rock   0.0001  11* 
        Collision           0.000199  
          0.7412                                                                                          Small 0.0299  12* 
                                                                                                 Column             0.8289 
                             On road                                            0.9688 
     fixed obj.     Column, abutment                               Large 0.0062  13* 
      0.1195          0.0042                       Abutment    0.1711 0.0011  14* 
                                                             0.0382 
                                                                Concr. obj, bottom str.    0.0850  15 
      Truck                                                0.0096 
     accident                                                       
                Wall barrier, wall, post    4.0079  16 
                0.4525 
                                                                       
                                                                Signs, cushions       0.5111  17                                                                       
                                                                0.0577  
                                                                       
                                                               Curb, culvert     3.7050  18 
                                                   0.4283 
          
                      Noncollision 
           0.2588           
                                  
                    *     Potentially significant accident scenarios 
                  **   Conditional probability which assumes an accident occurs 
 












      































                Probability    Accident 
            percent ** index 
        
       Collision          
      0.7412 
 
         Clay, silt        2.3063        19* 
          0.921370 
                                      
                         Into slope             Hard soil / soft rock       0.1881         20* 
                                 0.2789                 0.07454 
         Hard rock       0.0297         21* 
                                0.01176 
                Clay, silt       1.3192         22* 
                            0.5654 
         
                    Over embankment     Hard soil / soft rock    0.1076        23* 
     0.2578          0.0461 
               Hard rock       0.0171        24* 
               0.007277 
Truck         
accident                   Off road           Drain ditch     0.8894         25 
                                  0.3497           0.381223 
 
 
      Noncollision              Trees         0.9412         26 
      0.2588               0.1040 
  
                 Other         3.2517         27 
                 0.3954 
        
                                  Impact           Overturn        8.3493         28 
      Roadbed        0.6046 
       0.5336 
                 Jackknife        5.4603         29 
     0.3954 
  
       Other Involving mech. loading       2.0497         30 
       0.0792 
  
       Fire only          0.9705         31 
                    0.0375 
 
                    *     Potentially significant accident scenarios 
                  **   Conditional probability which assumes an accident occurs 
 
Figure 4 (Continued) 
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Appendix  4 
 
Description on the consequences modeling process flow calculation for LPG 
transportation  
There are several factors need to be considered in order to calculate the risk of 
hazardous materials transportation during road tanker accident. Among the factors 
need to be considered is the frequency of accident whereby how often is the road 
tanker accident loaded with hazardous material can occur over a period of time. Other 
factors affected are consequences from the road tanker accident towards human and 
area vicinity. 
The statistic information such as probability of accident from various causes (e.g. 
collision, overturn) collected for the road accident is based on the database 
information of major accident online likes Major Hazard Incident Data Service 
(MHIDAS), FACTS, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and BUWAL 
transportation risk analysis guidelines. As further study, model equations which is 
introduced by CCPS by AIChE, and Green Book or Yellow Book Guidelines 
published by TNO will be used to predict the consequences of road tanker accident. 
 As in flowchart 1, it is showing the sequences of the rail tanker accident during 
transportation. 
Level of road tanker catastrophic accident is depends on the type of product loading, 
the quantity and the condition of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) being stored during 
transportation. So, there are some parameters need to take into account in calculating 
the model of consequences such as heat capacity ratio of gas, (Cp/Cv), hole size, 
ambient temperature and also the stored temperature in the tank, and its product 
molecular weight. The hole sizes analysis can be within 1.5’’, 2’’ – 6’’ and 8’’ – 12’’. 
Normally, for road tanker case, they are using hole size of 8’’ – 12’’ and for tank 
truck case they are using 2’’ – 6’’ hole size. The hole sizes is varies from 5mm, 
25mm, and 100mm in estimating the corresponding of gas release and it is noted that 
the hole size above 100mm will contribute to the catastrophic case.  
For gas discharges through holes, Eq. (143) in Appendix 1 is integrated along an 
isentropic path to determine the mass discharge rate. This equation assumes an ideal 
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gas, no heat transfer and no external shaft work. However, majority of the gas releases 
from the road tanker occur from the hole size less than 25mm will initially be sonic or 
chocked due to the pressure drop competition. The gas pressure release at upstream 
and downstream will decrease and until at one point, the velocity will reach its 
maximum level to flow on either side of the phase and this maximum velocity 
phenomenon is known as sonic or choked velocity. For instance, if the gas release at 
upstream, the maximum of mass flow will tend to flow at the upstream phase. Thus, 
Eq. (145) in Appendix 1 will be used in demonstrating the pressure ratio required to 
achieve choking condition. Whilst, the Eq.(144) in Appendix 1 will be used to 
calculate the consequence model of sonic gas discharge to the atmosphere. 
For gases such as LPG  is characterized as dense gas dispersion because the molecular 
weight of propane (content in LPG) is greater than the molecular of air at ambient 
surrounding. The released gas is then will move towards upwind and downwind 
direction according to wind velocity at that current time. Naturally, the gas disperses 
will directly down to the ground level. Thus, from this consequence, the downwind 
distance of the gas release travel can be calculated. There three options in calculating 
this model namely Raman box model [ 11 ], K -   theory model [ 11 ] and Britter and 
McQuaid model [ 11 ]. In this study, we are using Britter and McQuaid model [11] as 
in Eq. (161) till Eq. (164) in the Appendix 1, Table 4 and Table 5 in the Appendix 2, 
to approximate the curves in the model correlations for plumes and puffs condition. 
The rationale to used this model are because it is simple and easy model besides its 
ability in expecting precise and consistent prediction even though the gaseous release 
could be at rapid or continuous conditions. 
Meanwhile, the rest models have their own weaknesses. For instance, Raman (1986) 
box model is not been chosen because any lack of data will tremendously affected the 
whole data. The parameters needed in running the calculation are thermodynamic 
process; gravity slumping and air entrainment which is difficult to obtained the exact 
results. While, for K -   theory model, it is only allow the prediction on flat terrain 
surface and no obstruction. Logically, our earth surface is filled with tress, building, 
vehicles and many more. Thus, this only complicates the problem of solving. 
In calculating downwind distance using Britter and McQuaid Model [ 11 ], initial 
buoyancy (go) of model Eq. (160) in Appendix 1, or generally known as at first 
velocity accelerate the gas cloud disperse to atmosphere is calculated. The gas 
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dispersion will then cover certain portion of circumstances and this is illustrated as 
source dimension by Gaussian et al.[  ] as in Eq. (151) till Eq. (156) in the Appendix 1 
are used with both tables in Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix 2, for type of continuous 
gas cloud release in determining the source dimension, for parameter, Dc. as in Eq, 
(161) in the Appendix 1. For further study, Eq.(163) in Appendix 1 will determine 
whether the value obtained from the previous equations is satisfactorily for dense 
densities of continuous gas cloud release at which it supposed to be more or greater 
than 0.15. If the value obtained satisfies the criterion, Table 4 as in Appendix 2, of 
Britter McQuaid model for dispersion of dense cloud plumes can be used in 
estimating the downwind distance. However if , the value obtained suitable in 
determining the downwind distance from puff cloud, Table 5 as in Appendix 2 
equation can be refer in approximating the curve. While the gas disperses, any 
ignition to this flammable cloud gases, or satisfies zone within the range between the 
upper or the lower flammability limit before the cloud is diluted, a vapor cloud 
explosion. 
There are four indications have been cited from AIChE of CCPS [11] of vapor cloud 
behavior in order for a vapor cloud explosion (VCE) to occur. The first indication is 
the release materials must be combustible. The second indication is the sufficient 
vapor cloud forming for it to ignite. The third indication for VCE to occur is the 
sufficient gas cloud within the flammable range. Lastly, the vapor flow undergoes the 
confinement place plus move in turbulence mixing. There are 3 methods in 
calculating the vapor cloud explosion (VCE), either by using TNT equivalent model, 
TNO multi-energy model or Modified Baker Model. Among of those methods, TNT 
equivalent model is practically been used because it is only requires an input 
parameters of mass of fuels and explosion efficiency. In additions, the ease of this 
model is also described by Baker et al (1983), Stull (1977) Decker (1974), and Lees 
(1986, 1996) and yet it is using widely in CPQRA[  ] .These parameters obtained also 
can be easily predicting the consequences of overpressure and impulse distance prior 
the vapor cloud explosion is known. 
The input parameters needed in TNO multi-energy are type of confinement and 
relative blast strength. While, for Baker-Strethlow method requires chemical 
reactivity, geometry and obstacle densities. Both methods are difficult to determine 
vapor concentration profile due to the congested process area. 
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In determining VCE using TNT equivalent model, the mass and vapor gas cloud is 
estimated prior to calculate the TNT mass, mTNT using as in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2).  
Then, the scaled distance, Ze of Eq.(2) is used to estimate the explosion parameters 
such as scaled overpressure (ps), arrival time (ta), Impulse (Ip) and duration (td) during 
the road tanker accident. .For further particular, the number of significant figures in 
CCPS [11] is used to obtain the correlation relationship between the explosion 
parameters and scaled distance, Z. Common structure of overpressure within 0 – 69  
kPa have their own damages. For instance, 0.14 kPa of VCE consequence the rail 
tanker accident will contribute to annoying noise while the maximum overpressure 
will lead to catastrophic case by buildings destruction. 
In determining overpressure using TNO multi-energy model, some standard 
procedure need to take into account and this is described in AIChE/CCPS [11]. The 
gas cloud result from gas release from hole size is examined by assuming no 
obstruction at affected circumstances and it is noted that the dense densities will 
directed to downhill..From the gas dispersion around the atmosphere, many potentials 
assumptions and possibilities need to figure out in predicting the strong blast within 
the source dimension areas. The potential strong blast could be at congested area likes 
chemical plant or refineries, multilevel car parking, and tunnels. Thus, by knowing the 
possible strong blast, energy absorb (E,J)at each source can be estimated by multiply 




. Once the strong blast of potential 
source and energy combustion (E) is estimated, the Sachs scaled quantities of Eq. (3) 
in the Appendix 1, gives the blast side on overpressure, Ps    as in Eq. (4) in the 
Appendix 1.Positive phase duration, td ,  the   s and ῑd is read from the blast chart in 
CCPS [11]. 
While, for Baker-Strehlow Model the flame speed can be used to determine the 
interpolated pressure by referring Figure 1 impulse by referring Figure 2 as in 
Appendix 2. This model is the combination of TNO multi-energy Model in 
determining the energy term as the flame speed is reliant on chemical reactivity, 
obstruction and confinement. Particularly in this model, confinement is based on three 
symmetries namely as point-symmetry (3D), line-symmetry (2D) and plane-symmetry 
(1D). Point-symmetry is denoted as unconfined geometry and it is less pressure for 
free moving flame. Line-symmetry is illustrated as cylindrical flame between two 
plates for instance space beneath cars. Thus the moving flame effect is stronger than 
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point-symmetry. Last but not least, plane-symmetry is describing as planar flame in a 
tube for example tunnels. This flame moving will result on overpressure and impulse 
at catastrophic case.  
Consequence of the road tanker accident also could result on pool fires wherein the 
beginning of the occurrence is due to thermal radiations from the flame source in the 
affected vicinity. The pool fires severity is dependent on the spill volume and fuel 
properties. Knowledge of the burning rate allows the heat output per unit area and the 
duration of the fire to be estimated (CCPS, 1992). The mass-burning rate is dependent 
on the diameter of the pool and the specific fuel type. For pool below 0.03 m in 
diameter, the flames are laminar, and the rate of burning decreases with increase in 
diameter. For large diameter (>1 m) pools, the burning rate becomes independent of 
diameter; the flames are now fully turbulent (DOW, 1993). The mass burning rate 
for a particular fuel has been reported by following correlation, based on work of 
Babrauskas (1983), to relate the actual burning rate to the maximum burning rate for 
a fuel as in Eq.( 32) in Appendix 1. It can be seen that the burning rate asymptotes to 
a maximum mass burning rate at large diameters. This can be explained by assuming 
that vaporisation of fuel from the pool surface is due predominantly to radiation 
from the fire. As the flame grows it reaches a characteristic size at which it is said to 
have become optically thick and any further increase in size does not produce an 
increase in emitted radiation. Thus there is a diameter at which the radiative 
feedback to the pool surface reaches a maximum. The pool diameter at which this 
occurs varies with fuel type and thus k in Eq.(32) in the Appendix 1, values are also 
fuel dependent (Rew and Hulbert, 1996). 
The pool surface area determines the shape of the radiation source, in case of pool 
fire. For circular pools the source can be considered cylindrical (TNO, 1992). In most 
cases, pool size is fixed by the size of release and by local physical barriers (e.g., 
dikes, sloped drainage areas). For a continuous leak, on an infinite flat plane, the 
maximum diameter is reached when the product of burning rate and surface area 
equal the leakage rate. Critical pools are normally assumed: where dikes lead to 
square of rectangular shapes, an equivalent diameter may be used (Andreassen, 1992).  
 
For unconfined continuous releases, it can be assumed that the pool increases in diameter 
until the release rate is balanced by the burning rate (Rew and Hulbert, 1996) as in 
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Eq (33) and in Eq. (34) in Appendix 1. The Thomas (1963) correlation as in Eq.(35) 
in Appendix 1, is widely used for models which use a mean surface emissive power 
over the entire envelope. The correlation based on the dimensionless mass burning 
rate of the fire under quiescent conditions.  
Heat transfer from fires incident includes both thermal radiation heat transfers from 
the flames to the surrounding objects as well as convection heat transfer. Convection 
heat transfer from the flames to engulfed objects is important particularly in 
calculating the response of boundaries to the fire (Kashef et. al., 2002). Thermal 
radiation is considered one of the more dramatic hazards related to hydrocarbon pool 
fires. According to Mudan et al., (1995), the quantification of the thermal properties 
of fires can be accurately obtained from basic principles that consider the mixing 
dynamics and the chemical processes of burning fuel with the oxygen in air. 
Estimating thermal radiation field surrounding a fire involves determining the burning 
rates, the physical dimensions and radiative properties of the fire and, the radiant 
intensity at a given location. 
Basically, there are two models in calculating the fire radiation effects which are Solid 
Plume Radiation Model and Point Source Radiation Point Source Model is more 
simplicity compare to solid plume radiation.  
In point source model, the surface emitted power is based on total combustion energy 
release and may ends to BLEVE consequence. Schulz-Forberg et al (1984) had 
discussed about the BLEVE consequence and this is supported by Baum (1984) in 
defining the missiles velocities from vessel bursting. Prior proceeding to BLEVE 
calculations, the incident radiant flux should be determined first. Radiant fraction 
from the energy release due to accident crushed can be referred in Mudan and Croce 
(1988) discoveries by divided the radiated power by flame of surface area. The radiant 
fraction propane (content in LPG) is 0.30. Then, Eq.(17) in Appendix 1  is used to 
estimate the point source where the road tanker accident occurred. Gas release from 
the point source will cause the thermal radiation absorbed throughout the atmosphere 
at the affected vicinity. Pietersen and Huerta (1985) have developed a correlation of 
Eq. (13), Eq. (14) and Eq. (11) in the Appendix 1 in determining the atmospheric 
transmissivity which recommend a correlation formula that accounted humidity. The 
path length, and distance from the flame surface to the target is calculated using 
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Eq.(15) as in Appendix 1.  Finally, the thermal flux of Eq. (9) is calculated using 
surface emitted flux as in Eq. (16)  prior the BLEVE catastrophic happened. 
BLEVE is a sudden release of a large mass flow of pressurizes superheated liquid to 
the atmosphere from the rupture pressure vessel.From CPQRAs said, “The beginning 
incident of the occurrence is the external flame or pool fire has impinging near the 
shell vessel above the liquid level, weakening the container and leading to a sudden 
bursting vessel”.The blast wave produce by the BLEVE is dependent on type of fluid 
release, rate of energy release, shape of vessel, type of rupture and the reflecting 
surfaces at the affected vicinity. The input data requires in approximating the BLEVE 
severity is the amount of fuel carried during transportation, atmospheric humidity, 
material heat of combustion and the vapor pressure. 
Eq. (5) till Eq. (8) are used to correlate the BLEVE diameter and the combustion 
duration.. These equations are used widely in estimating BLEVE consequence from 
the flammable materials. In addition, consequences from the blast wave of the 
BLEVE and VCE have leading to human injury in the vicinity and the geometric view 
factor of Eq.(17) as proposed by Pietersen and Huerta [  ] and the radiation fraction as 
given by Robert [  ] is equal to (0.25-0.4) are used to determine the oriented target of 
road tanker accident. Thus, the gas release from the estimated geometric view factor 
is then been used in determining the emissive radiative flux receive by a black body 
receptor as in Eq. (9) in the Appendix 1. Solid Plume model presents the most recent 
analysis techniques for evaluating the blast (overpressure, impulse, etc.), time-
dependent thermal radiation, and missile generation consequences of a BLEVE event. 
In this model, the thermal radiation generated from a BLEVE fireball is assumes as a 
spherical ball that rises into the air as the flammable material is burned. The time-
dependent diameter and height of the fireball and the duration of the fireball are 
estimated using empirical relationships. The duration of combustion (td) for the 
BLEVE fireball is estimated using  (Martinsen and Marx 1999) model as in Eq. (19) 
in the  Appendix 1, where td is in sec and MFB is the mass of released flammable 
material in the fireball in kg. The fireball diameter is time-dependent. Based on 
experimental observations, the fireball tends to reach its maximum diameter during 
the first third of the fireball duration. At this point, the fireball tends to rise into the air 
and the diameter remains constant until the fireball dissipates. Martinsen and Marx 
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(1999) present an Eq.(20) in the Appendix 1, for estimating the fireball diameter 
during the growth phase.  
At the end of the growth period, the fireball is assumed to achieve its maximum 
diameter (Dmax) as given by the following equation (Roberts 1981-1982) as in 
Eq.(21), where Dmax is in m. The initial ground flash radius (Rflash) associated with a 
BLEVE fireball is approximated using an Eq. (22).  This radius represents the 
distance that may be engulfed in flames during the initial development of the BLEVE 
fireball. The height of the center of the fireball is also time-dependent. Based on 
experimental observations (Martinsen and Marx 1999) the center of the fireball rises 
at a constant rate from its lift-off position to three times the lift-off position during the 
last two-thirds of the fireball duration. This leads to the following equations for the 
height of the center of the fireball (HFB) as in Eq. (23) and Eq.(24) in the Appendix1.  
 
The thermal radiation emitted from the surface of the fireball is also time-dependent. 
The fireball surface emitted flux is assumed to be constant during the growth period, 
and then is assumed to linearly decrease from its maximum value to zero during the 
last two-thirds of fireball duration. The maximum surface emitted thermal flux 
(Emax) during the growth phase is given by the following (Martinsen and Marx 1999) 
as in Eq.(25) in the Appendix 1, where Emax is in kW/m
2
. Fire research suggests that 
the maximum surface emitted flux Emax will not exceed some upper limit ranging 
from 300 to 450 kW/m
2
. A value of 400 kW/m2 is suggested as a limiting value 
(Martinsen and Marx 1999). Therefore, the lesser of the surface emitted flux given by 
Equation 16 or 400 kW/m
2
 should be used. During the last twothirds of the fireball 
duration, the surface emitted flux (ES) is given by Eq. (27) as in Appendix1. The 
thermal flux incident upon a target object is a function of the geometric view factor 
between the fireball and the target. For a target at ground level, the maximum 
geometric view factor (F) for a spherical emitter is given by Eq. (28) as in Appendix 
1, where F is dimensionless and D, HFB, and x are in m. 
The atmospheric transmissivity (g) between the fireball and the target is estimated 
from Eq. (29),  where g is dimensionless, R is the fractional relative humidity (e.g., 
for 70% relative humidity, R is 0.7), and Pv is the saturated vapor pressure of water at 




In order to estimate the consequences of an accident on people and the damage caused 
by the accident, the best method is probit analysis. Usually, the method used is the 
probit analysis, which relates the probit (from “probability unit”) variable to the 
probability. The probit variable ,Y  is a measure of the percentage of a population 
submitted to effect with a given intensity  V  which will undergo certain damage. 
This variable follows a normal distribution, with an average value of 5 and a normal 
deviation of 1.  
Abramowitz and Stegun (1965) have given a rational approximation for digital 
computation as in Eq. (43) till Eq. (53). Most of the previous works about probit 
analysis have been given by Finney, (1971); Eisenberg et. al., (1975); TNO, (1990); 
Weber, et. al., (1990); Schubach, (1995); Casal, et. al., (1999) and Vílchez, et. al., 
(2001).  
In short, this procedure should be carried out in approximating the thermal impact in 
order to predict the level of injury and number of fatality from a specified radius 






























Figure 1 Flowchart of Tank truck accident Analysis carrying hazardous materials 
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Dense cloud model: 
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Input Data : heat capacity ratio of gas (cp/cv), 
hole size, upstream and downstream pressure, 
temperature(T), gas molecular  weight (mr) 
Assume the LPG gas release through 
hole tank. The scenarios are 
representing by the equation below. 
Mass flow rate of the gas through the hole 
Unit: mass/time (kg/s) 
Bitter and McQuaid Model, (1988) 
Input parameter: 
-Spill duration 
-Windspeed duration (Rd) 
-LPG vapour density at boiling point 
-LFL 
Since the liquid gases 
need several time to 
change their phase 
from liquid to gases 
in the container at 
saturated vapor 
phases. Therefore, 
some of the liquefied 
gases leak out from 
the tanker and ignite 






























To determine the overpressure 
Input data: 
Heat of combustion 
       Standoff distance 
                     Ambient pressure 
Estimate the flame speed. 




Unit: meter, (m) 
 
Estimate mass and extent of 
Flammable cloud. 
Estimate TNT Equivalent 
Weight: 
W = 
    
    
  or 
TNO-multi energy method 
or 
Baker-Strehlow method 
Estimate Scaled Distance 
Parameter for Specified 
Overpressure 




    
 or 
TNO A standoff distance is 
then specified and the Sachs 
scaled energy is determines 







    or Baker 
interpolated scaled 
overpressure from cloud 
volume. 
 
Determine Vapor Cloud 
Explosion (VCE) Effect Zone 
Concentration Profile 
































Liquid leakage rate 
Heat of combustion LPG 
Heat of vaporization LPG 
Boiling point LPG 
Ambient temperature 
LPG density 
LPG heat capacity 
Dike diameter 
Receptor distance from pool 
Relative humidity 
Radiation efficiency for point source model 
Pool fires 




Estimate vertical or mass burning rate equation: 
Y*max= 127 X 10-6 
   
   
 
Pool size: Estimate maximum pool diameter 
Dmax = 2 √      
Estimate Flame Height :Thomas circular pool fires 
 
 
     
  
  √  
) 0.61 
Estimate Maximum Pool Diameter 
 
Estimate BLEVE size and duration 
 
Maximum fireball diameter : 
Dmax = .8 M 1/3 
Fireball combustion duration: 
TBLEVE = 0.45M 
1/3 for M<30,000 kg 
TBLEVE = 2.60M 
1/3 for M>30,000 kg 


























































Select Radiation Model 
(Heat transfer) 
Point source Radiation Model Solid plume radiation model 
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)   
         
   
          
                     
             
Dmax = 6.48M
0.225   , HBLEVE = 0.75Dmax, Dtabled = 
1.3Dmax, t BLEVE= 0.825M
0.20
 
Estimate Thermal Effect 
Et = ta         
Estimate surface emitted flux: 
Estimate geometric view factor: 
For a horizontal surface, the view factor is given 
: 
The view factor for a vertical surface: 
Estimate atmospheric transmissivity: 
                  
      , for 104 <    < 10
5 Nm 
The path length, distance from flame surface to 
target is: 
 








 Initial flammable mass 
 Water pressure 
 Radiation fraction 
 Distance from fireball centre on ground 
Heat of combustion of fuel 























































Point source Radiation Model Solid plume radiation model 
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   ⁄  , for  1/3 td < t < td 
                        
    
 
 , for 0 < t < 1/3 td 
            
      
   
 , for 1/3 td < t < td 
Estimate surface emitted flux: 
                              
     , for 0 < t < 1/3 td 
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)) ,  for 0 < t < 1/3 td 
Estimate geometric view factor: 
 
Estimate atmospheric transmissivity: 









Below BLEVE equation is given by Martisen and 
Marx [224], Fay and Lewis [228], Robert [227],  by 
considering the thermal radiation generated from a 
BLEVE fireball-fireball is assume as a spherical ball 
that rise into the air as the flammable material is 
burned. 
Thermal flux impact 
























































Total fatalities due to 
thermal flux from BLEVE, 
pool fire, VCE, fireball, and 
etc. 
Input data: 
 -Total people 




Select Radiation Model 
(Heat transfer) 
Point source Radiation Model Solid plume radiation model 
Thermal flux impact 
Novel Prognosis Approach in predicted Consequences Effect 
Analysis. 
Determine survival of burn injury victim based on clinical parameter 
analysis. 
• Probit Analysis (Effect calculation over age, TBS, medical treatment 
factor, 
resistence to infection factor and etc) 
• The per cent total body surface burned was grouped into deciles: 1-10, 11-
20, . . . ,91-100, to allow comparison with previously published results. 
Separate probit analyses were done in age groups 0-14, 15-44, 45-65 and 




Unconfined and Confined Vapour Cloud Explosions 
An unconfined vapour cloud explosion (UVCE) is the result of a unique sequence of 
events UVCE can be both very spectacular and very dangerous. This is because the leak 
is into the open air, and with the right meteorological conditions, truly large clouds of 
combustible mixture can be produced before ignition occurs. Confined vapour explosions 
(VCEs) is defined as explosions within tanks, process equipment, pipes, in culverts, 
sewage systems, closed rooms and in underground installations. UVCE was used to 
describe explosions in open areas such as process plans. The main distinction between 
confined and unconfined explosions is confined explosions are those occur within some 
type of containment. Often the explosion is in a vessel or pipework, but explosions in 
buildings also come within this category [64]. 
 
Models of VCE have been discussed in many articles. The most common models are: 
TNT, TNO and TNO Multi-Energy models. The TNT equivalent model has been widely 
used to model the vapour cloud explosions. An early application was that of Brasie and 
Simpson (1968), who used it to study the damage from three accidental explosions. The 
TNT model was also used by Decker (1974), Stull (1977), Baker et al. (1983) and Lees 
(1996). The TNT model is well established for a high explosion and it is applied in 
flammable vapour clouds (CCPS, 1994). Crowl and Louvar (2002) used TNT method to 
estimate the damage for common structures and process equipment whereby this damage 
is a result of the explosion. The explosion involves peak overpressure and flammable 
material. Three models of explosion have been developed by TNO. The first of these is 
the shock wave model described in the TNO yellow book (TNO, 1992). The Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research (known as TNO) published a book entitled 
Methods for the Calculation of the physical Effects of the Escape of Dangerous Material, 
which outlines models to be used for calculating the consequences of many types of 
hazardous release scenarios. This model is applicable to most flammable materials of 
medium reactivity. It allows the peak overpressure and the duration time of the explosion 
to be estimated. The second TNO model is the correlation model; this is described in the 
TNO yellow book (TNO, 1992). This model allows an estimate to be made of the radius 
of defined damage circles. It does not give explosion parameters such as peak 
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overpressure or duration time. The third TNO model is the Multi-Energy model described 
by van den Berg (1985) and updated model in 1996. This model allows the peak 
overpressure and duration of time to be estimated. The TNT equivalent model is easy to 
use. Neither it, nor the TNO model, is solidly based on theory, but they predict well the 
observed UVCE incidents. In the TNT approach an explosion yield must be selected. A 
weakness of the TNT model is the substantial physical difference between detonations 
and UVCE deflagrations. The TNO correlation model is based on actual UVCE incidents 
and employs one of two defined explosion yields, but it is limited to flammable materials 
of medium reactively. The TNT model has the advantage of being easy to use. It 
considers the uncertainty of the calculations to determine the amounts of a flammable 
release, efficiency factors, and the impact of wind velocity on the vapour cloud (CCPS, 
1994).   
 
Baker-Strehlow Method was developed to provide estimation of blast pressure from 
vapour cloud explosions. The methodology consists of a number of steps, i.e. assessing 
flame speed, fuel reactivity, confinement, and etc. The blast pressure and impulse are 
then read from a series of graphs.  
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) 
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) is the explosive release of 
expanding vapour and boiling liquid when a container holding a pressure-liquefied gas 
fails catastrophically. Catastrophic failure means that the tank is fully opened to release 
its contents nearly instantaneously. In most cases, this means that the tank is flattened on 
the ground after the BLEVE (Birk and Cunningham, 1996). BLEVE occurs when there is 
a sudden loss of containment of a pressure vessel containing a superheated liquid or a 
liquefied gas. The primary cause is usually an external flame impinging on the shell of a 
vessel above the liquid level weakening the container and leading to sudden shell rupture. 
If the released liquid is flammable, a fireball may result. The resulting thermal radiation 
is intense and has the potential to cause severe health-damage even loss of life as well as 




In a BLEVE the hazardous ladings are liquefied gases such as LPG, ammonia, chlorine, 
and vinyl chloride. Theses materials are gases at atmospheric pressure and normal 
temperature but are liquefied by pressurization for storage and transportation. However, 
there are some hazardous liquid materials such as methanol, propanol, and acetone that 
are flammable and used as fuel and raw materials in chemical plants. These liquids also 
have a potential to cause catastrophic damage if an accident occurs. Birk and 
Cunningham (1996) described the mechanism of occurrence of BLEVE. Heating of a 
closed vessel in a fire leads to elevation of the temperature of the liquid to values 
exceeding the normal boiling temperature. The vapour pressure is increased to a value 
much greater than atmospheric pressure. Heating of the walls of dry tanks causes 
reduction in the tensile strength of the metal, leading to destruction of the tank. A rapid 
pressure decrease causes propagation into the liquid of a rarefaction wave, which is 
followed by a liquid boiling wave with the associated pressure elevation.  
The steps below show the conditions that produced the BLEVE from the propane storage 
tank : 
 After the propane begins leaking from the tank and flows along the ground 
surface. 
 Soon after ignition of the leaking propane, a fire burns out of control in the 
vicinity of the tank. 
 The fire heats the propane inside the tank, causing it to boil and vaporize. 
 The pressure inside the tank increases as the temperature of the propane 
increases. 
 When pressure inside the tank reaches about 250 psi, the relief valves open 
to vent the tank. The propane escaping from the relief valves ignites and 
burns. 
 As boiling continues, the pressure inside the tank exceeds 250 psi, the 
temperature of the tank wall increases, and the strength of the steel used to 
construct the tank decreases. 
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 At some point, the weakened steel can no longer resist pressure-induced 
forces inside the tank so the wall of the tank ruptures, allowing propane to 
escape rapidly into the surrounding atmosphere. 
 Immediately following rupture, the escaping propane ignites, resulting in 
an explosion that causes the tank wall to separate to numbers of pieces. 
Fire quickly consumes the remaining propane. 
 Tank fragments are propelled at a high velocity in many different 
directions. 
 
Lees [64] states that the cause and effects of a BLEVE depend on whether the liquid in 
the vessel is flammable or not. In all the cases the initial explosion may generate a blast 
wave and missiles. If the material is flammable, it may cause a fire, which radiates heat 
or may form a vapour cloud, which then gives rise to a second explosion. Less [64] also 
indicated that the BLEVE can occur with both flammable and non-flammable materials, 
such as water. In all cases the initial explosion may generate a blast wave and missiles. 
The best-known type of BLEVE involves LPG. Once a fire impinges on the shell above 
the liquid level, the vessel usually fails within 10-20 min.  Birk et al. (1993) and Birk and 
Cunningham (1996) conducted a series of medium scale tests using 320 and 400 litre 
automotive propane tank. The tests involved exposing instrumented test tanks filled with 
80% liquid propane. The authors defined a BLEVE as the explosive release of boiling 
liquid and expanding vapour resulting from the catastrophic failure of a vessel holding a 
pressure liquefied gas. Three types of tank failure were categorized based on observing 
the event and outcome of tests. The authors suggest that the BLEVE event can be 
explained by using simple thermodynamics and stress analysis. The authors performed 
and described a tank deformation analysis, a BLEVE mechanism and the factors related 
to the consequences from a BLEVE hazards, including the suggestions for emergency 
response.  
 
Lees (1996) has considered some features of BLEVEs from an empirical viewpoint, the 
time of BLEVE, the model of rupture, the blast effects, the fireball, the missiles and the 
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release of flammable fluids. Time of BLEVE defined as the time between the occurrence 
of the engulfing or torch fire and BLEVE. For storage vessels the time to BLEVE has 
been of the order of 5-30 min. Blything (1986) studied the horizontal cylindrical storage 
vessel holding butane, with actual capacity of 75 tonnes. The time of BLEVE is between 
4 and 48 minutes. Time to BLEVE for tanks in transport accidents, particularly rail tank 
have also been mainly in the range 5-30 minutes (Lees, 1996).  
The vessel can lead to rupture if it is exposed to overpressure, mechanical failure and fire 
engulfment (Birk, 1995). The overpressure can be calculated from any of these methods, 
TNT, TNO, Strehlow, and Congestion Assessment Methods. The mechanical failure of 
vessel occurs, which may be due to a metallurgical defect, corrosion or impact [64]. 
Failure due to fire engulfment is a typical scenario of a BLEVE.  
The blast wave is the result of an explosion in air that is accompanied by a very rapid rise 
in pressure. Pressure effects are usually limited in magnitude and are thus of interest 
mainly for prediction of domino effects on adjacent vessels and equipment rather than to 
case harm to neighbouring communities. The blast wave generated by a BLEVE event 
may cause building damage or personnel injury. Personnel may be injured as a result of 
direct or indirect effects of a BLEVE. Direct effects result from direct exposure to the 
blast wave generated from a BLEVE. For example, eardrum rupture and lung 
haemorrhage can occur from direct exposure to excessive overpressures. The missiles 
may occur in any incident involving high pressure gases or superheated liquids. These 
can travel to distances up to the order of kilometres. Missiles are considered physical 
hazards which will be discussed as below. 
Physical Explosion 
Physical explosion occurs when two liquids at different temperatures are violently mixed 
or a finely divided hot solid material is rapidly mixed with a much cooler liquid. No 
chemical reactions are involved; instead, the explosion occurs when the cooler liquid is 
converted to vapour at such a rapid rate that localized high pressures are produced (Baker 
et. al., 1983). The physical explosion usually results from the production of large 
volumes of gases by non-chemical means, or the sudden release of gases already existing. 
They can be as destructive and dangerous as an explosion resulting from chemical 
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reactions. The outcome of explosions depends on the nature of the explosion. If no 
ignition occurs and vessel rupture results due to overpressure, the explosion is considered 
to be a physical explosion and shock wave and projectiles are the consequences . When 
this occurs, there is maximum amount of energy found in the bursting vessel waiting to 
be released. Basically there are two kinds of projectiles from BLEVEs:  
 Primary projectiles which are major pieces of the tank and  
 Secondary projectiles which are generated by the acceleration of 
nearby objects (attached pipe, support legs, other attachments, adjacent 
structures or objects, etc.). 
Objects or their fragments may be turned to missiles as a result of energy delivered to 
them by an explosion and can cause significant damage to the bodies they hit. Typically a 
BLEVE involving a ductile steel tank will result in only a few primary projectiles 
(typically less than five, as reported by Baum (1998) depending on the strength of the 
BLEVE and the design of the tank). The risk of the small projectiles is often low. 
However, if a large projectiles impacts there is a good chance for a domino event to 
result. It would usually be assumed that being hit by a large projectile will result in death 
or severe damage to construction. A calculation for hazards posed by pieces of metal tank 
that are scattered when a tank ruptures are difficult to quantify and it can be made to 
estimate the amount of energy released when the rupture occurs. However, uncertainties 
concerning how much of this energy is transmitted to the metal tank pieces, size and 
weight of fragments, etc., are of such a magnitude that one can have little confidence in 
the prediction of hazards due to flying fragments or rocketing tubs. The direction is 
difficult to predict but there is some evidence that cylindrical vessels tend to be more 
likely to travel in the direction of their longitudinal axis The risk of missile damage is 
often low because the probability of being happen is very low. However, if a large 
missile impacts there is a good chance for a domino event to result. It would usually be 
assumed that being hit by a large missile will result in death or severe damage to 
construction. There are basically many kinds of projectiles from BLEVEs: 
 Primary projectiles from the casing, 
 Projectiles from the vehicle. 
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 Projectiles ejected from the carter, 
 Secondary projectiles set in motion by the blast. 
 Falling masonry and glass, and 
 Flying glass. 
 
In many process plant installations, the system contains cylindrical vessels which contain 
high pressure, high temperature fluids. If a pressure vessel does rupture, missiles (i.e. 
fragments), shock wave and energy may be generated and equipment in the vicinity is put 
at risk. The energy release in a chemical explosion is considered first high explosive and 
then flammable gases and fluids. Explosion can also be caused by gas or liquid under 
high pressure. The physical energy may take such forms as pressure energy in gases, 
strain energy in metals or electrical energy. The important physical form is thermal 
energy (Less, 1996). Bjerketvedt et al. (1997) defined a shock wave as a fully developed 
compression gas wave of large amplitude, across which density, pressure, and particle 
velocity change drastically. A shock wave propagates at supersonic velocity relative to 
the gas immediately ahead of the shock. The propagate velocity of the shock wave 
depends on the pressure ration across the wave. Increasing pressure gives higher 
propagation velocity. Lees (1996) defined the shock wave as a very rapid rise in pressure, 
and the shape of this pressure profile near the centre of the explosion depends on the type 
of the explosion involved. The initial shape differs for explosions of high explosives, 
nuclear weapons and flammable vapour clouds. The initial pressure profile for nuclear 
explosion is probably the most readily defined. The pressure at the edge of the fireball is 
approximately twice compared to that at the centre. The most common models to 
calculate the shock waves are the TNO, TNT and Baker-Strehlow models.  
Fire 
The major hazards which the chemical industry is concerned are fire, explosion and toxic 
release. Fire is most common but explosion is more significant in terms of its damage 
potential. Toxic release has perhaps the greatest potential to kill a large number of people. 
Fire is normally regarded as having a disaster potential less than explosion or toxic 
release. Fire, or combustion, is chemical reaction in which a substance combines with 
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oxygen and heat is released. Usually fire occurs when a source of heat comes in contact 
with a combustible material. There are three conditions essential for a fire: fuel, oxygen 
and heat. If one of the conditions is missing, fire does not occur and if one of them is 
removed, fire is extinguished (Less, 1996). Fuel can be in solid, liquid, or vapour form, 
but vapour and liquid fuels are generally easier to ignition. The combustion always 
occurs in the vapour phase; liquids are volatised and solids are decomposed into vapour 
before combustion (Crowl and Louvar, 2002). Fire is normally the result of fuel and 
oxygen coming together in suitable properties and with a source of heat. The 
consumption of a material by fire is a chemical reaction in which the heated substance 
combining with oxygen.  
 
Within the petrochemical industries, many flammable gases are stored as liquid under 
pressure. Flammable gases are usually very easily ignited if mixed with air. Flammable 
gases are often stored under pressure, in some cases as a liquid, whereby even a small 
leak of a liquefied flammable gas from relatively large quantities of gas, which is ready 
for combustion. The major distinction between fires and explosions is the energy release 
rate. Fires release energy slowly, whereas explosion release energy rapidly in the order of 
microseconds. Fires can also result from explosions, and explosions can result from fires 
(Crowl and Louvar, 2002). Fires can take several different forms, including flash fires, jet 
fires, pool fires, and fireball. A jet fire would appear as a long narrow flame produced. A 
pool fire would be produced if a material release from a storage tank into a bund ignited. 
A flash fire could occur if an escape of gas released a source of ignition and rapidly burnt 
back to the source of the release.  
 
 Flash Fires 
A flash fire is a non-explosive combustion of an unconfined vapour cloud resulting from 
a release of flammable fuel into the atmosphere, which, on mixing with air, ignites. On 
ignition, the fire propagates through the vapour cloud and burns as a flash fire. A flash 
fire occurs when a vapour cloud, formed from a leak, is ignited without creation of 
significant overpressure. Such flash fires are not uncommon in chemical process 
industries. If the ignition is prompted the cloud may be modest in size, but if the cloud 
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has time to spread over an appreciable part of the site and is then ignited, a major vapour 
cloud fire may result. 
 
Generally the damage caused by flash fires is less widespread or spectacular than that 
caused by “Vapour Cloud Explosions” (VCEs), and in many cases it is not clear whether 
a flash fire develops into a VCE or not. 
Jet Fire 
A jet fire occurs when flammable gas emitting from a pipe or equipment then ignited and 
burns on the orifice (Lees 1996). A jet fire may result from a high-pressure leakage of gas 
from process plants or storage tanks. Storage tanks or process vessels containing, for 
example LPG which is exposed to an enveloping fire, after a very short period of time 
vent their contents though a relief valve. If the released gas is ignited, a jet fire may 
occurred (Andreassen, et al. 1992). Jet flames can occur in chemical process industries, 
either by design or by accident. They occur intentionally in burners and flares. Ejection of 
flammable fluid from a vessel, pipe or pipe flange can give rise to a jet flame if the 
material ignites.  
Pool Fire 
Pool fires can occur when a significant quantity of liquid is released and immediately 
ignited. A pool fire may also occur on the surface of a flammable liquid spilled onto 
water. These can be confined or unconfined. Pool fires are a result of spillage or leakage 
from tanks, pipelines, or valves. A pressurised release of either vapour or two-phase 
mixture may result in a fire whereas the momentum from a liquid release is more likely to 
be destroyed, and the release will form a pool fire. A pool fire is a type of turbulent 
diffusion flame, which burns above a pool of vaporising fuel where the fuel vapour has 
negligible initial momentum. Many industrial fires involve hydrocarbon fuels. Depending 
on the release rate and ignition of these fuels, various types of gas or liquid pool fires 
may occur. Event trees, which provide guidance as to which type of fire will occur for a 
given set of ignition and release conditions, can be found in fire protection engineering 
handbooks. A confined pool fire is one in which there is a dike or other barrier that does 
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not allow the fuel to spread beyond a certain diameter, whereas an unconfined pool fire is 
a fire where there is no barrier to prevent the fuel from spreading. Pool fires may also be 
classified on the basis of the rate and duration of the spill of fuel that burns. An 
instantaneous pool fire is a fire in which the spill of fuel occurs in a very short period of 
time, while a continuous pool fire is a fire in which the spill of fuel occurs at a given rate 
for a relatively long period of time.There are many experimental works done related to 
pool fire in the last century. Most work of pool fire deals with circular pools. A particular 
type of circular pool fires is the storage tank fire (Lees, 1996). Much of the early work 
was done on relatively small diameter pool fire. Subsequent studies indicate that the 
effect of pool diameter is important and that it is preferable to carry out studies on large 
pool fires. This initial works appeared to focus and concentrate on determining the liquid 
burning rate of heat transfer to the liquid surface and of the fraction of heat radiated. 
Experimental studies on these aspects were conducted by by Blinov and Khudiakov 
(1957). This work covered a wide range of pool diameters.  
Fireball 
Another significant fire hazard is that from fireballs. A fireball occurs when there is a 
release of some considerable violence and vigorous mixing and rapid ignition take place. 
The fire is burning with sufficient rapidity as to cause the burning mass to rise into the air 
as a cloud or ball. The sudden release of superheated flammable liquid from a storage 
tank or process vessel is the beginning of a complex event that often ends in the 
formation of a short-lived fireball. The event starts with a major failure of the container. 
Because the pressure in the container is greater than atmospheric pressure, much of the 
liquid is quickly expelled into the atmosphere. In response to this rapid drop in pressure, 
a portion of the liquid flashes to vapour nearly instantaneously. This vapour expands 
rapidly, shattering some of the remaining liquid into small drops, thereby creating a 
turbulent aerosol cloud consisting of vapour, liquid drops, and air (Martinsen and Marx, 
1999). Ignition of this cloud creates a fireball that grows rapidly until it reaches its 
maximum size. The fireball becomes buoyant and lifts off the ground as the heat of the 
fire vaporizes the liquid drops and increases the temperature of the remaining mixture of 
vapour, air and reaction products. As it rises, the limited fuel supply is consumed and the 
fireball ceases to exist (Marx and Martinsen, 1999).  
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The fireball grows larger and moves upward continuously because of buoyancy. The 
duration of the fireball is small (<40 sec), but the radiation levels are intense e.g. the 
radiation at fireball surface can be up to 200 kW/m
2
. Within the radius of the fireball there 
will be severe damage to process equipment and buildings. Beyond this, the danger is 
mainly for the people that may be affected by the radiation. Therefore, the fireball radius 
is defined as the domino effects radius (Petrolekasa and Andreoub, 1999). 
Toxic Release 
The third of the major hazards is the release of toxic chemicals. The hazard presented by 
a toxic substance depends on the conditions of exposure and on the chemical itself. It 
ranges from a sudden brief exposure at high concentration to prolonged exposure at low 
concentrations over a working life (Lees, 1996). Toxicity is a general term used to 
indicate adverse effects produced by poisons. These adverse effects can range from slight 
symptoms like headaches or nausea, to severe symptoms like coma and convulsions or 
death.  
The worst accident in the history of the process industries occurred on the third 
December 1984 at Bhopal, where water entered a storage tank of methyl isocyanate, 
causing overheating and release of methyl isocyanate vapour which spread over a shanty 
town close to the works and killed some 4000 people. There have been a number of 
major accidents involving chlorine. A list of major chlorine accidents world-wide has 
been provided by Lees (1996).  
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Appendix 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
